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Abstract 
Currently, Title II of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001 
appears to be stalled as a result of controversy over the intent and meaning of the law. 
Proponents of the title advocate the necessity of the act to combat modern terrorism, 
whereas opponents warn of circumventions of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. Using punctuated equilibrium as the theoretical foundation, the purpose of 
this case study was to explore the dialogue and legal exchanges between the American 
Civil Liberties Union and the Department of Justice related to the National Security 
Agency’s metadata collection program.  In specific, the study sought to explore the 
nature of resistance to changes needed to mollify the controversies associated with Title 
II. Data for this study were acquired through publicly available documents and artifacts 
including transcripts of Congressional hearings, legal documents, and briefing statements 
from the US Department of Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union.  These data 
were deductively coded according to the elements of PET and then subjected to thematic 
analysis.  Findings indicate that supporters and opponents of the law are locked in a 
consistent ideological polarization, with supporters of the law touting the necessity of the 
authorizations in combatting terrorism and opponents arguing the law violates civil 
liberties. Neither side of the debate displayed a willingness to compromise or 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the other viewpoint.  Legislators who accept the 
legitimacy of both researched viewpoints could create positive social change by refining 
the law to meet national security needs while preserving constitutional protections. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The 2013 revelations about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance 
programs brought increased attention to the ideological and partisan divide involving 
Title II of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (U.S.C. § 
1861). The basic debate involves striking the correct balance between national security 
and civil liberties. Many scholars and policy makers view the objectives of security and 
liberty to be diametrically opposed (Banks, 2010–2011; Bedi, 2014; Berghel, 2014; 
Simmons, 2013; Xhelili & Crowne, 2012; Yoo, 2014). This qualitative case study 
examined the polarizing debate about Title II provisions with the goal of identifying 
common ground between the two sides in an effort help mitigate contentions. Objectively 
examining the various points of view regarding the law, the chronology of security 
policies, and legal precedencies could have potentially led to the discovery of refinements 
to Title II that would make it more palatable to those who currently oppose it.  
Background 
In the realm of national security policies, currently there is no policy as 
ideologically or politically polarizing as Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. Francel 
(2014), Kris (2014), and Regan (2014) warned of the title’s potential for abuse, 
particularly the circumvention of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Although many concerns exist regarding Title II provisions, the basic contention is in 
how the title allows for surveillance (including bulk collection) with Foreign Intelligence 
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Surveillance Court (FISC) authorizations, which have been determined to have a lesser 
threshold for probable cause than traditional Fourth Amendment warrant protections 
(Donohue, 2014). The opposition voices vie that there is no legal justification for 
circumventing Fourth Amendment protections during domestic criminal proceedings 
even during times of crisis. The Fourth Amendment was intended to protect U.S. citizens 
regardless of the state of affairs (Mondale, Stein, & Fahnhorst, 2014). Substantial 
volumes of academic research support this opposition to Title II of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. 
Due to the polarizing nature of the title, significant amounts of scholarly opinions 
dismiss the aforementioned concerns about the circumvention of the U.S. Constitution 
and instead praise the authorities of Title II. Gilbert (2013), Lungren (2012), and Yoo 
(2014) strongly argued that not only are Title II authorizations essential for protecting 
modern America, but they are in compliance with all U.S. Constitution protections. 
Williams (2014) further explained that the courts’ warrant preference for surveillance is a 
relatively recent development in U.S. law and during the first 150 years of the United 
States it was not common for the courts to demand surveillance evidence to have been 
obtained using a warrant. Shults (2011) elaborated that the president’s constitutional duty 
to protect the United States would be in jeopardy if the executive’s access to FISC 
authorizations was unreasonably hindered. Supporters of Title II of the USA PATRIOT 
Act make a strong counterpoint to the previously mentioned and equally compelling 
opposition views. 
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Both sides of the debate are compelling, eluding to the validity of both views. 
Sufficient literature supports each view, but no literature acknowledges the legitimacy of 
the opposite opinion. Most literature available for this study is either slanted in support of 
the USA PATRIOT Act or in opposition of the law. The problem with these biases, in the 
academic examination of the law, is that they ignore the likely truth that the USA 
PATRIOT Act is both beneficial and imperfect. The articles seem to either fully support 
or aggressively attack the act due to strongly held preconceived notions and attitudes. 
Strongly held predetermined beliefs can cause individuals, including scholars and policy 
makers, to reject information that does not fit into their previously developed line of 
reasoning or agenda (Druckman & Leeper, 2012). Scholars and legislators should attempt 
to avoid such attitudes with the USA PATRIOT Act. No truly convincing argument for 
how or why these differing views need to be diametrically opposed exists.  
The academic and legislative goal should be to determine what authorities are 
needed and how these authorities can be granted without encroaching on civil liberties. 
The lack of information about areas in which compromise could occur between the sides 
of the debate creates a literature gap. No peer-reviewed articles were discovered that 
expressed any common ground between supporters and critics of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. Such information could be valuable to scholars and policy makers wishing calm the 
polarizing debate about the law in order to strike an appropriate balance between liberty 
and security. This study contributed to academia by examining the causes of the perpetual 
clash with provisions of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
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Problem Statement 
Ideological polarization routinely peaks and wanes (Jensen, Kaplan, Naidu, & 
Wilse-Sampson, 2012). Recent decades have demonstrated a significant polarization peak 
resulting in political gridlock (Fechner, 2014; Kirkland, 2014; Merrill, Grofman, & 
Brunell, 2014). In U.S. domestic security policies, polarization is most evident with Title 
II of the USA PATRIOT Act. Title II has always been controversial and continued to be 
aggressively debated in numerous 2015 court rulings and congressional decisions. 
Opponents of the act vilify its authorities, due to civil liberty infractions, without 
recognizing its benefits, whereas supporters only recognize the benefits and dismiss the 
act’s flaws. This polarization has even infiltrated peer-reviewed literature creating a 
notable lack of literature acknowledging the legitimacy of both views. 
The punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) of discontinuous change explained that 
polarized issues will remain relatively stagnant until external forces cause rapid imperfect 
change, as demonstrated by the USA PATRIOT Act enactment. Title II is likely both 
flawed and essential to modern security. Remaining stagnant leaves the imperfections in 
place, but rapid alteration could erode American citizens’ security or liberties. The PET 
concept of bounded rationality states that stasis periods lack the political will to act, but 
crisis periods lack the time to make perfect decisions (Tyson, 2007). A case study that 
qualifies both the concerns and benefits of Title II within the confines of the policy 
change PET framework could assist policy makers in developing more perfect decisions 
prior the next exogenous change. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this case study was to examine the advantages and contentions of 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to better understand how PET described bounded 
rationality prevented incremental policy change from achieving the objectives of the 
provisions while mitigating the potential for or perception of the circumvention of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Research Questions 
Central Research Question – Qualitative:  
How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent 
incremental change from achieving the security objectives of Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? 
Subquestion 1 - Qualitative:  
How is political and ideological polarization prolonging the stagnation period of 
the PET of public policy change with the USA PATRIOT Act? 
Subquestion 2 - Qualitative:  
How does the PET of public policy change explain the enactment and extensions 
of the USA PATRIOT Act? 
Subquestion 3 - Qualitative:  
How does Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affect U.S. law? 
Subquestion 4 - Qualitative:  
What are the benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act? 
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Subquestion 5 - Qualitative:  
How is Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act controversial? 
Framework 
The PET of public policy change, also known as the PET of discontinuous 
change, asserts that policy changes occur gradually with time through incremental 
adaptations until an outside source disrupts the status quo forcing immediate, significant 
change (Sabatier, 2007; Boushey, 2012; Prindle, 2012). This theory implies “there is 
long-term and relatively incremental policy change followed by an exogenous shock to a 
policy monopoly resulting in a tipping point oriented toward sharp and explosive policy 
change” (Givel, 2010, p. 189). National security policies had incrementally evolved since 
World War II with minor spikes during times of conflict until the disruption caused by 
the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, evoked the rapid enactment of the USA 
PATRIOT Act (Ripberger, 2011; Romano, 2011). Bounded rationality is a concept in 
decision making in which a decision maker is forced to accept a less than perfect choice, 
because it is the best possible choice at the time (Tyson, 2007). In the PET, decision 
makers often exhibit bounded rationality during the incremental stage and during the 
period of dynamic change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). During the 
incremental period of change, they are often unable to conjure enough influence to elicit 
change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). During the period of dynamic 
change, they are forced to make choices rapidly without adequate information or options 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). The PET and bounded rationality might 
explain the continued controversies with the USA PATRIOT Act. 
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Evidence of the PET is present from the rapid enactment of the USA PATRIOT 
Act to its lingering controversies and mild alterations. The terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, was an exogenous shock to relatively stagnant national security policies. The 
attacks generated public fear that transformed into unprecedented demand for security 
policy change. This demand was immediately met by all the macro political institutions 
including the U.S. Congress and the White House. On October 4, 2001, the first draft of 
the USA PATRIOT Act made its way to the capital (Baldwin & Koslosky, 2012). In 
modern American politics, having a draft presented to congress in 3 weeks of its 
conception is fairly unheard of. The USA PATRIOT Act is arguably one of the most 
influential national security policies in modern history. The bounded rationality aspect of 
punctuated equilibrium of policy change would suggest that such a rapidly developed law 
that significantly alters national security would be both imperfect and beneficial. The 
PET would also suggest that despite these imperfections, the law is unlikely to change 
significantly to address these issues. 
The stagnant and incremental change periods described in the PET of public 
policy change are easily identifiable with Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. A 
contributing factor to the prolonged lack of refinement is political and ideological 
polarization causes virtual legislative gridlock (Fechner, 2014; Kirkland, 2014). 
Throughout history political tensions have come and gone and the current polarized state 
in American politics is not new or uncommon (Jensen et al., 2012). The fringes of the 
ideological field have become increasingly popular which has created a barrier between 
the opposing views that prevents significant political actions (Merrill et al., 2014). This 
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dissertation asserted that ideological and political polarization is the reason Title II of the 
USA PATRIOT Act continues to be trapped in the PET described stagnation period 
despite being in the center of multiple controversies. 
Comparing the legislative lifespan of the Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to the 
PET of discontinuous change suggested one of 3 possible outcomes to the statute. First, 
the title could be drastically changed in response to an external jolt such as another 
terrorist attack or a blatant government overreach that enrages the American voter. If this 
were to happen, it is likely the kneejerk reaction would have a second order effect of 
either eliminating the benefits of the current version of the title or increasing the potential 
for governmental abuses. A second possible outcome for Title II, as predicted through 
PET, is that political and ideological polarization will keep the law in perpetual stasis. 
The benefits of the law would remain, but so would its contentions. The third possible 
outcome is that incremental change could preserve the benefits of the title while 
eliminating the contentions. Incremental change that forms a more perfect statute should 
be the goal of policy makers and understanding how such a goal is possible should be an 
equally important objective to scholars. 
The PET of public policy change suggested that an effective incremental change 
of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act would require a thorough examination of both sides 
of the debate. Understanding both sides of the debate could lead to identifying areas in 
which both sides are willing to compromise if such subjects exist. During the incremental 
change periods of PET, there is little political motivation. The benefit to this is there is 
more time to make decisions. The downside is, if there is opposition to change, as is the 
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case with Title II, the change is easily stalled and there is not enough political will to 
overcome the obstacles to change. If the proposed change is acceptable to both sides of 
the dispute it will take much less political capital to achieve the change. A firm grasp of 
PET’s incremental change and the contentions/benefits of Title II is essential to 
understanding how legislators could refine title to achieve the goals of the law while 
addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study was a qualitative case study. Qualitative research is 
capable of providing a better understanding of how the theory of punctuated equilibrium 
applies to the USA PATRIOT Act. A qualitative methodology allowed a deeper look at 
the intricacies of the law than what could be accomplished in a quantitative design 
(Creswell, 2009; Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2012). Each of the research questions align with a 
qualitative design of a case study. Case studies analyze the intricacies of a singular object 
and its subcomponents in a bound setting (Patton, 2002). This study analyzed the NSA’s 
bulk metadata collection program as its primary case. The case is bound by both time and 
the U.S. legal system. Case studies are commonly used with legal inquires, because the 
depth of the study can illuminate the pros and cons of practices, which can provide 
insight into preferred methods (Stacks, 2007). Case studies are done to achieve an in-
depth understanding of a phenomenon and its contextual circumstances (Yin, 2014).  A 
case study explores in great detail a single item or groups of items which are bound by 
and affect a system (Stake, 1995). This case study provided a general overview of the 
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USA PATRIOT Act and the views of those in support and opposition to the law, but its 
primary focus was to determine exactly what each group desires in an effort to determine 
whether common ground exists. 
Assumptions 
USA PATRIOT Act Assumptions 
I made several assumptions involving the USA PATRIOT Act identified. First, I 
assumed that even thou the NSA bulk metadata collection program theoretically ceased to 
exist on November 29, 2015, the controversies about Title II have remained. I assumed 
there are areas in which those who oppose and those who support Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act agree. I also assumed that those who oppose Title II provisions would be 
satisfied if the potential for the circumvention of the Fourth Amendment was mitigated. I 
further assumed that those who support the title are not actively looking to circumvent the 
Fourth Amendment and are instead concerned maintaining Title II authorizations. The 
most important assumption is: If Title II’s objectives could be met without the potential 
of abuse, both sides of the debate would appeased. I have not found literature supporting 
any of these assumptions, but congressional and legal developments in late 2015 
contributed validity to these assumptions. 
Methodology Assumptions 
Many of the assumptions with this case study involved the data collection. The 
first assumption was that subject matter experts would be willing to participate in 
interviews. However, they were not. The second assumption was that the public relations 
offices of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Department of Justice (DOJ) 
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would be willing to facilitate an interview process, but they were not. As a result, it was 
not possible to conduct interviews. 
In addition, some assumptions were associated with the analysis of this 
dissertation. The first assumption was the coding process and extensive self-reflection 
helped eliminate researcher biases. No study could ever be free of all biases, but I made 
every effort to mitigate potential validity threats from researcher biases. In addition, I 
assumed that the qualitative analysis software did not generate any analytical errors. Any 
errors contributed to the software likely stemmed from operator error. To combat this all 
computations were checked and verified. Finally, I assumed that the results of this case 
study were beneficial to broadening an understanding of PET and the USA PATRIOT 
Act. 
Scope and Delimitations 
As previously mentioned, the primary focus of this dissertation was to search for 
areas of mutual agreement between supporters and critics of Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act. Nevertheless, I could not merely review current opinions about the law. 
First, I needed to examine all national security policies throughout American history to 
validate the PET of public policy change. Verifying PET is useful in predicting the 
likelihood of policy change, because national security policy change tends to follow a 
predictable pattern. The PET pattern provided much of the direction for this study. 
The upcoming literature review chapter illustrates that throughout the history of 
the nation all substantial security policy changes have followed a punctuated lifespan of 
change. Typically, the national security statutes and policies have erupted onto the 
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legislative scene rapidly as a direct response to an external stimulus. The resulting 
policies and procedures have often been pragmatic but also deeply flawed as a 
consequence of the PET explained bounded rationality associated with political action 
during compressed timeframes. The policies remained both simultaneously useful and 
imperfect for varying periods of stagnation. These policies are usually refined in one of 
two ways, either through incremental change or rapid change in reaction to an exogenous 
force. Both ways are known to suffer from differing types of bounded rationality. In this 
dissertation, I assert that more perfect policy changes can be formed during incremental 
change periods than during shock response changes. Because the bounded rationality of 
PET explained that the more perfect proposed incremental changes usually lack the 
political encouragement to overcome the resistance to change, this dissertation sought to 
identify areas of potential compromise regarding Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The 
PET of discontinuous change provided the pattern analysis foundation from which to 
base the scope of the study. 
The scope of this study needed to include the history of national security policies, 
legal judgements, and a careful examination of applicable statutes to establish a sound 
academic foundation. Only after creating such a foundation and substantiating the 
theoretical framework was it possible to begin to understand the intricacies of the USA 
PATRIOT Act at the level needed for a case study. Chapter 2 provided the foundation for 
this case study. The literature review illustrated patterns in national security. Then 
explained these patterns using the PET of public policy change. This created both the 
academic foundation and the case boundaries. 
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The next logical step was to collect and analyze leading arguments on both sides 
of the USA PATRIOT Act Title II debate. This included congressional testimony and 
legal debate. The case was bound by focusing on the arguments made by the DOJ and the 
ACLU. These organizations are the leading voices in support of and opposing Title II of 
the USA PATRIOT Act. The data collection and analysis of the points made by the 
contrasting organizations established the studies scope boundaries. 
Limitations 
The primary limitation to this study is that it is a dissertation rather than a paid 
study. This limited both the time and resources available for the study. The primary focus 
of this case study centered upon congressional hearings and legal proceedings between 
the ACLU and DOJ. Neither organization seemed willing to participate in phone 
interviews. In addition, the DOJ specified they could not sign any document including a 
participation agreement. All the inquiries regarding potential interviews were made via 
phone call or email. The phone calls all led to being told to send an email and most of the 
emails did not garner a response, if time and resources were not limited the inquires could 
have been made in person. This might have had better results than the phone calls. The 
lack of time and resources available somewhat limited the data collection but did not 
affect the dependability or transferability.  
The transferability was limited by the study’s structure. The literature review only 
examined national security policies leading up to and including the USA PATRIOT Act. 
The theoretical framework of the PET of public policy consistently changing illustrated 
how major national security policies rapidly evolve in response to an event but are often 
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considered imperfect and undergo a period of stagnation followed by incremental change 
which bring the policies into a more acceptable form. In this study, I did not apply the 
theory to any policy not related to security and thus is limited to national security 
policies. In addition, the data collection and analysis only researched Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act and because of such the transferability of the analysis is limited to Title 
provisions.  
Significance  
Although contentions with the USA PATRIOT Act have not created 
unprecedented polarization spikes, it has contributed to already increasing political and 
ideological tensions in the United States. Partisan and ideological polarization has existed 
since the founding of the nation and routinely punctuated by spikes in polarization 
severity (Jensen et al., 2012). During the last 50 years there has been shift toward more 
the extreme views on both sides of the ideological spectrum (Merrill et al., 2014). In 
November 2013, Gallup polling data cited hyper ideological, partisan politics as the 
primary reason for congressional and presidential gridlock producing the lowest approval 
ratings to date (Fechner, 2014; Kirkland, 2014). In this dissertation, I not only contended 
that debate about the appropriateness of the USA PATRIOT Act reflects the polarization 
in the American political landscape, but I also deepened it. 
As PET explains, rushed legislation typically remains in an imperfect stagnant 
state until it is incrementally refined into a more acceptable form due to increasing public 
tensions. Banks and Tauber (2014) and Scheppele (2012) described how the USA 
PATRIOT Act’s rapid enactment led to unnecessarily intrusive security measures. 
15 
 
 
Kisswani (2011) further illustrated how other western countries took longer to enact new 
security policies in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, but those policies were less controversial 
than the USA PATRIOT Act. Bonet (2011) asserted the act was an egregious affront on 
civil liberties and the U.S. Constitution. Yoo (2014) defended the act by expounding on 
how and why the act is legal, ethical, and constitutional. These works reveal the 
philosophical divide widened by the swiftly enacted law. 
This dissertation provided an opportunity to examine the USA PATRIOT Act in 
an effort to assess the potential for narrowing the political and ideological divide. A 
multitude of divisive academic works and a series of contradictory legal decisions have 
created a sense that both sides of the debate have valid points. What is lacking is an 
effective solution to the rift between the competing ideologies. The goal of this 
dissertation was to identify areas in which the opposing sides could potentially agree 
upon. This by itself would not be enough to refine the law, but it could contribute to the 
discussion. Identifying the areas of agreement could facilitate social change by 
introducing areas of prospective conciliation in an otherwise polarized debate. 
Summary  
The purpose of this case study was to explore the advantages and contentions 
associated with the Title II provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act to determine whether 
the objectives of the provisions could be achieved while eliminating the potential for the 
circumvention of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This was 
accomplished by answering the central research question: How does the bounded 
rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent incremental change from achieving 
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the surveillance and information sharing objectives of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act 
of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the Fourth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution? The PET of discontinuous change was a valid and effective 
theoretical framework for conducting this dissertation and answering the central research 
question. Just as PET was the appropriate theory for the research, the case study design 
was the correct approach to answering the research questions. Stacks (2007) explained 
that the case study is ideal for researching law and policies. Before the case study or the 
theoretical framework could be tested it was necessary to build a strong academic 
foundation. I thoroughly describe the academic foundation in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Since its conception, the United States has strived to provide its citizens with 
freedom and security. A pervasive academic assumption asserts that modern strategies for 
providing freedom and security are diametrically opposed in a continuous balancing act 
(Banks, 2010–2011; Bedi, 2014; Berghel, 2014; Simmons, 2013; Xhelili & Crowne, 
2012; Yoo, 2014). Throughout the nation’s history, this perpetual equipoising between 
civil liberties and national security has created times in which national security policy 
debate has become polarizing and contentious (Ripberger, 2011). These contentions 
typically develop in support of and opposition to the government’s response to a 
traumatic event resulting in one faction championing increased security and an opposing 
faction fearing civil liberty infringements (United States President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 2013). National security and civil liberty 
tensions have spiked in recent years following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 
and the enactment of several new security policies. 
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 is both a widely supported and vehemently 
opposed piece of legislation. The USA PATRIOT Act is a comprehensive collection of 
amendments to existing law designed grant the government the authorities to conduct 
more effective investigations (Gilbert, 2013; Witmore-Rich, 2014). Despite the act being 
drafted and enacted within 45 days of the terrorist attacks, many of the amendments 
included in the USA PATRIOT Act had been proposed years before but never gained the 
political traction to be enacted (Bellia, 2011). Immediately following the terrorist attacks 
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of September 11, 2001, the American public demanded reform and the USA PATRIOT 
Act received near unanimous support and little debate (Huddy & Feldman, 2011). Since 
the law’s enactment, substantial, often polarizing, debate has occurred due to concern of 
civil rights infringements (Bellas, 2012; Kisswani, 2011; Scheppele, 2012). Baldwin and 
Koslosky (2012) explained that much of the civil liberty concern is due to “mission 
creep” from national security investigations into non-security related investigations. 
Mission creep has added to the division between those in favor of the law and those who 
oppose it. Gilbert (2013) and Yoo (2014) dismissed claims of mission creep or of civil 
rights infringement. This shift from near unanimous support to deeply divided opinions 
about the law coincides with the popular policy concept, the PET in public policy.  
This literary review examined the PET, the history of national security policies 
affecting civil liberties, surveillance scandals, court decisions, the Church Committee, 
and both sides of the contentions involving Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act with the 
goal of developing an academic foundation and exposing literature gaps. A plethora of 
current literature references these aforementioned topics. True literature gaps are found 
with the USA PATRIOT Act. Literature focusing on this topic is nearly always biased 
either for or against the law. There did not seem to be any literature that examined 
potential common ground between those opposed to the law and those in support of it. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The literature search strategy for this literature review was straight forward. The 
primary database used was Thoreau, but I found some articles in Academic Search 
Complete, and ProQuest Central. Nearly every article was peer reviewed, with the peer-
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review verified on Ulrich's Periodicals Directory. Many peer-reviewed articles discovered 
during the search could not be used due to extraordinary biases. This literature review 
also heavily relied on laws, court decisions, and various federal government reports.  
Punctuated Equilibrium 
The PET provided an explanation to how and why security policies tend to go 
through brief periods of rapid change and long periods of stagnation. The PET of public 
policy change, also known as the PET of discontinuous change, asserts that policy 
changes occur gradually with time through incremental adaptations until an outside 
source disrupts the status quo forcing immediate, significant change (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009; Boushey, 2012; Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). The PET has been widely 
accepted in the physical sciences of biology and seismology for decades (Givel, 2010; 
Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). Punctuated equilibrium has been an accepted public 
policy change theory since 1993 (Givel, 2008). Jones and Baumgartner (2012) asserted 
that their PET model was developed from both physical science and the “bounded 
rationality” models of the 1950s and 1960s. The concept of bounded rationality is still 
paramount to PET (Jones & Baumgartner, 2012). 
Bounded rationality affects most public policies. Tyson (2007) explained that 
bounded rationality is decision making in which a decision maker is forced to accept a 
less than perfect choice, as it is the best available choice at the time. In the PET, decision 
makers often exhibit bounded rationality during the incremental stage and during the 
period of dynamic change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). During the 
incremental period of change, they are often unable to conjure enough influence to elicit 
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change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). During the period of dynamic 
change, they are forced to make choices rapidly without adequate information or options 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Cairney, 2013). This imperfect decision making process 
has been repeatedly demonstrated throughout the history of security policies in the United 
States and plays a key role in the current debate between the USA PATRIOT Act and 
civil liberty concerns. In the next section of this literature review, I will examine security 
policy history. 
Security Policy History 
Reviewing national security policy history provided a better understanding of the 
controversies surrounding Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act and illustrated the PET in 
action. A comprehensive understanding of the USA PATRIOT Act can only be obtained 
by understanding national security history, the laws, policies, and procedures affected by 
the USA PATRIOT Act, and the nuances of modern security strategies (O’Brien, 2011). 
Policy makers study history with the goals of predicting outcomes, avoiding previous 
mistakes, and gaining a better understanding of present situations (Inboden, 2013). This 
section showed that U.S. security policies remain relatively unchanged for decades at a 
time then undergoes rapid imperfect change due to bounded rationality, just as the PET 
would suggest. Studying the history of national security policy helped identify legal 
precedence, illuminate previous errors, and possibly predict future outcomes. I began this 
review by examining the early United States. 
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Early America 
The Founding Fathers faced both security and civil liberty concerns. The 
Preamble of the U.S. Constitution clearly identified the need to “provide for the common 
defense” and “secure the Blessings of Liberty” (U.S. Const., pmbl.). President John 
Adams’ Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were a series of 4 of the first national security 
policies to create a clash between liberties and security (Olthof, 2013). President Adams 
faced naval warfare in the Quasi-war with France abroad and stiff political competition at 
home (Brookhiser, 2014; Olthof, 2013). The acts essentially gave the president special 
detention and deportation authorities to quell political dissent (Claeys, 2012; Napolitano, 
2014; Olthof, 2013; Plouffe, 2012). The acts were immediately polarizing with both sides 
of the debate claiming to have constitutional backing (Claeys, 2012; Olthof, 2013). The 
response to the acts is significant due to its similarities with the current USA PATRIOT 
Act controversies and because at the time many of the contributors to the U.S. 
Constitution were still active politicians. The debate helps illustrate the original intent of 
the U.S. Constitution.  
The Alien and Sedition Acts ultimately pitted Adams against the combined 
political powers of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. As the primary architect of the 
U.S. Constitution, a prominent author of the Federalist papers, Secretary of State, and the 
fourth President of the United States, James Madison’s intent to draft a form of 
government that both provided physical security and protected civil liberties is well 
documented (Dorn, 2012). As the author of the Declaration of Independence, Secretary of 
State, Vice President, and the third President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson’s 
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opinion regarding civil liberties was equally well documented. After coming out of a 
brief retirement in 1797, Jefferson lost the presidential election to his longtime rival, 
Adams, by a mere 3 electoral votes and by doing so firmly established a partisan divide 
between the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans (Napolitano, 2014; Olthof, 2013). 
The partisan divide is significant as it illustrates that the political party polarization was 
as intense and often more intense than its modern counterparts. 
Considering dueling was still an acceptable means of settling political disputes in 
the late 1700s it is not surprising that political contentions during this era were often less 
civil than modern politics. Democratic-Republican Representative Matthew Lyon of 
Vermont and Federalist Representative Roger Griswold of Connecticut drove the Partisan 
wedge even deeper in 1798 by having a fist fight during a session of congress 
(Napolitano, 2014; Olthof, 2013). Their physical altercation was not an isolated episode. 
A month before the fight Lyon spit tobacco on Griswold (Olthof, 2013). These actions 
did not degrade the standings of these politicians, instead it propelled them into the lime 
light. Lyon became even more popular and started a magazine to have another platform 
for expressing his anti-Federalist views (Napolitano, 2014). Adams immediately took 
issue with Lyon’s ideologically biased publication and was not afraid to use his newly 
acquired authorities to attempt to silence the congressman.  
Lyon became the target of the Federalists and a hero to the American public, 
which was wary of the authorities inherent in the acts. In October 1798 Lyon was 
indicted on sedition for implying President Adams had gone mad and eventually was 
sentenced to 4 months in prison by Justice Paterson of the Supreme Court, who was 
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serving as a Circuit Justice. (Napolitano, 2014). Lyon was not alone in his legal battle. 
Ten other Democratic-Republicans were convicted of similar antifederalist views, but 
Federalists were free to engage in similar tactics without fear of prosecution (Plouffe, 
2012). Of those sentenced to prison time and or fined most were either members of the 
newly formed Democratic - Republican Party or members of the press (Napolitano, 2014; 
Olthof, 2013; Plouffe, 2012). Aurora, a prominent newspaper of the time that was critical 
of Adams, seemed to draw particular scrutiny under the acts (Olthof, 2013). This clearly 
partisan bias did not set well with the American public. 
The Alien and Sedition Acts cost the Federalists dearly in the polls. The 
Federalists allowed the acts to sunset so they would expire on Adams last day in office, 
but this inaction was not enough to secure votes for the party. Lyon won re-election while 
in prison and was part of a Democratic-Republican sweep in the elections of 1800 
(Napolitano, 2014; Olthof, 2013; Plouffe, 2012). Jefferson won the presidency and the 
Democratic-Republicans took the majority in the Senate (Claeys, 2012; Napolitano, 
2014; Olthof, 2013; Plouffe, 2012). The Federalists maintained a majority in the House of 
Representatives, but not many other significant government positions (Claeys, 2012). 
Citizens raised funds to pay for fines imposed to many of those convicted under the act 
(Napolitano, 2014). Jefferson pardoned Lyons and another Democratic-Republican still 
imprisoned under the acts, dropped all pending fines, and ensured the government 
returned all fines collected (Claeys, 2012; Olthof, 2013). The constitutionality of the acts 
was never truly addressed, as the Supreme Court did even not start looking at the 
constitutionality of legislation until the case of Marbury v Madison in 1803, but the 
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American public soundly rejected the acts (Olthof, 2013). This is in no small part because 
of how the acts seemed to clash with the U.S. Constitution. 
The debate surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts, much like current discontent 
with the USA PATRIOT Act, is twofold with both sides of the controversy having some 
legitimate constitutional backing making analysis of this early controversy key for 
identifying legal precedence. From President Adams’ and the Federalists’ viewpoint, the 
president is constitutionally obliged to protect the nation due to his role as the 
commander in chief (Claeys, 2012). This notion was actually somewhat supported by the 
Federalist Papers, which repeatedly stressed the need for a strong executive to defend 
against foreign powers (Shults, 2011). Adams held, as did many other Americans, the 
belief that the last violent throws of the volatile French Revolution could spill into the 
United States and the only way to avoid insurrection was to suppress the French migrants 
(Plouffe, 2012). The repeated naval skirmishes between French and U.S. forces gave 
credence to this threat (Napolitano, 2014). President Washington had been able to 
mitigate the insurrection threat through his intense popularity and minimized the threat 
abroad through skilled negotiation, but Adams lacked Washington’s skills as a statesman 
(Olthof, 2013). There was a strong possibility that the U.S. would get drug into increased 
conflicts with the French.  
One of Adams’ first moves was to send a delegation to France to negotiate peace 
talks. The emissaries were confronted with demands for bribes they could not meet and 
the Marquis de Talleyrand, threatened to invade the United States (Napolitano, 2014). 
The unstable and corrupt French government not only threatened U.S. foreign interests, 
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but an influx of French citizens fled to the United States; creating turmoil in American 
domestic policies (Napolitano, 2014; Olthof, 2013). The Federalists believed that the 
French influence was certain to result in a constitutional crisis and the acts was were the 
only chance at preventing such an event (Olthof, 2013). For Federalists and their 
supporters the threat seemed credible and justified the Alien and Sedition Acts. The 
similarities with the enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts due to the credible French 
threat and the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act due to the current credible terrorist 
threat are worth considering, but so are the parallels in the opposition to the acts. 
The Democratic-Republicans led by Vice President Jefferson fervently opposed 
the Alien and Sedition Acts believing it was unconstitutional. Jefferson promptly 
denounced the acts as being in clear violation of the first amendment (Plouffe, 2012). The 
use of the acts against unfriendly newspapers reinforced the Democratic-Republican 
argument that the acts violated the first amendment (Olthof, 2013). Imprisoning sitting 
congressman, Lyon, for remarks he made in his own publication truly drove the 
antifederalist views into the American mainstream. State legislatures began developing 
anti Alien and Sedition Acts legislation to minimize the effects of the laws in their 
respective states (Claeys, 2012). This made it increasingly difficult for anybody to defend 
the acts. The laws effectively silenced any meaningful political debate or dissent from the 
Federalists, but the American populace did not tolerate the First Amendment violations 
(Claeys, 2012). The importance of this is it set the precedence that even if the executive 
branch is constitutionally obligated to protect the nation it must do so within the 
constraints of the U.S. Constitution.  
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Looking at the Alien and Sedition Acts through the lens of the PET is also 
beneficial to this study. The exogenous shock to the national security policy came with 
the French threat of invasion. Initially the public did not believe the threat was credible, 
but to prove the validity Adams released correspondence with the emissaries with their 
names changed to “X, Y, and Z” and the event came to be known as the XYZ affair 
(Napolitano, 2014). The XYZ affair was enough of a disruption to the feeling of security 
in the country that congress with support of the president drafted and enacted the laws 
within weeks of the release of the letters. The legislators felt compelled to act rapidly to 
mitigate the French threat and to gain political party superiority in the developing 
partisan divide.  
The time constraint led to the policy makers working within a bounded 
rationality. They were expected to act in a limited time window, which did not give the 
policy makers an opportunity to truly evaluate the situation and develop courses of action 
that would meet the nation’s security needs in a way that was more acceptable to the 
public. The assumption is that under different conditions the policy makers would have 
worded the acts in a way in which they were less controversial. Unfortunately the 
bounded rationality caused congress to produce acts that seemed to be in direct violation 
of the Bill of Rights. The Sedition Act was the first time in American history political 
dissent was considered a criminal act (Saito, 2011). The Alien and Sedition Acts were not 
the last time the national security policy conflicted or appeared to conflict with the 
constitution.  
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Habeas Corpus 
Title IV of the USA PATRIOT Act does effect habeas corpus proceedings and 
there is a plethora of academic literature regarding how the act affects habeas corpus, but 
this literature review is focused on Title II of the act. However, anytime the nation has 
suspended habeas corpus there has been a public outcry because of concerns of 
infringement of civil liberties which parallels current contentions about Title II 
controversies. In addition, studying habeas corpus suspension provides a unique 
perspective on security and liberty, because habeas corpus and its suspension is explicitly 
addressed in Article I Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. art. , § , cl. ). The 
focus of this section of the literature review will continue the examination of historic 
security policies and the public’s mandate for securing freedoms. This will begin with 
briefly defining habeas corpus. 
Habeas Corpus, the Great Writ of Liberty, is a directive from a standing judge 
ordering the government to present a prisoner to the court for proceedings to determine 
the legality of the imprisonment (Loo, 2007). A writ is simply a legally binding command 
(Federman, 2012). The concept of habeas corpus is believed to have originated in Fourth-
century England and was first codified with the British Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 (Loo, 
2007). In the United States the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was originally 
dependent upon state legislation as the constitution does not specify between federal and 
state prisoners. Then the Judiciary Act of 1789 clarified the matter, officially making 
state prisoners a state issue (Federman, 2012).  
28 
 
 
The first controversy involving habeas corpus occurred shortly after the Alien and 
Sedition Acts had expired. President Thomas Jefferson sent the army under the command 
of General James Wilkinson to arrest and detain without privilege of habeas corpus 
individuals conspiring with Jefferson’s former Vice President Aaron Burr to start a 
conflict with Mexico in an effort to acquire land in Texas. General Wilkinson did as 
directed and ignored habeas corpus pleas. Eventually Chief Justice John Marshall ordered 
the prisoners to be released reasoning that only congress not the president has the 
authority to suspend habeas corpus (Scheppele, 2012). The reason congress and not the 
president has the authority to suspend habeas corpus is the authorization is only found in 
Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution placing the issue solely in the legislative domain 
(Federman, 2012; Scheppele, 2012). Congress is further constrained to only suspend 
habeas corpus privileges in times of rebellion or invasion (U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 
Jefferson tried condemn Burr’s actions as rebellion, but even if Jefferson had been able to 
prove this claim it would have been a moot point as congress had not suspended habeas 
corpus (Scheppele, 2012). The president simply does not have the authority Jefferson 
sought. 
Jefferson had to react rapidly to Burr’s scandalous actions to avoid frivolous 
conflict with Mexico. It is likely that Jefferson thought he was acting in the best interest 
of the country. The PET would assert that Jefferson was prompted by Burr’s action into 
making a bounded rationality decision. It was not the perfect decision, but it can be 
assumed Jefferson thought it was the best course of action at the time. Jefferson acted 
outside his legal limits, but Chief Justice Marshall reigned in the president. This early 
29 
 
 
habeas corpus case confirmed that even in times of peril, such as rapidly deescalating a 
conflict with a foreign state, the government must work within the bound of the 
constitution. 
The next famous incidence of habeas corpus suspension was during the Civil War 
when President Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas corpus 3 times (Federman, 2012; 
Mondale et al., 2014; Napolitano, 2014; Scheppele, 2012). Just as Chief Justice Marshall 
had proclaimed during Jefferson’s presidency, the Supreme Court during the Civil War 
soundly rejected Lincoln’s attempts to suspend habeas corpus (Federman, 2012; Loo, 
2007; Scheppele, 2012). Lincoln essentially ignored the courts, but after the second time 
congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which authorized the president to evoke 
habeas corpus suspensions in areas under military controlled marshal law (Federman, 
2012; Scheppele, 2012). This solution still had congress in control of the suspension of 
habeas corpus and gave President Lincoln the authorities he felt he needed.  
President Lincoln led the nation through undoubtedly its darkest hour. The nation 
was truly dissolving, the casualty toll from the battles were astronomical, and civil unrest 
plagued both the North and South. If ever there had been a time that the government 
would have been excused for working outside the constitution it would have been during 
the Civil War. President Lincoln articulated such a defense for his actions both publically 
and to congress (Fallon, 2013; Scheppele, 2012). Lincoln suggested that there are times 
when the law must be circumvented for the greater good (Fallon, 2013). At the time the 
majority of congress and much of the public supported Lincoln’s suspensions of habeas 
corpus initially and one of the Supreme Court rebuttals did not conclude until after the 
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Civil War was over (Loo, 2007). The president had considerable support for his actions 
when he was working under bounded rationality circumstances. The question arises in 
retrospect, were the actions necessary to save the republic or not?  
Alien Immigration Act of 1903 
U.S. national security policy went relatively unchanged from the Civil War until 
World War I, with the exception of the Alien Immigration Act of 1903. From the 1864 
through World War II an often violent anarchist movement plagued much of the world 
(Chamberlain, 2012; Kraut, 2012). The anarchist movement in America can be traced as 
far back as the Revolutionary War, but it gained significant notoriety with Haymarket 
Bombing and subsequent riot (Chamberlain, 2012). Anarchists assassinated the French 
president in 1894, Spain’s prime minister in 1897, the Austrian empress in 1898, and the 
King of Italy in 1900 (Kraut, 2012). In September, 1901 Leon Czolgosz, an anarchist, 
assassinated President William McKinley (Chamberlain, 2012; Kraut, 2012). The Alien 
Immigration Act of 1903, known as the Anarchist Exclusion Act, was enacted to expedite 
deportations and limit immigration of known anarchists (Fox Jr., 2012; Kraut, 2012). The 
act was the first to officially target political views for deportation purposes (Kraut, 2012). 
The act also provided the legal precedence for the Espionage Act of 1917, the Internal 
Security Act of 1950, and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Fox Jr., 2012; Kraut, 2012).  
The legal precedence is what makes the study of this act significant to this dissertation. 
Policy makers, presidents, and the courts often refer to this act when discussing the legal 
foundation of the other acts. 
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Sedition Act of 1918 
The next major national security policy change was the 1917 Espionage Act and 
the 1918 Sedition Act, which amended the 1917 act (Napolitano, 2014). In addition, the 
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 which augmented the Espionage Act (Ingram, 
2012). Prior to the acts, subversive activities were dealt with solely through treason and 
theft of government property statutes (Markham, 2014). The acts essentially made it 
illegal to interfere with the war effort, disclose classified information, or conspire to do 
either activity (Ingram, 2012). The Sedition Act took a more extreme stance of 
prohibiting any criticism of the federal government (Saito, 2011). The primary objectives 
of the laws seem straight forward and prudent, but their implementation made many 
begin to worry if the 3 acts were in violation of the First Amendment. 
The acts drifted from prosecuting those actively trying to subvert the government 
to targeting political opposition. The acts were designed to prevent subversive activities, 
but were often used to suppress political dissent to President Woodrow Wilson’s foreign 
policy (Ingram, 2012; Napolitano, 2014). The DOJ conducted a series of warrantless 
search and seizures in an effort to identify potential German sympathizers, antiwar 
activists, or political dissidents (Napolitano, 2014). The laws cracked down on antiwar 
protests and socialist, communist, and anarchist rhetoric (Rosa, 2007). The DOJ even 
encouraged and offered immunity to vigilante surveillance of potential disloyal parties 
(Napolitano, 2014). Prosecutors began to actively target private conversations of key 
voices that were critical of the administration regardless of if the views were ever 
expressed publically (Ingram, 2012; Kennedy, 2004). Post Masters were required to 
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screen mail for anti-government correspondence (Napolitano, 2014). Journalists have 
often been, and continue to be, investigated and threatened with prosecution under the 
Espionage Act, but to date no journalists have been convicted (Markham, 2014). Between 
1917 and 1919, at least 2,200 cases were prosecuted under the 3 acts with many if these 
cases being settled by the Supreme Court due to First Amendment concerns (Ingram, 
2012). Approximately half of those prosecuted were convicted, with approximately 800 
convictions coming from the Sedition Act (Kennedy, 2004; Middleton, 2012). The steps 
taken during the Wilson presidency to suppress opposition were considerably more 
extreme than those taken during Adams’ Alien and Sedition Acts (Kennedy, 2004; 
Napolitano, 2014). The Sedition Act of 1918, considered the most controversial of the 
acts, would have a similar fate to that of its 1798 predecessor.  
The Sedition Act of 1918, like the Sedition Act of 1798, was contentious and its 
political popularity quickly faded. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer used the Sedition 
Act as part of the legal basis for prosecuting those who spoke out against the war effort or 
had radical political views (Middleton, 2012). Palmer’s prosecutions became known as 
the Palmer Raids, which resulted in more than 10,000 arrests, but only enough evidence 
to facilitate the deportation of 56 people (Cecil, 2015). The opposition to the Palmer 
Raids led to the development of the ACLU (ACLU website, 2014). One of the primary 
concerns about the Palmer raids, was the allegations and some evidence of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) being used to target political opposition (Cecil, 2015). The 
ACLU and some newspapers brought these concerns to the public with multiple cases 
reaching the Supreme Court. 
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The repeated Supreme Court decisions upheld the constitutionality of the acts, but 
its growing unpopularity sparked a congressional debate (Middleton, 2012). The debate 
to repeal the Sedition Act began on December 20, 1920 and led to its official repeal on 
March 3, 1921 (Middleton, 2012; Napolitano, 2014). Even though the act was repealed, 
Wilson was hesitant to release the prisoners. They remained imprisoned until President 
Harding and President Coolidge eventually pardoned everyone remaining in prison 
(Napolitano, 2014). The Sedition Act of 1918’s lifespan was nearly identical to that of 
every other national security policy examined thus far in this review. 
The PET explained why these national security policies tend to follow similar 
paths. There is a natural resistance to any policy change, which prevents adjustments 
even in the face of complications, but when the demand for change can no longer be 
restrained by the macro-political bodies rapid, sweeping change occurs (Jones & 
Baumgartner, 2012). Jensen (2011) explained that the electoral fear politicians have of 
not acting creates a demand to rush through legislature often results in imperfect statutes 
that require incremental change or eventual repeal. The Sedition Act had near unanimous 
support when it was enacted because of the turmoil of World War I, the large scale labor 
disputes, and the rise of anarchists, communists, and socialists in America (Ingram, 2012; 
Kennedy, 2004; Middleton, 2012; Napolitano, 2014). The aggregate of these events 
provided the exogenous shock expected to precede rapid bounded rationality changes in 
the PET model. The Wilson administration desired more authority in combatting these 
issues, because of there was tremendous political pressure for them to act immediately. 
The Sedition Act of 1918 amended the Espionage Act of 1917 past what was politically 
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acceptable at the time, but this was not immediately realized until a public feared the First 
Amendment was in danger. This developed into congress being pressured into repealing 
the law. Following this security policy correction, national security policy went back into 
a period of equilibrium until the disruption of Japan attacking Pearl Harbor. 
Japanese Internment 
Pearl Harbor On December 7, 1941 Japanese forces conducted a surprise attack 
on Pearl Harbor on Oahu, Hawaii killing 2,403 Americans, sinking 2 battleships, 
damaging 6 others, and destroying a significant percentage of the U.S. military aircraft 
(Caravaggio, 2014; Rosenberg, 2015; Zimm, 2015). The United States and Japan were 
engaged in failing negations and war seemed like a real possibility, but most did not 
expect a surprise attack (Caravaggio, 2014). In retrospect there seemed to have been 
some evidence that the United States missed vital intelligence that could have thwarted 
the Japanese attack (Burtness & Ober, 2013; Sales, 2010). The Japanese strategy 
depended so heavily upon achieving surprise that had the U.S. forces been given enough 
notice to get planes in the air, Japanese bombers would have been utterly decimated as 
they did not have significant fighter support (Zimm, 2015). Unfortunately for the United 
States, the attack was a surprise. The significant damage inflicted by the attack led most 
Americans to expect immediate follow on Japanese attacks and in actuality, the Japanese 
commander in charge of the attack wanted to continue attacks, but was denied by his 
superiors (Caravaggio, 2014). This left the United States in a state of fear. 
As the PET and history have demonstrated throughout this literary review, fear 
generated from a significant event often leads to policy change that is latter considered 
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deeply flawed. Beginning in 1924 the Federal Bureau of Investigation started collecting 
information on millions of Americans in the name of national security screening (Saito, 
2011). In the months leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack the FBI used this information 
to generate lists of potentially disloyal Americans of German, Italian, or Japanese 
heritage and within 3 days following the attack the federal government found and 
detained these individuals (Saito, 2011; Watkins, 2012). These people were detained 
under a number of statutes, including a military order from Lieutenant General John L. 
DeWitt that targeted West Coast Japanese Americans (Saito, 2011). This order was meant 
to be a short term precaution, but presidential action turned the detention into a more long 
term affair.  
On February 19, 1942 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Executive 
Order 9066, which allowed for the military internment of 120,000 Japanese Americans 
(Saito, 2011; Watkins, 2012; Wood, 2014). The bulk of those interned came from 
California (Wood, 2014). The internment camps were filled and primarily staffed by the 
U.S. military and the DOJ in conjunction with the War Relocation Authority (Watkins, 
2012). What made these detentions different than traditionally accepted confinements is 
the interned individuals were not suspected of any crime and were imprisoned solely 
upon their heritage (Saito, 2011; Watkins, 2012; Wood, 2014). This essentially made 
being of Japanese heritage a punishable offense. 
The common belief among several top U.S. officials of the time was for Japanese 
Americans, heredity and ethnicity outweighed national citizenship (Wood, 2014). 
Previously mentioned Lieutenant General DeWitt repeatedly and publically claimed that 
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the war was not with the country of Japan, but was with the Japanese race (Saito, 2011). 
This claim was not backed by any solid intelligence as there was few cases of seditious 
activities or leanings by Japanese Americans (Wood, 2014). Despite the lack of empirical 
evidence, DeWitt’s intentions were enthusiastically met by his subordinates. Lieutenant 
Colonel Karl Bendetsen, who commanded the internment process, stated his belief that 
internment applied to anybody that had any degree of Japanese heritage (Saito, 2011). 
His interpretation of President Roosevelt’s intent translated into the internment of West 
Coast first and second generation Japanese Americans (Wood, 2014). 
Many of the Japanese Americans detained in the camps were held until the war’s 
end (Saito, 2011; Wood, 2014). Some of those interned were allowed to join the U.S. 
Army’s 442 Regiment, a highly decorated all Japanese American unit (Wood, 2014). 
This not only provided a way out of the camps, but also the unit’s success helped 
discredit the notion of race over national pride. Eventually the camps were disbanded and 
gradually the anti-Japanese fervor resided. Decades later the government acknowledged 
the inappropriateness of the acts. In August 1988 congress and President Reagan enacted 
the Civil Liberties Act, which officially apologized to the former internees and provided 
each surviving internee $20,000 (Saito, 2011; Wood, 2014). This was intended to provide 
some closure to the internment debacle. 
The internment provides another example of how a disruptive event can rapidly 
generate questionable national security policies. In time, the public fear that facilitated 
these policies dissipates and the policies tend to drift back into a more acceptable 
equilibrium. Robinson (2014) opined that the PET is a “convincing cognitive 
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foundation”. Policymakers develop procedures for maintaining the status quo, but when 
an event disrupts the status quo the policymakers’ reactions are typically disproportionate 
to the event in an effort to restore order as fast as possible (Robinson, 2014). The 
contribution gained by studying the World War II internments is it both establishes the 
validity of the PET and develops a foundation of historic national security policies. The 
end of World War II ushered in a rather chaotic period for national security with the Cold 
War tensions and policies. 
Cold War 
From 1945 to 1989 was one of the more dangerous periods in world history due to 
the consistent friction between the communist countries and western democracies. The 
Cold War tension between the United States and Soviet Union was so great and lasted for 
so long that during the collapse of the Soviet Union, a prominent Soviet leader, Georgi 
Arbatov, warned the US that not having a dedicated enemy could be devastating to the 
United States (Fettweis, 2014). International threats can promote increased bipartisanship 
and reduce internal political conflicts (Flynn, 2014). Arbatov assumed the United States 
would become utterly dysfunctional and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
would dissolve, but neither of these events happened (Fettweis, 2014). The U.S. has not 
become dysfunctional, but bipartisanship is not prominent in current American politics. 
While international threat might bring U.S. politicians together, long term international 
military conflict, including the current War on Terror, seems to drive them apart (Flynn, 
2014). NATO continues to operate around the world in an effort to counter Russian 
influence (He, 2012). In short Arbatov was wrong and despite the increase in Islamic 
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terrorism, the United States is much safer now than it was during the Cold War (Fettweis, 
2014). The point that the Cold War was even more dangerous than the global terrorism 
threat is important, because it sets the stage for explaining domestic Cold War security 
policy. 
A common theme with domestic security policies during the Cold War was 
countering the Red Scare. Communists were targeted under the Sedition Act of 1918 but 
anarchists and disruptive labor union leaders overshadowed the communist threat (Rosa, 
2007). Communist prosecutions significantly ramped up during and following World 
War II (Wark & Galliher, 2013). The Alien Registration Act of 1940, known as the Smith 
Act, expedited prosecution, detention, and deportation procedures for migrants 
expressing communist or seditious views and (Bruce, 2014; Napolitano, 2014; Romano, 
2011; Wark & Galliher, 2013). The act received substantial support because it was 
championed as combatting communism and limiting migrant employment to boost the 
economy as the positive economic effects had not yet occurred (Bruce, 2014). Many of 
those initially charged under the act were convicted of actively trying to overthrow the 
government of the United States during a time of war, which further solidified support for 
the act (Wark & Galliher, 2013). As many other previous security policies have done the 
Smith Act drifted from its documented purpose bringing it into a contentious relationship 
with civil liberties. 
In the debate leading up to the Smith Act and following the enactment the ACLU 
repeatedly protested the Smith Act’s vague authorities and potential for abuse (Bruce, 
2014). For 16 years, until the courts stopped the prosecutions, the Smith Act was used to 
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reprimand political advocates for otherwise constitutionally protected speech (Haverty-
Stacke, 2013). The FBI used the Smith Act to prosecute attorneys that defended 
communists that were convicted under the Smith Act, despite the attorneys’ lack of 
connection to communist organizations prior to the defense (Wark & Galliher, 2013). The 
act also criminalized membership in any communist organization, but only one person 
was ever imprisoned under this clause of the Smith Act and he was later pardoned by 
President John F. Kennedy (Napolitano, 2014). The Smith Act set the precedence for 
greatly expanding domestic national security throughout the Cold War and beyond 
(Haverty-Stacke, 2013). 
The Cold War brought a series of domestic security policies and procedures that, 
in retrospect, are of questionable constitutionality. The Internal Security Act of 1950, 
known as the McCarran Act required all communists register with the DOJ and denied 
visa entry to known communists (Hefner-Babb, 2012; Kraut, 2012). The McCarran Act 
and the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which passed in conjunction with the 
McCarran Act, were part of the larger concerted effort to combat a domestic communist 
threat (Hefner-Babb, 2012). The act brought stiff penalties for failing to comply with the 
registration. Those convicted of failing to register with the DOJ incurred a fine of 
$10,000 per day and a possible imprisonment of 5 years per day (Wark & Galliher, 
2013). After registering with the DOJ the registered communist would then be required to 
provide annual financial reports, notifications of change of addresses and membership 
rosters (Hefner-Babb, 2012). The act was also seen as part of the legal basis for state and 
federal “loyalty review boards” that conducted investigations of potential communists 
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(Romano, 2011). These investigations were based upon political ideology rather than 
suspicion of criminal activity, which creates a clash between security and civil liberties.  
A significant difference between the McCarran Act and all the previously 
examined statutes in this literature review is congress and not the president pushed for the 
McCarran Act. President Harry S. Truman vetoed the law due to concerns about its 
constitutionality, but congress overwhelmingly supported the act and easily reversed the 
veto (Hefner-Babb, 2012). Fallon (2013) articulated that the constitution requires the 
president to respond to security threats while constraining the actions available to the 
executive branch. The courts traditionally interpret the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution as ensuring the freedom to associate with any peaceful political organization 
(Bedi, 2014). President Truman and Senator McCarran were both Democrats, indicating 
the veto was probably less about politics and more about substance.  
President Truman was likely concerned about criminalizing any peaceful political 
organization. While there were communist groups that advocated the overthrow of the 
federal government, there was also a plethora of standing laws to deal with such 
individuals and groups. The McCarran Act essentially sought to ban support of 
communist ideology. Government monitoring and suppression of speech has at times 
generated public support and possibly even short term benefits, but it is in direct violation 
of the U.S. Constitution and detrimental to the more important American ideals (Hughes, 
2012). President Truman seems to have realized it was better to defeat communism 
through comprehensive debate rather than suppression. Regardless of the reasons 
President Truman’s veto of the new authorities of the McCarran Act represents one of the 
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few times that the executive branch chose not to pursue the acquisition of new security 
provisions. 
The first half of the 20th century was a turbulent time. There was threat from both 
World Wars, the initiation of the Korean War, violent anarchist movements, disruptive 
labor clashes, and 2 bouts of the “Red Scare” leading to the Cold War (Napolitano, 2014; 
Romano, 2011). Historically periods of crisis tend to lead to security policies reflective of 
government overreaction (Mondale et al., 2014). Benson and Russel (2015) elaborated 
that the PET rapidly delivers a substantial policy change relative to the perceived social 
severity of the preceding event or events (Benson & Russel, 2015). The importance of 
examining these historic policies when looking at modern policy, such as the USA 
PATRIOT Act, is it provides historical, theoretical, and procedural policy perspectives. 
In addition, understanding the aforementioned perceived social severity of the 
international wars and internal threats of the early to mid-1900s is paramount to 
understanding modern security and surveillance doctrine.  
Surveillance Scandals 
The United States’ statutory structure is designed to both provide for national 
security and establish safeguards against undue government intrusions (Baldwin & 
Koslosky, 2012). This system typically is effective in meeting both goals. There have 
been instances when retrospective analysis of select U.S. security / surveillance 
procedures illuminate questionable authorizations (Anderson, 2014; Mondale et al., 2014; 
United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies, 2013). Usually these questionable programs are short lived responses to a 
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crisis. Many of these events occurred in response to political and social turmoil in 20th 
century America. A cumulative effect of these programs developed through the years 
resulting in federal agencies and the executive branch conducting surveillance, 
investigations, and even prosecutions outside the traditional limits of the law (Mondale et 
al., 2014). Eventually the collective egregious nature of the programs prompted a public 
outcry and the development of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 
to mitigate these programs. This section of the literature review examined some of the 
programs and events that led to FISA. 
Teapot Dome 
After being formed in 1908 the Federal Bureau of Investigation underwent a 
period of public scrutiny due to a series politically motivated investigations (Waskey, 
2012). The bureau’s image was further damaged by its involvement in the Palmer Raids, 
which John Edgar Hoover helped coordinate (Cecil, 2015). Hoover was concerned, as 
much of America was, that the United States was vulnerable to a socialist, communist, or 
anarchist insurrection similar to that of the Bolshevik Revolution afflicting Russia at the 
time (Babic, 2012). Between 1919 and 1920 the bureau used questionable often violent 
tactics to crack down on “disloyal” parties (Cecil, 2015). The Palmer Raids had a strange 
effect of bringing the bureau both scorn and praise, because the public feared insurrection 
and were leery of the bureau’s approach.  
This situation did not negatively affect Hoover’s career. At the time of the raids 
Hoover was not the widely known public figure he would later become. This anonymity 
allowed Hoover to later be selected to “reform” the bureau following some controversial 
43 
 
 
events (Babic, 2012; Cecil, 2015). The bureau did make a concerted effort to address 
some of the issues that arose from the Palmer Raids (Waskey, 2012). Moreover, the 
bureau under FBI Chiefs (later called Directors) William J. Flynn, William J. Burns, and 
Hoover worked to improve the public image of the bureau through reforms, 
standardizations, and an aggressive media campaign (Babic, 2012; Cecil, 2015). It took 
several years for the bureau’s role to mature and develop into its accepted roles of today. 
During the first several decades there were some growing pains as the roles were defined. 
In the 1920s the FBI’s role in the federal government shifted away from the 
policies that led to the Palmer Raids. With World War I and the first Red Scare coming to 
an end, the nation began to incrementally shift back into the more traditionally acceptable 
security versus liberty equilibrium. President Warren G. Harding freed many of those 
convicted of antiwar activities in an effort to bring normalcy to the country (Waskey, 
2012). The ending of first Red Scare did not reduce the importance of the bureau. The 
reason for this is the Eighteenth Amendment brought in the federally prosecuted alcohol 
prohibition and the rise of violent gangsters, which made the FBI more important than 
ever (Babic, 2012). Much of the bureau focused on these tasks and created a generally 
healthy image for the FBI. Unfortunately the FBI continued to engage in some 
questionable behavior due to political pressures. 
A common fear about the FBI in the early years was that the bureau would be 
used to target political opposition (Babic, 2012). There were some accusations of this in 
the early years of the bureau, but the FBI involvement with the Harding Administration’s 
Teapot Dome scandal would truly shock the public. President Harding’s administration 
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could have been seen being highly successful if it were not for some high profile 
scandals. President Harding was able to reduce the size of government, cut the federal 
budget in half, promote the free market, lower the unemployment rate, and generally 
improve the U.S. economy (Folsom, 2012). Unfortunately the president was surrounded 
by his “Ohio Gang”, a group of close friends many of whom exploited the president’s 
trusting nature (Folsom, 2012; Purdy, 2005; Waskey, 2012). The close friends of the 
president conducted 2 large scale construction kickback schemes which netted them 
millions of dollars in personal gain and eventual jail time (Folsom, 2012; Purdy, 2005). 
President Harding’s administration was so tarnished by numerous outlandish scandals 
that many believe his food poisoning death was actually a suicide (Purdy, 2005; Waskey, 
2012).  
The 2 primary scandals of the administration were similar in that they were 
perpetrated by Harding’s friends who received kickbacks for accepted ridiculously 
overpriced noncompetitive bids for construction. The first scandal involved President 
Harding’s longtime friend Charles Forbes, whom Harding appoint to be the first head of 
the newly formed Veteran’s Bureau (Folsom, 2012). The second involved Albert Fall, 
Harding’s friend and Secretary of Interior (Purdy, 2005). Forbes received a number of 
bribes during the construction of overpriced veterans’ hospitals (Folsom, 2012). Fall 
received millions of dollars in bribes during the construction of oil storage facilities and 
pipelines for the oil reserves of Teapot Dome, Wyoming that were under the control of 
the Department of Interior (Purdy, 2005; Waskey, 2012). The Veterans’ Bureau scandal 
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was a disgrace for the administration and when the Teapot Dome scandal broke the 
administration attempted to prevent a similar humiliation. 
A bipartisan Senate investigation, led by Republican Senator Robert M. La 
Follette Sr. and Democratic Senator Thomas J. Walsh, met stiff resistance at every turn 
(Purdy, 2005; Waskey, 2012). What happened next was inexcusable, illegal, and highly 
controversial. The Harding Administration elicited the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
investigate, intimidate, and harass the senate investigators. Walsh endured break-ins, 
constant unwarranted surveillance, personal threats, and even his 3 year old daughter was 
threatened (Purdy, 2005). The bureau’s top leadership, including Chief Burns, authorized 
the surveillances in 1923 (Cecil, 2015). After both senators endured unwarranted break-
ins, wire taps, background inquiries, and possibly even threats it became clear to the 
public that the bureau had drifted into dangerous waters.  
Hoover’s Surveillances 
In the wake of the Teapot Dome scandal J. Edgar Hoover was chosen to lead the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, as the bureau faced uncertainties about its proper roles 
and how to conduct those functions. In 1924 Hoover took the reins of the FBI from Chief 
Burns (Babic, 2012; Miller, 2012). Hoover was able to transform the bureau’s image into 
the iconic “G-men” in a relatively short period of time. Hoover ensured the bureau put 
forth an ultra-professional, non-partisan, image through strict conduct and appearance 
standards (Gage, 2012; Miller, 2012). The new image for the G-men was perfect timing, 
as the bureau had a new set of public enemies with the rise of gangsters in the 1920s. 
Hoover influenced the media to produce a number of extremely popular television shows, 
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comic strips, and books showcasing the bureau taking on the high profile gangsters 
(Cecil, 2015; Miller, 2012). The FBI’s performance, image, and popularity improved 
tremendously under Hoover’s leadership.  
Despite successfully fostering a non-partisan image for the bureau as a whole, 
Hoover became incredibly well connected politically and amassed enough power with his 
position that he could push political agendas. Throughout Hoover’s 5 decades with the 
bureau, his personal connections with prominent politicians seemed to at times 
inappropriately influence the bureau’s actions and policies (Gage, 2012). Hoover’s first 
years as director were spent developing and expanding the bureau’s national influence 
through increasing its size, training, capabilities, and political connections (Babic, 2012; 
Brame & Shriver, 2013; Gage, 2012). The first Red Scare established Hoover with the 
anti-communist sphere of politicians. This undoubtedly aided Hoover in soliciting 
resources for the growing bureau.  
The communist movement did not die out in America with the decline of the first 
Red Scare, only the hysteria surrounding it did. As World War II neared, the public once 
again began to take notice of communists in the United States. The second Red Scare 
brought Hoover new resources, extensive authorities, and connections to prominent 
members of congress and even presidents (Brame & Shriver, 2013; Gage, 2012). With 
the passage of the aforementioned Smith Act of 1940 the Hoover gained the authority to 
investigate anybody he “deemed a threat to national security” (Brame & Shriver, 2013). 
Hoover maintained this ability for the rest of his life, using it both legitimately and 
illegally. 
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Hoover’s surveillance capabilities made him an extremely feared and powerful 
bureaucrat. Hoover conducted surveillance on an untold number of individuals based 
solely upon Hoover’s determination without any probable cause or suspicion of a crime 
(Brame & Shriver, 2013; Miller, 2012; Richardson, 2015). The surveillances began with 
the communists with the intent of preventing subversion of those looking to overthrow 
the government, as the communists did in Russia (Brame & Shriver, 2013). As World 
War II progressed the bureau began an aggressive counter-intelligence program 
(COINTELPRO) initiated with the goal of countering the real threat of subversion, which 
it accomplished in several cases (Brame & Shriver, 2013; Romano, 2011). 
COINTELPRO was a domestic program that mimicked Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) and later Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “black operations” abroad including 
“false media stories, bogus leaflets, pamphlets and other publications, forged 
correspondence, anonymous letters and telephone calls, pressure through employers, 
landlords and others, tampering with mail and telephone service” (Romano, 2011, p. 
173). COINTELPRO operations never resulted in arrests and in 1971 after the program 
became public knowledge Hoover publically abandoned it, but it was likely just false 
information (Miller, 2012; Napolitano, 2014). COINTELPRO continued after the war 
and well into the 1990s, but it is how Hoover used COINTELPRO authorities against the 
civil rights movement and his political enemies that caused concern (Brame & Shriver, 
2013; Miller, 2012; Romano, 2011). 
The civil rights movement did contain some groups that sought the violent 
overthrow of the United States’ government (Brame & Shriver, 2013; Phelps, 2012). Part 
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of how the bureau came to investigate these groups was the fringes of the communist and 
socialist movements had crossed over into diametrically opposing, violent groups such as 
the Black Panthers and the Ku Klux Klan (Napolitano, 2014; Phelps, 2012). The FBI was 
justified in investigating these groups as they were and still do call for violence and 
subversion of the United States. The more questionable infiltrations occurred with groups 
like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the 
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), which did not advocate violence (Phelps, 2012). 
Hoover’s programs targeted violent and nonviolent groups on the political left and right 
(Greenberg, 2011; Holst, 2007). Hoover believed that much of the civil unrest in the 
South was due to a communist plot to agitate racial tensions (Phelps, 2012). Hoover 
notably authorized an extensive investigation of Martin Luther King Jr. out of concerns 
about his anti-Vietnam views, which Hoover considered to be communist leaning (Miller, 
2012; Purdy, 2007). Basically anybody Hoover deemed radical or a political dissent was 
a potential target.  
Worse than how the bureau handled political groups, was how Hoover used the 
bureau to further his political influence. Hoover made himself indispensable to every 
president between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Richard Nixon (Holst, 2007). It is 
believed that Presidents Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson all 
wanted to fire Hoover, but were afraid that Hoover’s investigations of them and their 
families would be leaked to the public (Miller, 2012). Hoover began the investigations of 
powerful Americans early in his career, with one of his earliest targets being Eleanor 
Roosevelt (Holst, 2007). In essence Hoover was untouchable by the end of World War II 
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and would remain so until his death. Hoover was so connected that President Johnson 
would waive the mandatory retirement age for Hoover allowing him to remain in charge 
of the FBI until he died (Miller, 2012). Hoover would be the only director to hold the 
position for such an extended period of time. Promptly upon his death congress placed a 
ten year term limit on the position and eventually began congressional investigations into 
the FBI, something that had been thwarted repeatedly during Hoover’s lifetime (Holst, 
2007). J. Edgar Hoover amassed more clout than any bureaucrat in American history. 
While he did amazing things for the FBI and the country, his private surveillance 
undertakings compromised the integrity of the bureau. 
 Even now, well past the 50 year expiration of their classification, the FBI refuses 
to release of millions of files related to these investigations to the national archives 
despite no ongoing investigations or national security concerns (Richardson, 2015). 
Regardless of how the records could potentially affect the image of Hoover or the bureau, 
these records should be transferred to the national archives. It seems some of these 
records would probably be of historical significance. Any confidential information would 
be protected under standard national archive policies, so there truly is no valid reason for 
withholding the files. Withholding information to paint a narrative does not do history 
justice. Furthermore there is evidence that some of these documents were destroyed by 
flooding during Hurricane Sandy due to insufficient storage facilities (Richardson, 2015). 
The refusal to release these records furthers speculation as to how far the bureau went 
astray with Hoover’s private missions. 
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Watergate 
Just a month and a half after Hoover’s death, the biggest scandal in the nation’s 
history would transpire and Hoover’s longtime friend President Nixon would be at the 
center of the controversy. On June 17, 1972 5 Nixon campaign workers were arrested 
while breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at Washington 
D.C.’s Watergate Hotel in an attempt to adjust existing unwarranted wire taps for better 
reception (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Feldstein, 2014; Gage, 2012). The arrests exposed a 
conspiracy with origins leading all the way to the President of the United States. The 
ensuing investigation led to more than 70 convictions for illegal break-ins, wire taps, and 
numerous other crimes which netted some of the perpetrators 40 years in prison 
(Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Feldstein, 2014). Many top White House advisors received 
jail time (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013). After 2 years of investigation and scandal President 
Nixon resigned in disgrace (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Feldstein, 2014; Gage, 2012). 
Despite all of Hoover’s previously questionable surveillance choices, in his last 
several months he did have reservations about the constitutionality of Nixon’s pre-
Watergate actions. The two had been friends for decades, but Hoover adamantly resisted 
Nixon’s attempts to use the FBI for partisan purposes (Gage, 2012). With COINTELPRO 
being exposed in 1971 Hoover attempted to limit the bureau’s involvement with 
questionable activities, which conflicted with Nixon’s agenda resulting in increasing 
tensions between the men (Gage, 2012; Miller, 2012). Upon Hoover’s death, Nixon 
attempted to get a more compliant director, but the bureau’s leadership would never be 
truly united behind Nixon’s unconstitutional endeavors (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013). In 
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fact Hoover’s protégé, Mark Felt, later FBI Director Felt, would become the famous 
“Deep Throat”, who exposed the Nixon conspiracy (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Feldstein, 
2014; Gage, 2012). Nixon did not have FBI support and the bureau did investigate the 
Watergate scandal (Faulkner & Cheney, 2013; Gage, 2012). The CIA did try to delay the 
bureau’s investigation (Gage, 2012). This turned out to be Nixon’s undoing, as he taped 
White House conversations including the one where he prompted the CIA to slow the 
FBI investigation, which was eventually heard by investigators (Faulkner & Cheney, 
2013; Gage, 2012). The Watergate scandal toppled the Nixon presidency.  
The events described throughout this section of the literature review illustrated 
how domestic security practices have, at times, led to abuse. It is vital for scholars and 
policy makers to understand what has happened and be vigilant against future abuses. 
Studying the Watergate scandal, Hoover’s surveillances, and the Teapot Dome scandal 
provides clear examples of such abuses. With Watergate as the pinnacle of half a century 
of questionable practices, the American public was ready for reform. The stage was set 
for the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities, also known as the “Church Committee”.  
Court Decisions 
While examining the history of security policies suggested the validity of the PET 
and proposed there is an acceptable balance between liberty and security, it did not fully 
address the legality of the issues. The courts had several significant rulings in the 20th 
century regarding the legality of security and surveillance policies. It is critical to review 
these ruling in an effort to fully understand modern surveillance authorities. Since 
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antiquity it has been common practice when reviewing a statute to refer to previous 
relevant decisions that form the legal precedence of the statute in question (Strouthes, 
2007). This section of the literature review explored some of these rulings in respect to 
their contribution to the legal precedence involving surveillance cases. 
Olmstead v. United States 
The first court case with bearing on this study was the 1928 Olmstead v. United 
States. The basic premise of the case was Olmstead contended that a wiretap should 
require a warrant or it would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Emas & Pallas, 
2012; Ferguson, 2014). At the time, wiretaps were a relatively new technology and had 
yet to be challenged at the Supreme Court level. In the Olmstead investigation a 
wiretapped recorded conversation was presented as evidence, which led the Olmstead 
defense to present a case that the incriminating evidence was inadmissible and 
unconstitutional (Ferguson, 2014; Jones, 2011). When writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Taft concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to electronic 
surveillance if there was not a physical intrusion or seizure (Bedi, 2014; Ferguson, 2014). 
In 1942 and in 1951 the courts reconfirmed Olmstead ruling with the similar cases of 
Goldman v. United States and Lee v. United States (Emas & Pallas, 2012). For nearly 4 
decades electronic surveillance would not require a warrant if there was not a physical 
intrusion. 
Katz v. United States 
In 1967, the Olmstead decision would again be challenged in the Supreme Court. 
Charles Katz was accused of conducting interstate gambling operations via telephones 
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booths and the FBI and local police were able use recording devices to obtain 
incriminating about the case (Emas & Pallas, 2012; Sales, 2010). In all 6 recorded 
conversations were heard at the trial contributing significantly to the conviction (Emas & 
Pallas, 2012). The case was appealed until it reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant prior 
to conducting electronic surveillance, as the amendment safeguards the person rather than 
just their property (Bellia, 2011; Ferguson, 2014; Harper, 2014; Howell & Lesemann, 
2007). The Supreme Court decision asserted that the intrusion occurred in a 
constitutionally protected area, as Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
phone booth (Davis, 2014). Katz did not have the expectation of privacy that he would 
not be seen or photographed, as the booth was predominately clear glass in a public 
setting, but he could reasonably expect that his conversation would not be heard outside 
of its intended audience (Emas & Pallas, 2012). Also in 1967 Berger v. New York came 
to a similar conclusion only with eavesdropping of a house rather than a phone booth 
(DeVito, 2011). Katz v. United States adequately addressed its reasons for changing the 
Olmstead procedures for conducting electronic surveillance in criminal cases. 
What the Katz decision did not address was domestic security surveillance cases. 
The courts did not require warrants for domestic security investigations that used 
electronic surveillance techniques (Francel, 2014; Harper, 2014). Shults (2011) 
contended that by not tackling domestic national security investigations the Katz decision 
suggested that the Fourth Amendment argument does not necessarily apply to executive 
directed surveillance. Shults (2011) further proclaimed that this lack of judgment made 
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foreign intelligence confusing and ripe for abuse. Whether or not the lack of depth of the 
decision led to any abuse, the Supreme Court was deciding on a gambling case not a 
foreign intelligence case. 
The Katz and Berger cases provided the exogenous shock the PET suggests is 
necessary for significant change. A review of literature suggests the 2 similar cases 
created a public demand for change. Congress adopted Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, known as Title III or the Wiretap Act to coincide 
with the trends established in the Katz and Berger cases (Bellia, 2011). Title III 
established the warrant requirements for electronic surveillance in criminal cases (Harper, 
2014; Jones, 2011). While Title III became the standard for wiretap procedures in 
criminal cases, it did not apply to domestic security cases (Shults, 2011). This further 
implies that the Katz, and to a lesser extent the Berger, case was the catalyst for the Title 
III provision as these cases were criminal cases not domestic security cases. Title III 
would not remain strictly within the realm of criminal justice for long.  
(Keith) United States v. United States District Court for Eastern District of Michigan 
The next major court decision involving surveillance procedures would come in 
1972 with the famed “Keith” case, named after Judge Damon Keith of the United States 
District Court for Eastern District of Michigan. In the United States v. United States 
District Court for Eastern District of Michigan the defendants were accused of plotting to 
bomb a CIA building in Michigan (Francel, 2014). The prosecution used electronic 
surveillance without a warrant, but failed to prove a connection to a foreign power 
(Bellia, 2011). The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that Executive Branch does not have 
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the authority to conduct surveillance without a warrant unless there is a connection to a 
foreign power (Harper, 2014; Howell & Lesemann, 2007; Shults, 2011). Furthermore the 
Keith ruling added to the legal precedence that information gathered for foreign 
intelligence investigations cannot be used in criminal cases unless a traditional warrant 
authorized the collection (Baldwin & Koslosky, 2012). This standard remained until the 
creation of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Church Committee 
The Church Committee, in response to numerous scandals, helped reform and 
shape domestic security policies from the late 1970s until the 2001 terrorist attacks. The 
committee was formed to investigate executive branch surveillance practices, the US 
Army surveillance on American citizens, CIA programs on U.S. soil, and even the 
previous analysis of the assassination of President Kennedy (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). 
The Church Committee was the most thorough investigation of U.S. intelligence policies 
and practices in American history (Mondale et al., 2014). There was public pressure for 
the investigation to be free of political gaming, as a result the committee was well 
balanced by party and ideology with both Republicans and Democrats carefully selecting 
members across the political spectrum (Donohue, 2014). The committee was chaired by 
Senator Frank F. Church (D-ID), with Senator John G. Tower (R-TX) as Vice Chairman 
(S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). Church’s committee was an effort to counter the hazards of 
unfettered government surveillance (Berghel, 2014). 
One such moral hazard was President Nixon’s Huston Plan, which essentially was 
a joint CIA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
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and NSA intelligence collection operation that targeted Vietnam War protesters (Mondale 
et al., 2014; S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). In some ways this cooperation could have been 
seen as a positive step forward as years later the 9/11 Commission would recommend 
increased cooperation between the agencies (9/11 Commission, 2004). In fact the 
cooperation between the organizations was used as the justification for the program (S. 
Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). The problem with Nixon’s plan was the military and CIA are not 
supposed to conduct operations in the United States and the president targeted all those 
publically opposed to the war rather than just radicals advocating for violence. The Posse 
Comitatus Act of 1878 prevents the United States military from conducting domestic law 
enforcement activities (Sales, 2010). The National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA 
but specifically prohibited the agency from conducting domestic security functions 
(Donohue, 2014; Sales, 2010). The Church Committee found that the DIA and CIA’s 
involvement with domestic counterintelligence operations was inappropriate and illegal 
(S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). The moral hazard of using the DIA and CIA in domestic 
programs could have been avoided by limiting their activities to outside the country while 
still increasing information sharing regarding international pursuits amongst the 
intelligence community. In addition, the committee found using the IRS to harass 
organizations based upon their political leanings to be troublesome and clearly not within 
the service’s intended purpose (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). Using the IRS as a political 
weapon should not have been considered a viable option and demonstrates how far the 
administration was willing to push the limits of the law. 
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The worst aspect of the Huston Plan was not with its enactment, but its 
cancellation. The Huston Plan was soundly and immediately rejected by J. Edgar Hoover, 
which led to President Nixon revoking the plan within the week of its enactment, but only 
the FBI actually heeded the revocation (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). Essentially either the 
other intelligence agencies went rogue or the president covertly authorized the actions in 
direct violation of the law. The Church Committee believed the latter to be the case (S. 
Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). Without official authorizations the intelligence community 
collected on more than 100,000 American citizens due to their opinion on the Vietnam 
War (Mondale et al., 2014). The Church Committee found these operations to be illegal 
and egregious, but not uncommon. 
The Church Committee found literally volumes of information about questionable 
to blatantly unconstitutional intelligence activities. The following is a highlight of some 
of these activities as found in the Church Committee reports: 
• The FBI investigated approximately 500,000 U.S. citizens for the purpose 
of domestic intelligence. Some of these individuals might have been 
relative to a criminal investigation, but if they were it was pure 
coincidence. The investigations led to the development a national name 
index of potential political dissidents.  
• The CIA had a similar program which collected on 1.5 million Americans 
resulting in a computerized index system. 
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• At least 380,000 first class letters were opened, read, photographed, 
resealed, and delivered by the postal service in conjunction with the FBI 
and CIA in 2 unwarranted operations spanning approximately 20 years. 
• All international telegraphs were from 1947–1975 were obtained by the 
NSA through a secret arrangement with the telegraph services. 
• From 1969 – 1973 the IRS kept secret files on 11,000 individuals based 
upon their political affiliations. 
• The FBI secretly infiltrated civil and women’s rights group with the 
expressed intent of disrupting the movements from within. For example 
the bureau had agents in the NAACP for more than 25 years without any 
evidence of criminal activity. 
• Each president from Roosevelt through Nixon conducted flagrantly illegal 
and progressively worse surveillance of their political opposition. 
Watergate is a clear example of this, but was not much worse than 
President Kennedy’s action. President Kennedy wiretapped at least one 
member of congress, a congressional staffer, and other Washington D.C. 
insiders. 
• The military and CIA conducted extensive human experimentation using 
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and other destructive drugs for several 
years with limited controls, goals, or scientific purpose. The CIA 
continued the experiments for several years with unwitting subjects, no 
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stated objectives, and limited medical staffing inferring the “experiments” 
had more sinister motives. 
The Church Committee reports are noteworthy in modern domestic security 
policy administration and this study in that they comprise an exhaustive inquiry into 
domestic practices and mission creep. More than that, the reports were designed to not 
only expose abuses but to provide recommendations to prevent future abuses. The United 
States has had repeated episodes of security policy abuses, which are quickly rectified 
and forgotten upon exposure, but the Church Committee was the first serious attempt to 
prevent future abuses (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). The reports generated the political 
momentum to reform domestic security practices (Mondale et al., 2014). This shows that 
not only are surveillance authorities susceptible to mission creep but that the American 
public eventually brings these authorities into a more acceptable role. It is typically not 
the surveillance procedure that is the problem, but how it is used. With this dissertation 
examining the allegations of mission creep with the USA PATRIOT Act, the Church 
Committee reports provided essential historic perspective of previous misuses of 
domestic security authorities.  
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
The domestic security policies, procedures, and practices from World War I until 
the 1970s was problematic, as demonstrated in the last several sections of this literature 
review. The PET would assert that these practices were bound to only undergo 
incremental change until an external force would create the demand for change. The 
literature examined thus far showed that there were in fact incremental changes through 
60 
 
 
various policy changes and court decisions. The public became more and more aware of 
the need for reform due to the coverage of the Katz case, Watergate scandal, and Keith 
decision. These incremental events spawned the Church Committee which served as the 
external force needed to reform policy. The reform came as the FISA. 
FISA was an ambitious act designed to clarify authorities, reign in abuses, and 
provide a codified approach to domestic security. FISA was congress’ most significant 
attempt at regulating domestic intelligence gathering (Jones, 2011). FISA was drafted to 
restrict domestic intelligence gathering, based upon the Church Committee findings 
(Butler, 2013). FISA’s primary functions created a system of checks and balances on the 
Executive Branch’s unilateral surveillance practices (Davis, 2014; Howell & Lesemann, 
2007; Sales, 2010; Shults, 2011). The checks and balances are achieved through the FISA 
court (FISC). 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
The creation of the FISC greatly changed domestic security practices in the 
United States. Traditional federal courts lack the security clearance requirements related 
to many domestic security policies. For this reason the U.S. Congress was compelled to 
create a court with the necessary clearance qualifications and with doing so the FISC was 
born (United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies, 2013). The FISC convenes in an undisclosed secure location within the 
DOJ in Washington D.C. to help maintain a level of secrecy (Pfander, 2013; Ruger, 2007; 
Walton, 2013). The FISC can authorize the clandestine electronic surveillance of a target 
for up to a year at a time provided the Attorney General submit an application showing 
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probable cause that the target is affiliated with a foreign power (Gilbert, 2013). This 
probable cause does not specifically demand suspicion of nefarious activities, but there is 
an extensive review process to assess the legality of the surveillance (Francel, 2014; 
Ruger, 2007; Walton, 2013). In addition, the application must show that the desired 
foreign intelligence cannot be obtained through traditional investigative techniques 
(Harper, 2014; Shults, 2011). The application is secretive and submitted without 
knowledge of the targeted individual (Shults, 2011). The secrecy and access to classified 
information requires the FISC to be carefully staffed. 
The FISC is currently comprised of 11 judges appointed by the Chief Justice of 
the United States to serve staggered term of 7 years or less (Davis, 2014; Pfander, 2013; 
Ruger, 2007). Congress changed the number of FISC judges from 7 to 11 in 2002 (Ruger, 
2007). Presumably this change was to accommodate an expected increased workload in 
response to the War on Terror. The judges preside over the FISC for one week at a time 
with the off duty judges typically assisting with unusual or complex surveillance 
applications (Walton, 2013). Despite the weekly rotation judges are expected to make 
well informed, contemplative rulings not quick decisions. 
Approval Rate 
The literature regarding FISC application rulings was polarizing with literature 
defending the practice and others excoriating it. The reason for this seems to be the way 
in which the approval rate is reported. The FISC provides an annual report to congress, 
which provides the statistical information for the number of FISA applications submitted, 
approved, and rejected (United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and 
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Communications Technologies, 2013). These reports show in the FISC’s first 20 years it 
never rejected a submitted application (Ruger, 2007). In all of FISC’s history only 11 of 
the more than 20,000 submitted applications have been rejected (Francel, 2014). This 
leads many question how critically the FISC judges review these applications and several 
media outlets routinely refer to the FISA process as a rubber stamp (Francel, 2014; 
Ruger, 2007; Walton, 2013). The criticism and the statistical information seems solid to 
those opposed to FISA. 
To those who support FISA the criticism of the FISA approval rate and the 
statistical information backing it does not have sound footing. The FISC procedures start 
well before the final application is submitted with the requestor and FISC attorneys going 
back and forth until the application is ready for final submission (Francel, 2014; Walton, 
2013). Most, if not all, applications are altered based upon the FISC attorneys’ 
recommendations, which generally make the applications acceptable to the FISC judges 
(Walton, 2013). The annual report only accounts for applications actually submitted to 
the FISC judge, meaning the applications that would have been rejected have likely been 
changed or abandoned (Francel, 2014; Walton, 2013). In addition,, as FISC’s Judge 
Walton (2013) pointed out, from 2008 through 2012, only 5 of 13,593 traditional Title III 
wiretap applications were rejected. Between the FISC attorneys’ guidance making the 
applications more acceptable to the FISC judges and the FISA approval rate being similar 
to the traditional wiretap approval rate, the rubber stamp criticism loses validity with 
those in support of FISA. 
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FISA Application v. Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. (U.S. Const. amend. IV) 
Most of those opposed to FISA claim FISA authorizations violate the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in Katz v. United States 
that Fourth Amendment protections applied to electronic searches when it intrudes on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy (Davis, 2014; Sales, 2010; Shults, 2011). The Katz 
ruling does not make the leap that Fourth Amendment protections apply in national 
security cases (Shults, 2011; Yoo, 2014). Thus the electronic surveillance warrant 
requirement only extends to criminal cases (Banks, 2010; Shults, 2011). Despite the 
robust deliberation process of FISA authorizations, in the United States v. Cavanagh the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that FISC proceedings do not satisfy Fourth 
Amendment requirements, (United States v. Cavanagh, 1986/1987). This creates a 
controversy when FISA authorized information is used in criminal proceedings.  
The Cavanagh ruling raised concerns about the use of FISA materials in criminal 
cases and strengthened the wall between FISA and criminal proceedings. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals declared that “FISA court is not a detached and neutral body, 
but functions instead as a compliant arm of the government” (United States v. Cavanagh, 
1986/1987). Rightly or wrongly this ruling combined with the perception of the FISA 
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approval rate gives the impression that FISA authorized surveillance is akin to the British 
general warrants of pre-revolutionary America. The general warrant allowed the British 
to conduct searches and seizures without probable cause of a criminal offense (Mondale 
et al., 2014; Napolitano, 2014). The Fourth Amendment was specifically designed to 
prevent such activities through specific warrant requirements (Mondale et al., 2014). 
Throughout the history of the United States, the courts have preferred specific warrants in 
the investigation of a crime (Banks, 2010; Williams, 2014). Searches not specifically 
authorized by warrants have been permitted since the founding of the country, but 
typically involve reasonable suspicion and a need for immediate search (Williams, 2014). 
The Cavanagh ruling reaffirmed the courts’ preference for traditional warrants rather than 
FISA authorizations. 
There have been controversial instances in which FISA authorized information 
was used in the prosecution of a U.S. citizen. While investigating the 2004 Madrid train 
bombings the FBI misidentified fingerprints at the bomb site as belonging to Brandon 
Mayfield (Rush, 2008). The FBI then used FISA authorizations and National Security 
Letters (NSL) to conduct various physical and electronic searches / surveillances for the 
Mayfield case (Mayfield v. United States, 2009). Next the FBI detained Mayfield without 
charge for 2 weeks (Rush, 2008). Ultimately it was discovered that Mayfield’s 
fingerprints did not match those at the site and was not likely involved in any criminal 
activities (Mayfield v. United States, 2009; Rush, 2008). The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that Mayfield’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated as the NSLs 
and FISA authorizations did not meet Fourth Amendment protections (Mayfield v. United 
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States, 2009). Mayfield was awarded $2 million for his troubles (Rush, 2008). The 
Mayfield case illustrates how FISA authorizations can be problematic when the 
investigated individual is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
Discovery 
Another common complaint against FISA authorizations in criminal cases is the 
lack of discovery. In criminal proceedings throughout the United States since early in the 
1900s the prosecution has had to provide the discovery of evidence to prevent the 
defendant from being blindsided by unexpected evidence during the trial (Heeren, 2014). 
In FISA cases defendants are not likely to have total access to the prosecutor’s evidence 
against them as its disclosure is always suppressed (Harper, 2014; Howell & Lesemann, 
2007). This is especially troublesome if the legality of the FISA authorized surveillance is 
questioned as the defense counsel is never granted access to FISA materials (Harper, 
2014). In the criminal setting FISA obtained information is usually controversial and 
denying the defense discovery due to security classification creates constitutionality 
concerns (Butler, 2013). The lack of discovery in criminal cases with FISA authorized 
surveillance could lead to abuses or at least the perception of abuse as the defendant has 
less protections than in a traditional warranted surveillance.  
This potential for abuses or the appearance of abuses is largely because FISA was 
not originally drafted to be used in criminal proceedings. Changes to FISA created the 
prospective contentions. The USA PATRIOT Act contained some of the first and more 
significant FISA changes. More specifically most of the changes are in Title II of the 
USA PATRIOT Act. The next section addressed the title. 
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USA PATRIOT Act – Title II 
As mentioned in the introduction of the USA PATRIOT Act was passed during 
the turbulent weeks following the 2001 terrorist attacks with near unanimous support, but 
has since been the subject of criticism. On September 24, 2001 the DOJ presented a draft 
of the requested authorities to the House of Representatives (Gibbons, 2007). The DOJ’s 
requests rapidly gained traction. On October 4, 2001 a draft was introduced to the Senate 
and one week later received Senate approval (Baldwin & Koslosky, 2012). The final 
version of the act introduced to congress on October 23, 2001 was passed with 83% of 
the House of Representatives voting yea on October 24, 2001 and 98% of the Senate 
voting yea on October 25, 2001 (GovTrack.US website, 2004). President Bush signed the 
bill into law on October 27, 2001 (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). By modern standards the 
statute was enacted exceedingly quickly, but as the PET would explain speed in 
enactment does not necessarily translate into flawlessness. 
The USA PATRIOT Act’s enactment is a prime example of the PET in action. 
The external shock to the system was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This 
eliminated the standard ebb and flow of incremental security policy change for the abrupt 
changes ushered in under the USA PATRIOT Act. The law rapidly fixed many national 
security vulnerabilities, as demanded by the American public. As with many of the 
previously mentioned, rapidly enacted national security policies, the legislators faced a 
serious time crunch. They needed to act quickly to meet the electorate’s mandates, which 
did not give them time to craft the most faultless bill possible. This perfectly represents 
the bounded rationality of the PET. Since the act became law there have been concerns 
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about some of the law’s faults. Some of these concerns have been soundly rejected or 
ignored while others have garnered support and lead to amendments to the USA 
PATRIOT Act. This illustrates the shift back to incremental policy changes. 
Among the first to identify the polarizing effects of the USA PATRIOT Act was 
President Bush. The acronym USA PATRIOT Act is polarizing in that it implies that 
disagreeing with provisions of the act is unpatriotic (Levinson, 2008). President Bush had 
pushed for rapid congressional approval of the act, but opposed its name (Baker, 2013; 
Jones, 2012). The president’s opposition to the name was so strong that he considered 
sending it back for revision, but worried about the political fallout and potential danger of 
delaying the act (Baker, 2013; Jones, 2012). There was a national sense of urgency at the 
time that mandated increased security measures (Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Traister, 
2013). The terrorist attacks generated a temporary window of opportunity, in which 
partisan politics subsided allowing congress and the president to come together to 
strengthen security (Traister, 2013). Rejecting the act based upon its name would have 
appeared petty and imprudent, because a speedy enactment seemed necessary at the time. 
The unifying urgency eventually faded. As the political environment returned to a 
competitive atmosphere, the USA PATRIOT Act was looked at more critically. 
Contentions began to emerge about the surveillance aspects of Title II of the law. The 
next portion of the literature review examined some of the more controversial aspects of 
Title II. This segment of the literature review built the academic foundation about Title II 
and illustrated the ideological divide regarding the title. 
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Section 203: Information Sharing 
One of the increased security measures demanded by the public was improved 
information sharing amongst intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The driving 
force behind the public’s demand for information sharing was primarily for predicting 
terror attacks (De Goede, Simon, & Hoijtink, 2014). The general premise is that the 
various information gathering entities might fail to piece together bits of information 
because they are focused on their agencies’ specific missions (Sales, 2010). This is a 
noble goal, but its practical implementation needs to be carefully monitored for potential 
mission creep; because while foreign led terrorist attacks are subject to national security 
law, domestic terrorism is a criminal offense. The Keith ruling prevents information 
obtained through national security intelligence gathering to be used in criminal cases 
unless a traditional warrant was used to collect the information (Baldwin & Koslosky, 
2012). The legality of any information sharing in criminal cases must be assessed using 
this precedence. 
Striking the appropriate procedures for sharing information amongst agencies has 
been debated for some time. In the 1980s and 1990s the DOJ conducted limited 
interagency information sharing in the prosecution of criminal cases (9/11 Commission, 
2004). In the 1980s various joint counterterrorism task forces provided platforms for 
information exchange between local law enforcement and federal authorities (Jones, 
2011). By 1995 the DOJ essentially abandoned the practice due to concerns of legality 
(Sales, 2010). There was a general fear in the department that using information gathered 
for another criminal or intelligence investigation could be a “career ender”, especially if 
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the information was obtained through FISA authorizations (9/11 Commission, 2004). 
This fear, combined with the innate secretive nature of any investigation, led prosecutors 
to avoid providing information to other agencies or using others’ information in their 
cases. In 2001 the federal government would seek to change this tendency. 
Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act is encourages information sharing 
amongst government agencies, but has been the center of some debate. As with most 
contentions involving the USA PATRIOT Act, the controversial authorities does not 
come solely from Section 203, but rather an amalgamation of sections, laws, policies, and 
procedures. Sections 203, 504, and 905, as well as, Title II of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 and Title II of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 
all effect post 9/11 interagency information sharing (H.R. Res. 3525, 2002; H.R. Res. 
5005, 2002; Martin, 2005; H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). In addition, Executive Order 12333 
and the 3 executive orders that amend it, guide the collective information gathering and 
dissemination operations inside and outside the nation (Exec. Order No. 12333, 1981-
2008; United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies, 2013). Information sharing operations are not exclusively dictated by 
Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
While Section 203 is not the sole source of information sharing legislature, its 
cumulative effects with Section 504 and Section 905 are significant. Section 203 
essentially permits and directs law enforcement officials of varying jurisdiction to 
disclose information pertaining to national security to federal intelligence officials 
(DeRosa, 2005; H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). Section 504 allows federal intelligence officials 
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operating under FISC authorizations to coordinate and share information with law 
enforcement (Martin, 2005; H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). Section 905 requires any information 
gathered that might pertain to national security must be promptly disclosed to the 
Director of National Intelligence (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001; Philbin, 2002). In a 2002 DOJ 
legal counsel opinion, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General explained that sections 203 
and 905 have a necessary synergistic effect that authorizes and requires disclosure while 
safeguarding confidentiality provisions (Philbin, 2002). The combined effects of these 3 
sections constitute the USA PATRIOT Act’s information sharing properties. 
Some people have and continue to question the legality of the USA PATRIOT 
Act’s information sharing properties. In the aforementioned DOJ legal opinion, Philbin 
(2002) recognized that no law, including the USA PATRIOT Act, is perfect. Martin 
(2005) argued that Section 203, 504, and 905 created an atmosphere in which the 
government overstepped its bounds in several ways. The argument is the sections create 
an environment in which the government disregards privacy, stores investigative 
information beyond its authorized time period, and bogs down national security 
operations with insignificant material related to criminal cases (Martin, 2005). Sales 
(2010) addressed similar concerns of privacy intrusion and “flooding” investigators with 
inconsequential information. More recently Husain (2014) argued that information 
sharing generated by the USA PATRIOT Act is appropriate for law enforcement agencies 
operating with traditional warrants or for intelligence agencies working under FISA, but 
is absolutely inappropriate for FISA information to be shared for criminal prosecution. 
Husain (2014) argued that the theoretical wall between domestic and criminal 
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investigations should be restored to prevent civil liberty offenses. Husain’s analysis is 
backed by some legal precedence. 
The legal precedence of FISA cases has included the aforementioned Cavanagh 
and Mayfield cases, both of which were critical of FISA information in criminal cases, 
but FISC authorized surveillance has never truly been forbidden in criminal proceedings. 
In the Cavanagh case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that FISC authorizations 
do not meet the same standards as a traditional warrant, which added inherent legal 
uncertainty to information sharing in criminal cases (Ruger, 2007; Sales, 2010; United 
States v. Cavanagh, 1986/1987). There is a general understanding that Fourth 
Amendment restricts FISA obtained information in criminal cases (Shults, 2011). While 
the Cavanagh and Mayfield cases both address the Fourth Amendment concerns never 
ruling has prevented the use of FISC authorizations in criminal cases (Mayfield v. United 
States, 2009; Rush, 2008; United States v. Cavanagh, 1986/1987). Rush (2008) argued 
that in both instances the Ninth Circuit attacked FISA procedures, but failed to actually 
rule on the constitutionality of FISA surveillance in criminal proceedings. These legal 
actions are significant in understanding the legal precedence of FISA in criminal cases, 
but they do not prevent FISA information from being used to prosecute criminals. 
The Ninth Circuit judgments do not prevent prosecutors from using FISA 
information and as evident by the Cavanagh case, the use of FISC permissions in 
criminal prosecution precedes the USA PATRIOT Act. In general sections 203 and 905 
are designed to eliminate hesitancy in providing information regarding a terrorist threat, 
discovered during a criminal investigation, to the appropriate federal authority (Kisswani, 
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2011; H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). As previously mentioned the 9/11 Commission uncovered a 
reluctance in the law enforcement and intelligence communities to share information, 
because of a fear of legal or administrative repercussions (9/11 Commission, 2004). 
Despite this finding there were procedures for information sharing long before the USA 
PATRIOT Act. Confusing internal policies and misunderstandings of federal statutes is 
what created the “wall” that prevented the free exchange of information between the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities (9/11 Commission, 2004; ACLU, 2011). 
Section 203’s effect was not in changing federal law, but removing misconceptions about 
information sharing (ACLU, 2011; DOJ, 2005). In this way Section 203 is an effective 
provision. Section 203 removed any doubt that it is legal for agencies to share grand jury, 
electronic surveillance, and foreign intelligence information. 
Critics of the USA PATRIOT Act contend that the sharing of grand jury 
information can lead to personal liberty abuses. Section 203 (a) provides guidelines for 
the sharing of grand jury information (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). Grand juries are law 
enforcement investigations conducted in secret to determine if criminal charges are 
warranted (Merkey, 2015). The grand jury process is constitutionally protected by the 
Fifth Amendment and has been practiced in America since colonial times (Collins, 2002; 
Merkey, 2015). The main advantage of a grand jury is the subpoena duces tecum. The 
subpoena duces tecum directs the production of evidence with less or insignificant 
probable cause (Donohue, 2014). Collins (2002) opined that while sharing grand jury 
information is beneficial to national security officials, it could also lead to abuses because 
of the less rigid requirements, secret nature, and lack of congressional oversight. Banks 
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(2010) noted that critics of Section 203 believe the sharing of grand jury information 
compromises civil liberties. Martin (2005) and Husain (2014) both contend that 
information sharing during criminal or potential criminal investigations could lead to 
political abuse by the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or similar 
federal intelligence entity.  
The 9/11 Commission recognized that a substantial information gap existed in the 
Osama bin Laden case precisely because the FBI’s grand jury information could not be 
paired with the CIA’s intelligence (9/11 Commission, 2004). Dahl (2014) observed that 
bin Laden was tracked down and successfully killed, because of increased interagency 
information sharing. Sales (2010) explained that sharing bits of information creates a 
mosaic allowing investigators to develop a clearer picture of the situation. In United 
States v. Jones and United States v. Maynard the FBI and the District of Columbia 
Metropolitan Police Department Safe Streets Task Force conducted several types of 
surveillance which led to convictions of Jones and Maynard in an illegal drug bust 
(United States v. Antoine Jones, 2012; United States v. Lawrence Maynard, 2010). The 
FBI and police tracked the pair in the course of several weeks using wiretaps, direct 
observation, and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to establish their daily patterns 
eventually leading to their arrests and convictions (Kerr, 2012; United States v. Antoine 
Jones, 2012; United States v. Lawrence Maynard, 2010). Jones and Maynard appealed 
their convictions based upon the “mosaic” of the surveillance used against them (Kerr, 
2012; United States v. Antoine Jones, 2012; United States v. Lawrence Maynard, 2010). 
The mosaic theory asserts that collective, long term surveillance regardless of the level of 
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intrusion constitutes a search (Kerr, 2012). While the Jones and Maynard case did not 
truly illustrate the information sharing described in the USA PATRIOT Act it did 
illustrate how effective the mosaic of surveillance can be.  
The literature review of the USA PATRIOT Act information sharing provisions 
has revealed several key points. First following the terrorist attacks of 2001 the American 
public demanded increased information sharing (Ripberger, 2011; Sales, 2010). The 
assumption that FISA had created a wall between the agencies preventing information 
exchange had been exaggerated (ACLU, 2011; DOJ, 2005). There were ways for 
interagency information exchange, but confusing policies prevented it (9/11 Commission, 
2004). The USA PATRIOT Act clarified and even demanded information exchange 
(ACLU, 2011; DOJ, 2005). Finally the literature review illustrated a divide a between 
those that support the information sharing aspects and those that oppose it. 
 There was a notable literature gap explaining any common between the opposing 
ideologies. Some of the opposing groups suggest basic reversal of the law, or increased 
oversight, but any change would need to meet the investigatory requirements of law 
enforcement and national security. There was not any literature that addressed how 
information can be shared while mitigating civil liberty concerns. This dissertation will 
focus on examining the common ground between those in opposition to the USA 
PATRIOT Act and those who support it. While Section 203 is not the most controversial 
section in Title II concerns about information sharing seem to contribute to the more 
contentious sections. 
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Section 206: Roving Wiretaps 
Section 206 is worth briefly mentioning in this literary review, because there has 
been limited concerns about FISC approved roving wiretaps. Section 206 allows FISA to 
authorize roving electronic surveillance (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). A roving (multipoint) 
wiretap order targets a person rather than a specific electronic device in an effort to track 
foreign agents as they cycle through communication devices ( DOJ, 2005). Prior to the 
adoption of Section 206 spies or terrorists, trained in tradecraft, understood simply 
changing phones would thwart surveillance (Mueller, 2005). Multipoint electronic 
surveillance has been part of criminal investigations since 1986. Section 106 (d) of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 allows criminal investigators to 
apply for an order attached to a specific person allowing them to wiretap any device the 
person uses (H.R. Res. 3778, 1986). 
 Despite the long standing practice of roving wiretaps in criminal investigations 
the ACLU and others have expressed some concerns about granting this authority to 
intelligence agencies. The ACLU contends the secrecy of FISC authorizations, unlike 
those of traditional courts, does not facilitate adequate judicial oversight of multipoint 
surveillance (ACLU, 2011). The claim implies there is a potential for intelligence 
agencies to abuse this authorization. In addition, the ACLU (2011) asserted that the 
provision could be read to require neither a specific name nor device. This could be 
troubling, if found to be accurate, as it could be used to justify sweeping surveillance of 
broad sections of the population. 
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Some political leaders have opposed the concept of roving wiretaps in foreign 
intelligence. One of the earliest opponents to the practice was U.S. Representative Jan 
Schakowsky, Chief Deputy Whip. The congresswoman voted against the USA PATRIOT 
Act in 2001 in part due to the roving wiretap provision. Then she voted against the 
extension of the provision in 2005 (Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky website, 2005). 
Representative Schakowsky urged Congress to allow the practice of roving wiretaps to 
expire and warned against the potential erosion of civil liberties due to the USA 
PATRIOT Act. In her words the “Sweeping and unnecessary federal surveillance and 
unchecked law enforcement powers undermine the rights that are the cornerstone of our 
democracy" (Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky website, 2005, para. 10). 
 It is difficult to determine the validity of these arguments given the secretive 
nature of foreign intelligence surveillance. It is easy; however, to realize the importance 
of roving wiretaps to national security agencies. Without this authorization a spy or 
foreign terrorist could merely use multiple phone to avoid electronic surveillance. There 
needs to be a pragmatic approach to electronic surveillance of foreign threats, but the 
approach must not unjustly erode civil liberties. Like Section 203, there is a split between 
those opposed to the authority and those in support of it, but unlike Section 203 there is 
little recent scholarly research on Section 206. On June 1, 2015 Section 206 technically 
expired as a second order effect of Senator Rand Paul’s procedural delay of the renewal 
of Section 215 (Kelly, 2015). The section was inactive for slightly more than 24 hours 
prior to it getting re-enacted in the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (H.R. Res. 2048, 2015). 
The bulk of academic work mentioning the section is more than 5 years old and when 
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combined with the secretive nature of foreign intelligence surveillance, the legitimacy of 
the concerns cannot be qualified in this dissertation. 
Section 213: Delayed Notice 
Section 213, much like Section 206, was somewhat controversial at first, but has 
not raised much concern recently. Section 213 allows for the delayed notification of the 
execution of warrants in both criminal and foreign intelligence cases (H.R. Res. 3162, 
2001). The section allows for investigators to petition the courts for authorization to 
conduct surreptitious searches or seizures (Witmore-Rich, 2014; Xhelili & Crowne, 
2012). The DOJ has benefitted the most from the section. Section 213 searches have been 
used in various crimes such as child pornography, drug trafficking, etc. and is not limited 
to international terrorism (DOJ website, 2013). Approximately 75% of the delayed notice 
authorizations were used in drug trafficking investigations (Witmore-Rich, 2014). The 
success of the section has been overshadowed at time by controversy. 
The contentions began early in the life of the USA PATRIOT Act. A 2005 Center 
Survey Research & Analysis (CSRA) survey found that 71% of Americans opposed the 
sneak and peak provision (Herman, 2006). There were a variety of reasons for the 
opposition. First many were concerned because the delayed notification is primarily used 
in routine criminal investigations with only one percent of authorizations having a 
connection to terrorism (Witmore-Rich, 2014). Next the length of notification delay and 
scope of the search or seizure is rather vague and subject to change on a case by case 
basis (Herman, 2006). Finally the provision limits the likelihood that the suspect is able 
to observe the search or seizure going against American and English law dating back to 
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the Magna Carta (Whitehead & Aden, 2002; Witmore-Rich, 2014). Despite these 
arguments there has been little recent attention paid to the subject in the public, political, 
or academic realms. The relevance of reviewing the literature pertaining to this section is 
to help build a better overall understanding of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Section 215: Access to Records 
Unlike Section 206 or Section 213, Section 215 has received political, academic, 
and media attention in the past couple years. Section 215 amends the FISA to grant the 
FBI access to “any tangible things” relevant to an international terrorism or foreign 
intelligence investigation (H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). Davis (2014) opined that the change 
from “business record” to “any tangible things” broadly expanded the government’s 
investigative authorities by granting new accesses. Yoo (2014) explained that the tangible 
things clause of Section 215 is part of the legal basis for the bulk metadata collection 
programs revealed by Edward Snowden in June 2013. Section 215 programmatic 
surveillance practices are further sanctioned by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and 
the FISA Amendment Acts Reauthorization Act of 2012 (Anderson, 2014; Banks, 2010; 
Gilbert, 2013). Since the Snowden controversies Section 215 has been repeatedly in the 
public eye, but the contentions did not begin with Snowden’s June 2013 leaks. 
In fact Section 215 was almost immediately considered contentious by some. 
Early in the section’s existence, opponents raised concerns that investigators accessing 
library records could infringe upon library users’ privacy rights (Matz, 2008). Whitehead 
and Aden (2002) argued Section 215 gave investigators secret access to any record 
without probable cause and little oversight. Whitehead and Aden were not alone in these 
79 
 
 
concerns. By September 2003 the public outcry for privacy in libraries led to the DOJ 
declassifying statistical information about the section, which had reportedly never been 
used at the time (Herman, 2006). The public apprehension of potential Section 215 
abuses eventually led to the section being amended. 
The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 addressed the 
procedures for applying for, approving, and conducting Section 215 searches (Matz, 
2008). The major change from the act was the requirement of “a statement of facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible objects sought are 
relevant” (H.R. Res. 3199, 2005). This change in conjunction with other amendments 
positively affected public opinion about the section. Theissen (2012) opined that the 
amendments of 2005 and 2006 clarified the law and resolved much of the legal concerns. 
Judging by a relative lack of scholarly work regarding Section 215 between 2006 and 
2013, as well as some praise of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005, it seems the amendments quelled some of the early contentions about the 
section. 
As previously mentioned, the general acceptance of the section was short lived. 
The 2013 Snowden leaks led to the public disclosure of multiple NSA domestic 
surveillance programs authorized under Section 215 (Banks & Tauber, 2014). Section 
215 of the FISA allows the government to store bulk telephony metadata such as phone 
numbers and time stamps (United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communications Technologies, 2013). The various NSA programs seemed to have ran 
somewhat consistently between 2006 and 2013 with FISC authorizing bulk metadata 
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collection at least 34 times covering all major telecommunication service providers 
(Donohue, 2014). Most of this bulk collection was consolidated into a single database 
essentially spanning 5 years’ worth of U.S. cell phone activities (Davis, 2014). The 
revelation of the bulk collection led many to wonder how such a large amount of data 
could possibly be relevant to any investigation (McGowan, 2014). There is some 
credibility to this assertion.  
The main contention with Section 215 authorized bulk collections is its 
questionable legality. Barnett (2015), Berghel (2014), Davis (2014), Kris (2014), 
McGowan (2014), and Regan (2014) raised concerns that any bulk collection should be 
considered a search without probable cause; thus, violating Fourth Amendment 
protections. The primary concern is the overwhelming majority of call data collected was 
of innocent people making innocent calls, which could not be relevant to any 
investigation (Barnett, 2015; Kris, 2014; Regan, 2014). Regan (2014) further claimed 
bulk collection could potentially be used to monitor and punish dissenting, 
constitutionally protected, voices in the United States. Davis (2014) warned that the 
NSA’s bulk collection creates a moral hazard as the secrecy of database could lead to 
rampant abuse without fear of retribution. McGowan (2014) asserted the metadata 
collection program is an illegal, unwarranted invasion of privacy. Kris (2014) 
additionally pointed out that Section 215 is specifically written to authorize FBI 
collection procedures not NSA collections, which should limit 215 authorizations strictly 
to the FBI. On May 7, 2015 the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in New York ruled the 
programmatic surveillance practices should be considered an overextension of the law, 
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but did not rule on the constitutionality of the program and instead noted Section 215 
would undergo congressional review in June 2015 (Mills, 2015; De Vogue, 2015). In 
June 2015 Senator Rand Paul utilized a procedural maneuver to ensure Section 215 
would expire. The culmination of these issues raises serious concerns about bulk 
collection.  
Despite these concerns there are also many voices in support of the bulk 
collection procedures. Gilbert (2013), Mastracci (2014), Walton (2013), and Yoo (2014) 
contended that bulk collection authorized by Section 215 is legal. Mastracci (2014) 
opined that bulk metadata collection does not constitute a search, does not violate Fourth 
Amendment protections, and is essential for counterterrorism operations. Yoo (2014) 
articulated that Section 215 is not unique in American legal history, because its 
authorizations are basically the same as a grand jury subpoena. Walton (2013) explained 
the extensive legal considerations that goes into authorizing the now somewhat routine 
bulk collection authorizations. Gilbert (2013) explained that prior to the USA PATRIOT 
Act metadata collection crossing state lines could require several different warrants, but 
now the same collection can be achieved by a single authorization. The single 
authorization is more practical and allows investigators to focus more time on the 
investigation (Gilbert, 2013). With the Gilbert article it is important point out the article 
was published before the Snowden leaks. The Gilbert, Mastracci, Walton, and Yoo works 
create a sense of dismissal of Section 215 apprehensions. 
Other scholars that seemingly oppose Section 215 and / or bulk metadata 
collection have also acknowledged an existing legal precedence for the procedures. Bedi 
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(2014), Davis (2014), McGowan (2014), and the United States President’s Review Group 
on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (2013) recognized the Third Party 
Doctrine provides the legal precedence for Section 215 bulk collections. The Third Party 
Doctrine states that any record or information voluntarily given to a third party no longer 
is subject to the same constitutional protections as if the records were maintained by the 
individual (Bedi, 2014; Davis, 2014; Yoo, 2014). The Third Party Doctrine was 
established through the court cases of United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland, as 
well as the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (United States President’s Review 
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 2013). Xhelili & Crowne 
(2012) argued information voluntarily presented to a third party could then collected by 
the government, as was the case in United States v. Miller. The Miller case dealt with 
bank records being seized while the Smith case dealt with phone records being seized in 
an investigation (United States President’s Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communications Technologies, 2013). The Smith case is of particular importance, 
because its 1979 Supreme Court ruling determined there was no reasonable expectation 
of privacy with metadata (McGowan, 2014). This has provided more than 3.5 decades of 
legal precedence involving metadata collection, albeit never on the scale of the current 
NSA collections. 
Critics allege the effectiveness of the NSA database authorized by Section 215 
does not justify its size and scope of collection. The NSA metadata database is 
presumably the largest surveillance related database in the world containing call 
information on billions of calls (Regan, 2014). Despite capturing a portion of cellphone 
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metadata in the United States the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) explained the 
database has been used less than 300 times (Davis, 2014). Morrison (2014) argued that 
data mining on the scale of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection is likely frivolous, 
because it wastes limited resources and increases the proverbial “haystack”. There seems 
to be truth to the belief that the practice of bulk metadata is ineffective, but do to the 
secretive nature of the NSA it is difficult to determine the true effectiveness of the 
program. 
The importance of Section 215 in this literature review is it illustrated the rift 
between those who support the section and those who oppose it. The benefits of Section 
215 all involve the practical applications of the section. The contentions tend to center on 
the legality of the section and the NSA metadata collection. Some claim the NSA 
metadata collection is impractical, but this is difficult to truly judge as the NSA doesn’t 
typically publish the results of investigations. Even the courts are divided on the legality 
of the section. Judge Leon of the District Court for the District of Columbia held in 
Klayman v. Obama, that the bulk collection of telephony metadata violates the Fourth 
Amendment (Davis, 2014). Then just 11 days later in American Civil Liberties Union v. 
Clapper, Judge Pauley ruled the bulk collection is not even a search (Davis, 2014). The 
facts, opinions, and analysis gathered from these articles left a literature gap of how the 
benefits of the section can be achieved while mitigating the controversies. 
Section 218: Significant Purpose 
Section 218 is one of the smallest sections of the USA PATRIOT Act, but it has 
at times been the center of some contention. Section 218 amends sections 104 and 303 of 
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the FISA by striking ‘‘the purpose’’ and inserting ‘‘a significant purpose’’ (H.R. Res. 
3162, 2001). This simple change in wording expanded FISA authorizations to be 
available for non-foreign intelligence related cases, perhaps even including common law 
enforcement investigations (Francel, 2014; Sales, 2010). The term “significant” was 
added as a compromise between the legislators wanting the amendment to read “a 
purpose” and those opposed to the amendment all together (Glick, 2010). The conflict 
between the 2 sides basically centered on whether it was appropriate for FISA 
authorizations to be used in criminal investigations.  
While there has not been many recent scholarly works regarding Section 218, 
there is still a divide between those whom embrace the section and those whom oppose it. 
Francel (2014) contended that FISA was created with the intent purpose of preventing 
secret investigations to be used in common criminal proceeding and Section 218 alters 
the original intent of the law. Glick (2010) dismissed similar assertions stating that the 
section does not violate any statute and is a practical solution for both intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement. For the purpose of this literature review, Section 218 
furthers the divide between USA PATRIOT Act support and opposition. It also illustrated 
how the Title II sections of the USA PATRIOT Act are interconnected. For example 
theoretically an intelligence investigator could obtain a FISA authorization for a roving 
wiretap with delayed notification through Sections 206, 213, and 218, then share the 
information with a criminal prosecutor through Section 203. These observations made 
Section 218 important to this dissertation. 
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Summary of Literature 
Punctuated Equilibrium 
The PET provided the theoretical framework for this dissertation. A 
comprehensive understanding of the theory was essential, because PET was clearly 
illustrated with each of the national security policies examined in the literature review. 
The Givel (2010) description of PET was the most coherent of all the literature reviewed 
for this dissertation. PET is “long-term and relatively incremental policy change followed 
by an exogenous shock to a policy monopoly resulting in a tipping point oriented toward 
sharp and explosive policy change” (Givel, 2010, p. 189). The reviewed literature 
regarding PET provided a basic understanding of the theory, but reviewing security 
policies throughout America’s history validated the theory.  
Security Policy History 
Reviewing U.S. national security policy was necessary for this dissertation in 
many ways. First it legitimizes PET by showing a consistent pattern of security policies 
remaining stagnant for long periods of time then rapidly and dramatically changing 
during episodes of crisis. Following the crisis, incremental changes typically bring the 
policy back to more equilibrium between civil liberties and security. Examining the ebb 
and flow of security strategies indicated that controversy, partisan politics, and 
ideological polarization is nothing new to national security policies. In addition, the 
historical review provided insight into the original intent of several statutes, policies, and 
procedures. The early American security policy history was particularly valuable as it 
demonstrated the Founding Fathers’ vision of balancing national security with personal 
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freedoms. Finally history confirms that U.S. national security policies occasionally lead 
to abuses. 
Surveillance Scandals 
Exploring historic surveillance abuses was as essential to understanding the 
development of current national security policies as PET and previous security practices. 
The various FBI and Watergate scandals contributed to national security discussions by 
providing concrete examples of what the American populace would not tolerate. They 
each demonstrated how access to unconstrained surveillance assets has a tendency of 
leading to corruption. Time and time again surveillance has been used for personal 
political gain. Modern national security debates often look for the potential for abuse in 
an effort to avoid mistakes of the past. Often the debate spills into the courtroom. 
Court Decisions 
The Olmstead, Katz, and Keith court decisions were also paramount to the 
development of modern national security policies. Among the most important aspects of 
understanding any law is establishing firm legal precedence by reflecting upon previous 
decisions (Strouthes, 2007). The Olmstead ruling briefly established the notion that 
electronic surveillance did not constitute a search and was thus not subject to Fourth 
Amendment protections (Bedi, 2014; Ferguson, 2014). The Katz ruling reversed the 
Olmstead decision, but only in criminal cases (Francel, 2014; Harper, 2014). The Keith 
decision established the notion that surveillance must have either a direct connection to a 
foreign power or be authorized by a warrant (Harper, 2014; Howell & Lesemann, 2007; 
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Shults, 2011). These court cases and the others examined in this literature review shaped 
not only the law, but the public opinion about how surveillance should be conducted. 
Church Committee 
The Church Committee investigated, exposed, and provided suggestions for 
eliminating numerous questionable surveillance practices and policies (Berghel, 2014). 
Never before or since has there been such a comprehensive, objective, and public 
examination of U.S. surveillance operations (Mondale et al., 2014). No literature review 
involving modern surveillance policies would be complete without exploring the Church 
Committee Reports. The reports chronicled several decades of surveillance practices and 
developed recommendations based upon these findings (S. Rep. No. 94-755, 1976). 
These recommendations ultimately led to the FISA. 
FISA / USA PATRIOT Act 
The FISA is as important to this dissertation as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
FISA was established to constrain the federal government’s domestic surveillance 
procedures (Butler, 2013). As described in the FISA section of this literature review, 
FISA created a theoretical wall between domestic and foreign investigations. This wall 
has been considered both a positive development for civil liberties and a negative 
development for national security concerns (Francel, 2014; Yoo, 2014). Much of Title II 
of the USA PATRIOT Act is designed to strike a balance in the FISA wall between 
security and liberty concerns (Gilbert, 2013; Harper, 2014). These amendments to FISA 
are at the center of USA PATRIOT Act controversies and there is adequate literature both 
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in support and opposition to the amendments. There was, however; a literature gap 
regarding any common ground between the sides of the debate. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this case study was to examine the advantages and contentions of 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to better understand how PET described bounded 
rationality prevented incremental policy change from achieving the objectives of the 
provisions while mitigating the potential for or perception of the circumvention of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Chapter 4, I reaffirm the research 
questions and explain the central concept, research design, and methodology. After 
providing an in-depth look at how I conducted the study, I address trustworthiness and 
ethical concerns associated with the study. All studies have some issues of 
trustworthiness and ethical considerations. In this chapter, I identify these matters and 
plans for combatting the potential problems. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Central Research Question – Qualitative:  
How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent 
incremental change from achieving the security objectives of Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? 
Subquestion 1 - Qualitative:  
How is political and ideological polarization prolonging the stagnation period of 
the PET of public policy change with the USA PATRIOT Act? 
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Subquestion 2 - Qualitative:  
How does the PET of public policy change explain the enactment and extensions 
of the USA PATRIOT Act? 
Subquestion 3 - Qualitative:  
How does Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affect U.S. law? 
Subquestion 4 - Qualitative:  
What are the benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act? 
Subquestion 5 - Qualitative:  
How is Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act controversial? 
Central Concept 
The central concept of this study centered on the division between those that 
support Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act and those that oppose it. This dissertation 
proposed it might be able meet the surveillance and information sharing objectives of the 
Title II provisions while mitigating the risk of circumventing Fourth Amendment 
protections. There have been, as I described in the literature review, repeated 
controversies related to Title II. It was essential to examine these contentions in the 
literature review to develop the academic foundation of the research. In the literature 
review, I pinpointed a literature gap involving how the differing factions agree or any 
potential for compromise. This dissertation contributed to filling this important gap. 
Research Design 
This dissertation was a case study. Case studies provide an in depth, contextual 
examination of a specific facet of a subject (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2012). The case study 
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approach is a preferred method of examining a law or policy, because of the depth of the 
analysis allows the researcher to truly examine the effectiveness of given strategies 
(Stacks, 2007). This is exactly what this dissertation hoped to accomplish; examine 
competing strategies and look for areas of compromise. More specifically, I used a 
holistic, single-case study to accomplish that goal. A holistic, single-case study, as 
defined by Yin (2014), is a study that concentrates on a lone unit of analysis without 
embedded subunits. The unit of analysis for this research was Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.  
There are several reasons this study focused only on Title II. First, of all the 
controversies associated with the USA PATRIOT Act, none better illustrated the 
dissention between supporters and critics of the title. This provided a comprehensive 
answer to the central research question and subquestions. Second, the disagreement about 
Title II is a current point of contention. During this dissertation, a May 2015 court ruling 
soundly pushed the topic back to Congress (De Vogue, 2015; Mills, 2015). The House of 
Representatives renewed the act, but the Senate failed to vote in time to confirm the 
renewal allowing Section 215 and others to expire (Kelly, 2015). The expiration did not 
last, as congress reauthorized Section 215 the next day with the passage of the USA 
FREEDOM Act.  
The bulk metadata collection first authorized by Section 215 and recently the 
USA FREEDOM Act is an excellent example of Title II controversy. Much of the latest 
data collected and analyzed in this dissertation focused on the bulk metadata program. In 
addition, the bulk collection was a continuous endeavor that was reauthorized several 
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times per year to collect from each of the communication carriers, which explains why 
the analysis contained a disproportionate focus on the bulk metadata collection program. 
Finally most other controversies involving the USA PATRIOT Act are linked to a web of 
other laws or there is some disagreement about what actually authorizes the controversial 
action, but the government has been clear that Section 215 is the authority for the NSA’s 
bulk collection efforts. Information about other controversial programs, policies, and 
even potential programs, including roving wiretaps, library record collections, and 
information sharing also contributed to the data analysis. These simple reasons make 
Title II an excellent case for determining if the objectives could be met without 
potentially violating Fourth Amendment protections.  
In addition to having a well-defined unit of analysis, case studies must be clearly 
bounded (Putney, 2010; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2012). Time is a common boundary for most 
case studies (Yin, 2014). Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is clearly bounded by time as 
the act came into existence in 2001. In addition to this chronological boundary there is 
another time related boundary is found in the study’s theoretical framework. 
The PET of public policy change in itself provides limited construct boundaries, 
but this case study is looking for information that could potentially be used in the specific 
incremental change period of PET. Yin (2014) opined that case boundaries are often 
“fuzzy”, however; a sound theoretical framework can assist in defining the boundaries. 
The PET incremental change period has a unique style of bounded rationality with a high 
resistance to change and low political capital (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Boushey, 
2012; Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). Any data deemed to be useful to this case study 
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would need to lower the resistance threshold while increasing political motivation for 
change. This creates a clearly defined boundary. Limiting the data to information directly 
related to the incremental change process creates a substantial boundary. This is not the 
most significant boundary for this particular case. 
The most significant boundary for this case is its central focus on examining 
potential legislative refinement of data mining and information sharing. These 2 activities 
comprise most of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The synergistic effects of data 
mining and information sharing is at the center of most of the contentions with Title II. 
Focusing on these 2 specific activities established an effective boundary for this case 
study. This is essential for the practicality of the study as it narrowed the emphasis to a 
manageable topic. 
The second most important boundary for this case study was, as defined by the 
central research question, the specificity of achieving the security goals of Title II without 
circumventing the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This greatly narrowed the 
focus of the case study as the bulk of Title II focuses on data mining and information 
sharing. Scholars and policy makers have identified multiple potential conflicts between 
the USA PATRIOT Act and the constitution. The boundary of only addressing the Fourth 
Amendment limited the size and scope of the study without diminishing its significance. 
The constitution is not the only legal boundary for this study. 
The case was also bound by Title II of USA PATRIOT Act, FISA, and the 
procedures of FISC. It is important to note that many scholars might argue that some 
programs attributed to Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act, including the NSA 
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programmatic operate outside the letter of the law. Barnett (2015), Berghel (2014), Kris 
(2014), McGowan (2014), and Regan (2014) argued that the bulk collections violate 
Fourth Amendment protections, because the lack of probable cause makes the collection 
an unreasonable search. Other scholars acknowledge the Third Party Doctrine, which 
essentially states that any information voluntarily turned over to a third party loses its 
privacy protections thus making the bulk metadata collection legal (Bedi, 2014; Davis, 
2014; Xhelili & Crowne, 2012; Yoo, 2014). Kris (2014) further observed if taken 
literally, Section 215 only applies to the FBI not the NSA, making the collections illegal. 
As described in the literature review, the courts have issued conflicting decisions about 
the legality of surveillance practice (Davis, 2014). Despite the concerns of legality the 
program remains. For the purpose of this case study the NSA programmatic surveillance 
program is bound by the legal system. 
Case studies are all also bounded by participation and sampling criteria (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). The draft sampling plan for this dissertation contemplated 
drawing data from a wide variety of civil liberty organizations that oppose Title II of the 
USA PATRIOT Act and multiple government organizations that benefit from the 
increased authorities of the title. While this would have generated an overabundance of 
information for the case study, it simply was not practical due to time and resource 
considerations. To narrow the scope of the study the sampling will be limited to the 
ACLU and DOJ. The ACLU is the leading opponent of the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
DOJ has been the most vocal governmental supporter of the statute. This created a 
boundary of membership in the ACLU or DOJ. The bounds of this case study are defined 
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by the numerous aforementioned boundaries. It is essential in a case study to understand 
how it is bounded (Putney, 2010; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2012). 
The next step in the case study was linking the data to propositions. Linking the 
data to propositions is accomplished by using analytical techniques to foreshadow the 
outcomes of the data enquiry (Yin, 2014). The proposition in this particular case was that, 
there is a possibility to meet the surveillance and information sharing objectives of the 
Title II provisions without the risk of violating Fourth Amendment protections, which 
would ultimately lead to security/liberty equilibrium. The literature review produced 
repeated circumstances in which a threat to national security generated an aggressive, 
rapid response that garnered overwhelming, but short lived, support. In each case 
following the abrupt response, incremental changes restored the balance between security 
and liberty to a more socially accepted level. This ebb and flow of security policy 
validated conceptual framework of the PET of public policy change. This made relying 
on the theoretical proposition strategy a viable option for this case study. 
Using the PET as the foundation for the theoretical proposition strategy in linking 
the data to the proposition lent credibility, validity, and reliability to this research. Valid 
theoretical constructs and propositions can be generalized and identified across time and 
space (Patton, 2002). Throughout American security policy history, PET is easily 
identifiable and consistently evident suggesting the theory is sound. This established a 
predictable pattern in regard to security policy lifespans and the aforementioned USA 
PATRIOT Act Title II proposition. If the policy cycle follows this pattern with the USA 
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PATRIOT Act, public tensions will continue to mount until incremental change makes 
the law more tolerable to the American public.  
As the review of historic security policies and PET demonstrated, security 
policies and laws incrementally change either through legislative compromise or 
imbalances in partisan / ideological political control. Due to the current divisive nature of 
the USA PATRIOT Act, even changes in partisan control of the legislative and executive 
branches would not likely produce enough of an ideological shift to substantially affect 
the law. Barring any significant threat to security or clear cut example of substantial 
abuses of the authorities, Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is unlikely to change in the 
near future. This case study sought signs that compromise is possible. Using the patterns 
established throughout security policy history, PET, and data collected through policy 
review, and document examination provided the basis for predicting the near future of the 
law. The stability of the USA PATRIOT Act, despite the simmering debate about the 
law, made searching for incremental change key to using PET in a theoretical proposition 
strategy. 
As mentioned earlier, the theoretical proposition strategy linked the data to the 
proposition. The theoretical proposition strategy took the theory used to develop the 
research design, research questions, and general concept into the analysis phase by 
organizing the data evaluation procedures and establishing contextual conditions (Yin, 
2014). The data for this project was organized into the general categories of in support of 
and in opposition to Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act based upon the ACLU and DOJ 
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perspective on the law. Any commonly shared viewpoints would have been considered 
potential areas of compromise, but only if the contextual conditions were met. 
The contextual conditions for the proposition were as follows: 1.The polarization 
surrounding the USA PATRIOT Act remains general gridlock. 2. No credible threats to 
national security emerge. 3. No flagrant abuses of USA PATRIOT Act Title II authorities 
are revealed to the public. 4. The USA PATRIOT Act follows a path similar to what is 
described in PET. If these four contextual conditions remain it will become increasingly 
likely the USA PATRIOT Act will undergo additional refinement through incremental 
change. If there had been evidence of areas of compromise and the contextual conditions 
were met it would be likely the incremental change will involve compromise. 
Role of the Researcher 
I conducted the data collection and analysis from thousands of pages of legal 
documents and congressional hearings. All of the data is unclassified and available in the 
public domain. I have no conflicting interests or power relationships involved with the 
data collection. The data focused solely on ACLU and DOJ public interactions. I do not 
and never have worked with or for any of the organizations involved in the interview 
process, which could have adversely affected the analysis.  
I do not have strong biases about the USA PATRIOT Act, as it does not affect my 
career or personal life in any facet. I believe there is credibility to both the argument for 
and against the Title II provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. I hoped the study would 
reveal some areas of potential compromise between the opposing sides, but did not find 
any strong evidence of this and realize this is unlikely as the division between the sides of 
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the debate is significant. This dissertation was never meant to heal the rift between the 
ACLU and DOJ over the USA PATRIOT Act. It was, however; designed to contribute to 
the discussion about the rift, which it does.  
Methodology 
Participants 
This case study used policies, testimonials, and relevant legal documents to 
collect data for the case study. The primary data was the spoken or written words of 
members of the DOJ and the ACLU. These organizations contain leading experts that 
clearly articulated the supporting and opposing views of Title II of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. The DOJ was selected because of the department’s direct knowledge of USA 
PATRIOT Act Title II authorities and the organization is the leading voice in support of 
the law. The ACLU was selected because many leading opposition voices have emerged 
from this organization.  
Sampling 
In qualitative research there are no regulations governing sample sizes for the 
various approaches, as it is dependent only upon answering the research questions to the 
satisfaction of the researcher (Patton, 2002). In a case study the participants are 
purposefully selected (Patton, 2007). This case purposefully selected data related to the 
DOJ and ACLU for the reasons previously mentioned. This case study purposefully 
selected data that fully and accurately expressed the DOJ and ACLU viewpoints. The 
bulk of the data was from the records of members of the ACLU and DOJ in congressional 
testimony and legal proceedings.  
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Instrumentation  
This case study used congressional hearings and legal arguments made in a court 
of law as the primary sources of data. The reputability of the sources is well known and 
accepted. Congressional testimony and court arguments are typically carefully articulated 
lines of reasoning, especially in such high profile topics as national security and civil 
liberties. These arguments were made in front of members of congress, judges, and even 
Supreme Court Justices. These were the best sources of data available at the time of 
collection. There is a likelihood for additional Supreme Court proceedings regarding at 
least one of the ongoing legal clashes over Title II authorities between the ACLU and 
DOJ, but as of now there are no superior sources of information on this topic. 
Data Collection 
As previously mentioned, the data collection for this case study focused on ACLU 
and DOJ exchanges about the contentions and benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT 
Act on the floor of congress and in numerous court cases. This study examined thousands 
of pages of debate between the ACLU and DOJ in congressional hearings. This resulted 
in more than 1200 pages of coded references. The criteria for using the congressional 
testimony in this study was simple. First the witness needed to officially represent the 
ACLU or DOJ. Second the testimony needed to contribute to answering the study’s 
research questions. The data from the congressional hearings was vital to answering the 
research questions and the earlier hearings formed the foundations for both the ACLU 
and DOJ arguments that have since been repeated in several legal battles. 
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This study also examined thousands of pages of legal documents and oral 
arguments between the DOJ and ACLU over Title II authorizations. This resulted in more 
than 1,500 pages of coded material. Much like the congressional testimony these 
documents needed to either record a member of the ACLU’s or DOJ’s spoken words 
about Title II or directly expressed their respective organization’s viewpoints on the 
subject. Furthermore the documents needed to assist in answering the research questions. 
One notable circumstance with the legal material was that often verbatim material ended 
up in multiple court proceedings as many of the cases were concurrent and virtually 
identical with simply different plaintiffs and defendants. In many cases the same 
attorneys contributed to multiple cases and submitted the same materials to different 
courts with only a change of name. In these instances the duplicate material was 
discarded for the purposes of this study. 
A number of non-official documents including blogs and organizational posts 
were also considered and reviewed for this study, but ultimately these materials were not 
as useful to the study as the highly refined answers to congressional inquiries or legal 
arguments. Out of these sources only one ACLU speech and no additional DOJ material 
made it to data analysis. In addition, the data collection process examined thousands of 
pages of data in 99 Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) obtained documents, although 
many of these documents proved irrelevant to answering the study’s research questions 
and were also discarded.  
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Data Analysis  
Due to the reliability and validity of the PET of public policy change the logic 
model technique of data analysis was appropriate for this dissertation. The logic model 
technique is a form of deductive qualitative analysis that involves generating a paradigm 
of expected outcomes based upon previously verified and consistent cause and effect 
patterns in the theoretical framework (Yin, 2014). Deductive analysis begins analysis by 
first looking at theory then narrowing down to specific data to see how the data results 
compare to the expected results (Trochim, 2006). Deductive analysis involves 
discovering patterns through the use of a preexisting organizational framework (Patton, 
2002). This case study analyzed data using predictive coding schemes derived from the 
previously established PET patterns. 
The literature review of this study demonstrated how all major national security 
policies in American history have followed the PET framework. The consistency of PET, 
in regard to political and ideological polarization, made it possible to predict themes in 
the data prior to collection. The deductive approach to analysis and coding consists of 
establishing codes and predicted outcomes prior to collection (Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldaña, 2014). Yin (2014) opined that in the theoretical proposition strategy guides 
every aspect of the dissertation including the questioning and expected results. Studying 
PET led to the development of the predictive coding used in this study. The logic model 
complemented the theoretical proposition strategy described in the research design.  
The logic model for this case study effectively narrowed the analysis down to a 
single pattern matching variable seeking any crossover between those who support or 
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oppose Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The basis of the predetermined framework 
was the categories of in support of and in opposition to Title II of the USA PATRIOT 
Act based upon the interviewees’ perspective on the law. This is precisely what was also 
used to link the data to the proposition with the theoretical proposition strategy. The 
deductive analysis was used to search for common ground between critic and supporters 
of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. By deducing that data from advocates of the title 
would be in the in support of category and critics of the title would be in the in opposition 
to category any anomalies outside this pattern might represent common ground. This 
formed the framework for coding scheme. 
By applying the PET framework to Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act it appeared 
the statute has entered the stagnant change period. The hallmark of this stage is long 
periods of the policy only undergoing limited incremental change (Jones & Baumgartner, 
2012). Generating a logic model based upon PET and the USA PATRIOT Act the 
incremental or stagnant change stage revealed opposing viewpoints with little or no room 
for compromise. The literature review has already illustrated the polarizing nature of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, but it has not revealed if there is any possibility of compromise. The 
logic model technique in this case predicted the leading voice of support (DOJ) and 
opposition (ACLU) would have strongly differing views. This case study searched for 
any instance that did not fit the prediction. 
It was expected, due to the polarity of opinion about Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, that each of the following categories would have at least 2 trends emerge 
from the data with one supporting the title and one critical of the title: Information 
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Sharing, Roving Surveillance, Metadata Collection, Significant Purpose Clause, and 
Delayed Notice Searches, Appropriateness of FISC Authorizations. The coding 
categories must be evaluated by their internal homogeneity and their external 
heterogeneity (Patton, 2002). In other words the data needed to be judged by how well 
they belong in their respective categories and how different the categories are. The 
categories mentioned provide distinct separation for the data and generated 12 coding 
sets. Following the logic model for PET during this stage in the USA PATRIOT Act’s 
lifespan, it was predicted the following categories will be agreed upon by the ACLU and 
DOJ: USA PATRIOT Act could not have existed without the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, Title II is polarizing, Title II will not significantly change in the near 
future, compromise is unlikely, and change won’t happen unless their side scores a 
decisive legal victory. This would have added another 5 – 10 coding categories 
depending upon the data results, but during analysis it became apparent that only the 
“USA PATRIOT Act could not have existed without the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks” was relevant to the study. Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, (2014) suggested that 
deductive coding should have between 12 and 50 codes annotated in a precise and logical 
structure. This study had 12 predetermined codes. 
To better identify the crossover between supporters and critics of the law this 
study employed the QSR NVivo 10 software. The QSR NVivo 10 qualitative research 
coding software is a computer program that provides some advantages over hand coding 
when dealing with large volumes of qualitative data. The process of coding is used to 
populate a database in qualitative research in an effort to lend quantitative properties to 
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qualitative research, which is often subjective and not readily available for numerical 
analysis (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). The QSR NVivo 10 organizes data to 
decrease biases and errors during numerical analysis. The software did not eliminate the 
need for researcher input and analysis, but did aid in these tasks. Yin (2012) opined that 
currently there is no computer algorithm that adequately analyzes narrative data. The 
auto-coding function in this software struggled with accurately coding the data and all 
data was manually coded and uploaded in the program. The biggest benefit of the 
software was that the program provided an excellent organizational system for the vast 
amounts of data analyzed in this case study. The program also offered a variety of 
outputs. For this study all software generated products were manually verified to further 
the validity of the analysis. 
Trustworthiness 
Credibility (Internal Validity) 
The internal validity, or credibility, of this case study should be assessed by 
carefully examining the theoretical framework, literature review, interviews, data 
analysis, and the researcher. Credibility is the degree of which the findings of a study 
make sense and produce an authentic account of the situation (Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldaña, 2014). With all qualitative studies, internal validity is a determination of the 
trustworthiness of the research as substantiated through the empirical evidence and 
previous findings (Rudestam & Newton, 2007). The credibility of this dissertation will 
likely be judged by standards similar to those described by Rudestam and Newton in 
2007 as well as the standards of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña in 2014. This section of 
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Chapter 3 evaluated the credibility of the theoretical framework, literature review, 
interviews, data analysis, and the researcher by looking at the authenticity of the subjects 
using the available empirical and historic data. 
The theoretical framework in this case study was intertwined in all aspects of the 
study. Maxwell (2013) explained that the root of credibility concerns with theoretical 
frameworks generally stem from the underuse of an acceptable theory or from uncritical 
acceptance of a theory. The PET of public policy change has been widely accepted in 
academia for more than 2 decades (Givel, 2008). This lends to the credibility of the 
theory, but it was still important to validate PET for use in the study. Patton (2002) 
rationalized that for a theory to be a valid theoretical framework it must provide an 
accurate interpretation of the particular situation across time and space. The literature 
review examined several contentious national security policies throughout American 
history. The examination of each policy displayed the PET pattern of rapid change in 
response to an event, followed by stagnation and incremental change until equilibrium 
between liberty and security was reached. The literature review confirmed PET was a 
valid option for the theoretical framework of this case study. 
Examining PET patterns in the literature review supports the use of the theory, but 
was not enough to mitigate the credibility risk of underusing the theory. To help 
eliminate the credibility risk, the PET was used in the data analysis as the foundation for 
the theoretical proposition strategy. The decision to use the theoretical proposition 
strategy was made after the literature review illustrated a consistency in security policies 
to follow the PET pattern. There was growing evidence that Section 215 of the USA 
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PATRIOT Act is on the precipice of incremental change designed to restore equilibrium 
between liberties and security. Using the PET pattern it was possible to predict general 
coding categories from both sides of the USA PATRIOT Act debate. The prediction in 
this case study was that there will be some overlap between the opposing sides and 
eventually an incremental change will develop from this common ground that will restore 
equilibrium and effectively end the debate. The prediction was derived from analysis of 
the reviewed literature.  
The literature review also contributed to the credibility of a study. Yin (2014) 
asserted that credible case studies need a literature review that examines relevant topics 
to a point of saturation. Chapter 2 explored PET, pertinent security policies, surveillance 
scandals, applicable court decisions, the Church Committee, FISA, and of course, Title II 
of the USA PATRIOT Act. While reaching saturation is subjective, the literature review 
seems to provide a robust academic foundation that offers adequate information for 
understanding PET patterns in security policy history, historic surveillance abuses, 
relevant legal proceedings, and current points of contention with Title II. In addition, this 
literature review exhausted multiple scholarly databases of suitable peer reviewed 
articles.  
To be considered a suitable article for this study the articles had to meet several 
requirements. First the articles had to contribute to the knowledge base of the study. With 
few exceptions, for current news articles, all the articles were peer reviewed. 
Unfortunately the peer review did not eliminate extraordinarily biased literature. Several 
articles could not be used, because, despite their peer review, they were steeped in 
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propaganda style talking points and void of useful information. The articles that did 
qualify, usually still had a noticeable agenda. To combat this a conscious effort was made 
to use articles both for and against the USA PATRIOT Act making it possible to express 
both sides of the debate. In addition, government reports, legal decisions, and U.S. laws 
were reviewed to fill gaps left by the articles. The extensiveness of the literature review 
added to the study’s credibility. 
My research credibility was not as strong as that of the theory or literature review, 
but should not significantly affect the case study’s overall credibility. The primary 
credibility concern was my lack of research experience, as this was only the second time I 
have conducted true academic research, with the first time being my Master’s Degree 
capstone. To mitigate this risk to credibility I have read nearly a dozen works that explain 
the inner workings of case studies. In addition to the Creswell, Patton, Maxwell, 
Rudestam, and Newton books that are mandatory in the Walden University curriculum; I 
have also looked to the works of experts in case study methodology. This additional 
research has included multiple articles and books from Stacks, Stake, Yin, Miles, 
Huberman, and Saldaña. With each aspect of this dissertation I referenced these books to 
ensure my plans and actions have been in line with the aforementioned case study 
experts. 
Another common credibility concern with regard to the researcher is the 
researcher’s biases (Patton, 2002). To combat this internal validity challenge I chose a 
topic that I find interesting and significant, but don’t really have any predetermined 
assumptions about. The USA PATRIOT Act does not affect my career or daily life in any 
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noticeable way. Throughout the literature review I became hyperaware of the deeply 
polarizing nature of the debate that swirls around the USA PATRIOT Act. Most peer 
reviewed articles on the subject display some biases either for or against the law. By 
reviewing hundreds of articles looking at both content and predispositions has made me 
more aware of my own biases. While nobody is capable of being truly free of partiality, I 
do not hold strong feeling for or against the USA PATRIOT Act. Ultimately this relative 
impartialness contributed significantly to the credibility of this case study and even fill a 
niche mostly ignored by other studies on the subject. 
Transferability (External Validity) 
Case studies generate considerable amounts of information about a specific case, 
but the information does not necessarily only apply to that particular case. The more 
easily the results of a study can be applied to a related topic, the greater the transferability 
the study has (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). Yin (2014) suggested that single-case 
studies should be well grounded in theory and theoretical proposition to increase the 
external validity. The primary purpose of theory is not just to explain a phenomenon, but 
to build a framework of knowledge upon which to expound upon an explanation 
(Reynolds, 2007). A sound theory crosses time and space (Patton, 2002). The PET was 
not only the theoretical framework and basis for the theoretical proposition strategy in 
this case study, but it was also a sound theory with extensive empirical evidence of its 
suitability throughout key policy changes in history.  
Using PET for the theoretical framework and proposition strategy added to the 
transferability of the study. The pattern described in the PET of public policy change was 
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consistently illustrated in the literature review. Despite actively looking for instances 
when the pattern did not match, none were found. This means it is likely that the theoretic 
proposition strategy used in the examination of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act can 
not only be used for pattern recognition and predictive purposes for the single case, but 
could also be adapted for similar security policies. There have been numerous 
contentious security policies enacted since 2001. Researching these laws under a similar 
PET framework could help the search for areas of compromise, which would ultimately 
help usher in equilibrium between security and liberty. Following Yin’s 2014 advice 
about using theory to promote transferability should be beneficial to this case study or 
any other single case study. 
After clearly linking the single case to an acceptable theory, it was then necessary 
to present all new data with an abundance of “thick description”. Thick description is 
accurately capturing perceptions of the various participants (Stake, 1995). Using an 
interview guide, digital recording devices, and transcription should make it easier to 
effectively portray the interviewees’ opinions in a manner worthy of being pronounced 
“thick description”. The more articulate the description of the data is, the better other 
researchers are able to determine if the case is similar enough to their case to consider 
using the same strategies or methodologies (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). A goal 
of this dissertation is to provide a thick description that is useful to other researchers. 
Dependability 
This section addressed dependability concerns with this case study. Dependability 
is the consistency and stability of the study (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). Yin 
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(2014) further addressed dependability as being the process that mitigates errors and 
reduces biases in research. Maxwell (2013) suggested the best way to create a consistent 
and stable study is to identify the threats to validity and draft a strategy aimed at those 
specific threats. The most significant threat to errors and biases in this holistic single-case 
study came from the data analysis. Repetitive examination of the results helped mitigate 
data analysis errors. 
Dependability confirmation is obtained through rigorous auditing (Creswell, 
2013; Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). This includes the data analysis process. Yin 
(2014) explained that an evaluation of the analysis process must demonstrate how all the 
evidence, regardless of how it affects the study’s proposition, was explored. To help 
illustrate how all data has been examined for this study, the results of the analysis made 
special mention of any data that falls outside expected results or was significantly 
different than similar data. In addition, the codebook, notes, and all source are available 
to further the dependability of the case study.  
There were a few errors that were identified upon further review of the data, but 
none of these errors would have significantly affected the results of the study. A 
reoccurring error that was caught during the analysis was on a few occasions statements 
from non-ACLU or non-DOJ participants in the legal proceedings were attributed to the 
ACLU or DOJ. This error occurred because in some of the legal documents it was 
difficult to ascertain when the shifted to a third party. This problem was quickly 
identified and rectified. With each legal document the participating attorneys and their 
respective organizational affiliation was identified either on the first page of the 
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document or the last. By simply printing off the listed affiliation it was easy to identify 
each attorney’s affiliation during the oral arguments and thus eliminate the potential for 
that error.  
Confirmability 
Confirmability is the degree of which a study is free from the burden of researcher 
biases or how differently the results would be if the research was conducted by a different 
researcher (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). Basically if identical procedures were 
performed by different researchers in parallel studies the differences in the results due to 
researcher biases illustrates confirmability. Fortunately confirmability can be 
strengthened through methods used to diminish threats to other trustworthiness aspects. 
Chronicling the data collection and analysis with thick description, illustrating how all 
evidence affected the study, and being vigilant for researcher biases all reduce threats to 
confirmability (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Patton, 2002). As previously 
explained each of these techniques were employed to bolster the trustworthiness of this 
case study. 
Of these techniques reflexivity is among the most effective way to reduce 
researcher biases (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014). 
Reflexivity is consciously being attentive to the perspectives of the participants and the 
researcher (Patton, 2002). To accomplish this I continuously assessed myself and the data 
collection and analysis procedures for potential biases. It is especially important to 
monitor the influence of my preexisting attitudes and opinions when conducting the data 
analysis. The main evidence I have that I kept my biases in check was that I truly desired 
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to find a significant potential area of compromise between the 2 groups and even though 
such findings eluded this dissertation I did not skew the data to illustrate an area of 
potential compromise. For example I believe the USA FREEDOM Act amendments to 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act should be palatable for both organizations, but the 
evidence suggests that the compromise does not please either group, so I mentioned the 
changes without inferring it was an acceptable compromise. 
Ethical Procedures 
IRB Ethics Planning Worksheet / NIH Certification / IRB Approval 
Prior to conducting this dissertation I completed both the Walden University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) ethics planning worksheet and the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) human research protections certification. These items are mandatory for 
IRB approval to collect data. The ethics planning worksheet included a proposal to 
conduct telephone interviews, but ultimately that method of data collection was not used 
and instead publically available records were used instead. The overall ethical risk for 
this dissertation was minimal. The IRB application was approved on November 16, 2015. 
The IRB ethics planning worksheet is available in Appendix A and my NIH certificate is 
available in Appendix B. 
Summary of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 has presented the plan for this study. The chapter has described in detail 
the research methodology of this study. The central concept of this study centered on the 
division between those that support Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act and those that 
oppose it. An examination of this central concept drove the research to answer the 
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question: How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent 
incremental change from achieving the surveillance and information sharing objectives of 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential 
circumventions of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? The methodology 
was designed to adequately answer this question while mitigating issues of 
trustworthiness and ethical risks. For each ethical concern or trustworthiness issue, 
Chapter 3 provided a plan to address the problem. With the IRB approval and acceptance 
of the proposal, I was approved by Walden University to conduct research starting in 
November 2015. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The data that I examined in this case study provided ample information to answer 
all the research questions to a point of saturation. In Chapter 4, I will explain how I 
collected and analyzed the data. The data collection relied heavily on numerous 
congressional testimonies and volumes of legal material developed in a multitude of court 
cases. All the data directly represent either DOJ or ACLU viewpoints. As I previously 
explained, these organizations were purposefully selected as they are the leading voice of 
support for Title II authorities and the leading voice of opposition respectively. Due to 
the consistency of the PET of public policy change, the logic model technique’s 
predictive coding was a logical choice for the data analysis. The results from the 
predictive coding were as I expected, showing that bounded rationality caused by 
ideological polarization is preventing incremental change from achieving the security 
objectives of Title II while mitigating constitutional concerns. 
Purpose 
 The purpose of this case study was to examine the advantages and contentions of 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to better understand how PET described bounded 
rationality prevented incremental policy change from achieving the objectives of the 
provisions while mitigating the potential for or perception of the circumvention of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
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Central Research Question – Qualitative:  
How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent 
incremental change from achieving the security objectives of Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act  of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? 
Subquestion 1 - Qualitative:  
How is political and ideological polarization prolonging the stagnation period of 
the PET of public policy change with the USA PATRIOT Act? 
Subquestion 2 - Qualitative:  
How does the PET of public policy change explain the enactment and extensions 
of the USA PATRIOT Act? 
Subquestion 3 - Qualitative:  
How does Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affect U.S. law? 
Subquestion 4 - Qualitative:  
What are the benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act? 
Subquestion 5 - Qualitative:  
How is Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act controversial? 
Chapter Organization 
This chapter begins with a description of the political, legal, and ideological 
contentions peaking between the ACLU and the DOJ during the time of the data 
collection. I will illustrate the demographic identification of the data sources. Next, I will 
explain in detail the data collection methods. Following the data collection methods, I  
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will dissect the data analysis (logic model technique with predictive coding) procedures 
including the results and evidence of trustworthiness. I end the chapter with a summary 
of its contents. 
Data Collection Setting          
Origins of Contentions 
Understanding the setting for this data collection it is important to review the 
strife between the ACLU and the DOJ. The current friction between the ACLU and DOJ 
over national security surveillance, especially bulk collection of non-content data, began 
in 2001 and has had incremental spikes in recent months, as the subject of bulk collection 
has continued to make headlines. The federal government enacted a series of data 
collection programs within weeks of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks designed to 
reform intelligence operations related to national security (Gonzales, 2015). Almost 
immediately the ACLU took issue with Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. By 2005 
the ACLU was engaged in a legal battle over the potential collection of library records by 
the DOJ (Oder, 2005). This case, Doe v. Gonzales, would be the first of many 
surveillance related litigations brought by the ACLU. 
In midst of this initial legal battle, which ended with the DOJ dropping the 
specifically opposed collection, the New York Times exposed the controversial Terrorist 
Surveillance Program (TSP). The TSP was an NSA, CIA, and DOJ bulk international 
communication collection program (Gonzales, 2015). The ACLU claimed to have 
suffered injury due to chilled communication caused by the TSP violating their First and 
Fourth Amendment rights (Wong, 2006). The ACLU eventually lost the case and was 
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denied a Supreme Court appeal, but the TSP was ended due to constitutional concerns 
(Gonzales, 2015; Hughes, 2012). Even with the ending of TSP neither bulk collection nor 
the ACLU’s opposition truly subsided. 
While TSP was stopped, a series of acts were used as the justification and 
authorization of the bulk collection of telephone and internet non-content information. 
The bulk collection was authorized by FISA Section 402 in 2004, FISA Section 501 in 
2005, then the Protect America Act of 2007, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, the 
FISA Amendment Acts Reauthorization Act of 2012, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, and FISA Section 702 (Anderson, 2014; Banks, 2010; Gilbert, 2013; Office of 
Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2013). As of November 30, 2015, the USA 
FREEDOM Act is the source for NSA metadata monitoring, but now rather than the 
government maintaining the metadata the communication carriers maintain the data (H.R. 
Res. 2048, 2015). The changes to the bulk data programs, brought about by the USA 
FREEDOM Act, appears to be a compromise by the government and a win for the 
ACLU. Somewhat surprisingly, the ACLU has not embraced the changes. Alex Abdo, 
Staff Attorney in the ACLU's Speech, Privacy and Technology Project, described the 
USA FREEDOM Act’s changes as a “symbolic victory” (Duncan, 2015).  
Recent and On Going Legal Battles 
There is some reluctance from the DOJ and ACLU to participate in a study 
involving national security, which could be due to the fact that the ACLU and DOJ are 
engaged in several high profile court cases. These court battles have amplified in 
intensity and frequency during the past 2.5 years. This is in part because of the publicity 
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of Edward Snowden’s unauthorized disclosure of various national security programs 
including bulk metadata collection. Most of the lawsuits have involved bulk data 
collection or Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) requests related to bulk data 
collection, but not all of these cases were in response to Snowden’s exposure of data 
collection programs. 
Amnesty International v. Blair (later Clapper) began prior to the Snowden 
releases and focused upon the potential for the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 to 
authorize bulk collections that could infringe upon First and Fourth Amendments 
protections. The Supreme Court decided the ACLU and Amnesty International did not 
have standing, as there was not concrete proof of injury (Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence, et al. v. Amnesty International USA et al., 2012). 
Shortly after the Snowden leak, Larry E. Klayman, in conjunction with the 
ACLU, sued the federal government over the constitutionality of the bulk phone and 
internet collections. Klayman v. Obama (actually 3 sequential cases) claimed that the 
bulk collections authorized under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act violated First 
and Fourth Amendment protections (Klayman, 2015). In a series of court actions from 
August through November 2015, the D.C. Circuit Court declared Klayman, et al. did 
have standing due to the speculative nature of their claims (Whitaker, 2015). This case is 
currently back at the district court level. Klayman v. Obama, like many national security 
related court battles, is likely to last several years. Klayman is not the only current case 
between the ACLU and DOJ regarding bulk metadata collection. 
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Anna Smith, with legal assistance from the ACLU, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF), and the Smith + Malek law firm, filed a claim against the government 
similar to Klayman’s claims (Electronic Frontier Foundation website, 2015). Smith 
asserted the amount of information collected, presumably including hers, constituted an 
unwarranted virtual search due to the potentially rich and revealing description that could 
be attained through the analysis of the data (Smith IV, 2015). The DOJ countered by 
stressing that the Section 215 authorized collections have been repeatedly reviewed by 
congress and the courts and have been found to be constitutional, but even if it were 
unconstitutional Smith’s case would no longer have standing, because the USA 
FREEDOM Act now expressly authorizes the analysis of metadata (Whitaker, 2015). 
Smith like Klayman continues to be played out in the courts and likely contributes to the 
ACLU’s and DOJ’s hesitance to be interviewed about the USA PATRIOT Act. The 
Smith and Klayman cases are not the only cases still clinging to life in the legal system. 
2015 was an interesting year for another relatively long lasting court battle, 
ACLU v. Clapper. On May 7, 2015 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
NSA metadata bulk collection program exceeded the authorities of Section 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act (Dunn, Eisenberg, Jaffer, Abdo, & Toomey, 2015). This ruling 
effected both the Klayman and Smith cases, but not significantly. All 3 cases were 
basically put on hold as Section 215 was set to expire less than a month after the ruling 
and the courts expected congress to settle the issue (De Vogue, 2015; Mills, 2015). This 
eventually led to the USA FREEDOM Act and questioning the legal standing of the 
plaintiffs in each case.  
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The 3 cases are likely to have similar outcomes. They have had a history of 
following parallel trajectories. There was one seemingly major difference in December 
2013 when the courts declared in Klayman v. Obama that the bulk data collection 
violated the Fourth Amendment, but days later in ACLU v. Clapper stated there was not a 
search and did not violate the Fourth Amendment (Davis, 2014). Even this apparent 
drastic difference faded and the cases quickly aligned once more. The advantage the 
closeness of these cases present to this study is they provide the ACLU and DOJ 
platforms to clearly express and perfect their arguments for and against the surveillance 
programs once authorized by Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Demographics 
This study examined the works of the 2 most prominent voices regarding the USA 
PATRIOT Act. As previously described the ACLU has been the leading opponent of the 
USA PATRIOT Act and the DOJ has been the leading voice in support of the law. The 
ACLU is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, civil rights organization with more than 1 million 
members (ACLU website, 2014). While the ACLU performs a multitude of functions it is 
best known for its legal services. The ACLU appears to be rather selective of whom 
represents the organization on the national stage, as a very select number of ACLU 
attorneys ever participate in the high profile engagements. Typically the leading attorneys 
in a specific field handle all the congressional hearings and complex court cases. In this 
study, many of the ACLU attorneys were repeatedly the authors or orators in legal 
proceedings, debate, or testimony. Jameel Jaffer, Alex Abdo, and Patrick Toomey were 
commonly the originators of sources coded in the data collection. 
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This study used a somewhat wider selection of DOJ representatives than that of 
the ACLU’s representation, but this was somewhat expected and easy to explain. The 
primary cause of this difference is, in many of the congressional hearings high level 
officials testified rather than DOJ attorneys. The various court cases examined in this 
study illustrated that the DOJ handled its representation much like the ACLU with a 
select group of top level attorneys articulating the DOJ’s view. Works of staff attorneys 
Douglas N. Letter, H. Thomas Byron III, Henry C. Whitaker, and Benjamin C. Mizer 
accounted for a significant amount of the data collected in this study. As mentioned 
before the advantage of having a limited amount of high level professionals articulate an 
organization’s views is that viewpoint comes across clearly and consistently. Both the 
DOJ and ACLU accomplished this by having the same people repeatedly engaged in the 
legal debates. 
Data Collection 
Congressional Hearings 
The data collection for this case study began with an examination of the numerous 
congressional hearings in which the ACLU and DOJ debated the USA PATRIOT Act. 
This study coded the transcripts of 8 such congressional hearings and 2 additional 
Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation hearings that had particular relevance to 
the study. The 1,240 pages of these transcripts yielded 600 references relatively equally 
split between the ACLU and DOJ. These hearings were essential to both organizations in 
forming their respective viewpoints on Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The themes 
developed in the hearings changed little through the years. 
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Many of the talking points used in even the earliest of hearings was repeated in 
later hearings and numerous court battles throughout the years. Due to this fact, starting 
with the hearings provided an effective platform for refining the coding references. All 
changes to the coding were developed while coding the hearings. The repetitive nature of 
the arguments made by the ACLU and DOJ aided the study. This allowed the same 
arguments to be consistently coded, which generated a clear and concise representation of 
the ACLU’s and DOJ’s views on Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. It also facilitated the 
answering of the research questions to the point of saturation.  
Responses to Congressional Inquires 
The ACLU has a Freedom Of Information Act collection which contains 
approximately a hundred works related to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
including the 2 responses to congressional inquiries coded in this study. Both of these 
letters were penned by Assistant Attorney General, Ronald Weich as he represented the 
DOJ in a congressional review. Mr. Weich was the Assistant Attorney General from 
2009-2012 (DOJ website, 2013). It is important to note these letters, one written in 2009 
and one in 2011, were both authored before the Snowden leaks. This demonstrates both 
that there were concerns about Section 215 prior to public knowledge about the NSA 
metadata collection program and that the DOJ has consistently valued aspects of the 
provision. In this study these letters only generated 32 references to 4 codes, but the 
references clearly articulated the DOJ’s views. In addition, the Assistant Attorney 
General used at least one of these letters repeatedly just changing the names of the 
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addressed member of Congress. The letter was only coded once as not to skew the study 
findings. 
Human Rights Hearing 
The ACLU has regularly been a leading public voice of concern about the balance 
of surveillance and liberty. One such public petition by the ACLU came when Alex 
Abdo, one of the primary ACLU staff attorneys, testified before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights on October 28, 2013. Mr. Abdo’s testimony was valuable 
to this study because this it demonstrated the organization’s consistency in expressing its 
concerns in multiple forums, as this hearing does not share the magnitude of legal cases 
or congressional hearings. The testimony was consistent with other coded ACLU sources 
and provided a total of 18 references. This testimony was the only non-legally binding 
deposition used in this study. 
Amnesty v. Blair (Clapper) 
Amnesty v. Blair (Clapper) was crucial to the data collection for the case study. 
While many of the available legal documents for this (and all the court cases) were not 
applicable to the study, there were still ten documents that contributed 410 coded pages 
and 325 references. The arguments used by the ACLU and DOJ in this case mimicked the 
arguments used in the congressional hearings and other court proceedings.  
ACLU v. Clapper, Klayman v. Obama, Smith v. Obama, ACLU v. FBI 
The ACLU v. Clapper case was equally as important to this case study as 
Amnesty v. Clapper was. The legal documents presented in this case contributed 360 
coded pages and 548 references. Again the arguments presented by both sides changed 
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little in this case, but there was one difference in both sides of the debate. Since ACLU v. 
Clapper was in response to the Edward Snowden leaks, the ACLU arguments changed 
from the theoretical potential of abuse from USA PATRIOT Act authorities to declaring 
the bulk metadata collection program was an abuse. This in turn caused the DOJ to 
change their argument from declaring there was no evidence of abuse to explaining how 
the program authorized under Section 215 was constitutional. This also played out in the 
court case’s doppelganger cases of Klayman v. Obama and Smith v. Obama. 
ACLU v. Clapper, Klayman v. Obama, and Smith v. Obama are all such similar 
cases that their outcomes seem destined to be intertwined. Whenever a significant 
development occurs in one of the cases the other two often must explain or defend the 
happenings. This has led to the arguments being carefully and consistently articulated to 
ensure all the attorneys are in unison. In fact many of the attorneys participate in all 3 
cases. This has been beneficial to the case study presenting clearly definable viewpoints 
for both organizations.  
Much like ACLU v. Clapper, the cases of Smith v. Obama, Klayman v. Obama, 
and ACLU v. FBI all express these viewpoints. Smith v. Obama documents provided 7 
source documents to this study. From these 7 documents there were 499 coded pages and 
197 code references. Klayman v. Obama did not start out as an ACLU case, so most of 
the documents related to this litigation were outside the parameters of the data collection, 
but there were 5 source documents that met the data collection criteria. The 5 sources 
provided 237 pages, which generated 94 code references. ACLU v. FBI is a supporting 
legal battle directed by the ACLU to prompt the FBI to deliver on a number of Freedom 
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of Information Act requests. This case only produced one legal document applicable to 
this case study, but in its 33 pages were 93 code references.  
How Data Were Recorded 
To better identify the crossover between supporters and critics of the law this 
study utilized QSR NVivo 10 software. The QSR NVivo 10 organizes data to decrease 
biases and errors during numerical analysis. The software did not eliminate the need for 
researcher input and analysis, but did aid in these tasks. QSR NVivo 10 has an auto 
coding function, but it was unable to accurately delineate between the ACLU and DOJ 
nor consistently determine the correct code to use for the specific passages. For these 
reasons I deductively coded the approximately 3,000 pages of data using a predictive 
coding strategy of a logic model technique based upon the consistent finding of the PET 
of public policy change. This is explained in further detail in the Data Analysis section of 
this chapter. In addition, I manually extracted the subthemes from the coding by moving 
each code onto a word document for ease of printing and analysis. QSR NVivo 10 was 
very helpful in organizing the 45 sources of data. The software increased the efficiency, 
reliability, and credibility of this study. 
Variations from Original Data Collection Plan  
The most significant variation from the original data collection plan was the 
inability to conduct the telephone interviews. The original plan called for telephone 
interviews with 5 members of the ACLU and 5 members of the DOJ. The DOJ was 
willing to allow one interview, but was not willing to sign any document including 
Walden University’s mandatory consent form. The ACLU never responded to any 
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emailed request, but I did not pursue it further, because of the inability to interview the 
DOJ. Initially this seemed to be an impassable obstacle to continuing the study. 
The original plan had always called for examining and coding congressional 
hearings and court cases prior to conducting the interviews. I decided to begin this coding 
process and wait 2 months before re-approaching the DOJ and ACLU. During the months 
of coding the congressional hearings it became clear that the interviews would be less 
necessary than originally thought, as both sides of the argument changed little in the last 
decade. I contacted the DOJ again a couple months after initially being told only one 
interview and no signing consent forms. This time I received an email back from the DOJ 
that did not specify only one interview, but did state that 5 interviews was very unlikely. 
The email reiterated that the interviewee was not allowed to sign any forms. This only 
seemed like a moderate set back the second time around, because by this point in the data 
collection it appeared there was a chance of answering all the research questions to a 
point of saturation without the interviews. 
Due to the lack of interviews, the court case documents coded in this study 
became paramount in answering the research questions. Every source related to the court 
cases echoed the arguments made in congressional testimony and confirmed each 
organization’s stance on Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. The combination of the 
congressional hearings and court cases answered the research questions to the point of 
saturation. This was fortunate as the inability to conduct the interviews could have 
derailed the case study, had the legal battles and congressional inquiries not answered the 
questions. With 3 current court cases involving the ACLU and DOJ debating the 
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contentions and merits of the USA PATRIOT Act playing out at the time of the data 
collection, I was able to obtain current relevant information. The arguments made in the 
legal proceedings essentially answered the questions I would have asked in the 
interviews. Ironically I believe the 3 ongoing lawsuits contributed to the reluctance of the 
organizations to participate in the interviews, but their legal arguments sufficed to answer 
the research questions. 
Data Analysis 
Logic Model Technique / Coding Process 
The reliability and validity of the PET of public policy change made the logic 
model technique of data analysis an appropriate choice for this dissertation. The logic 
model technique is a form of deductive qualitative analysis that involves generating a 
paradigm of expected outcomes based upon previously verified and consistent cause and 
effect patterns in the theoretical framework (Yin, 2014). Deductive analysis begins 
analysis by first looking at theory then narrowing down to specific data to see how the 
data results compare to the expected results (Trochim, 2006). Deductive analysis involves 
discovering patterns through the use of a preexisting organizational framework (Patton, 
2002). This case study analyzed data using predictive coding schemes derived from the 
previously established PET patterns. The predetermined codes were: 
 ACLU Opposition to FISA (FAA)   DOJ Support of FISA (FAA) 
ACLU Opposition to Section 203    DOJ Support of Section 203 
ACLU Opposition to Section 206   DOJ Support of Section 206 
ACLU Opposition to Section 215    DOJ Support of Section 215 
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ACLU Opposition to Section 218    DOJ Support of Section 218 
ACLU & DOJ: USA PATRIOT ACT enacted due to 9/11     
The coding process for this dissertation was designed to highlight that the current 
policy stagnation of Title II is aligned with the bounded rationality element of the PET of 
discontinuous change. The PET illustrates how stagnation occurs when bounded 
rationality prevents the forces of change from overcoming the resistance to this change 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Boushey, 2012; Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). The 
literature review demonstrated with previous national security policies that political and 
ideological polarization contributed to the bounded rationality. This dissertation’s logic 
model technique used predictive coding analysis to illustrate the seemingly complete 
polarization between the leading support and opposition voices to Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act. 
The USA PATRIOT Act has been supported and opposed equally by both major 
U.S. political parties, so for the purpose of this dissertation political polarization was not 
a significant factor. Ideological polarization appeared to be the dominant contributing 
factor to the bounded rationality surrounding Title II. Ideologically, the DOJ (made up of 
both Democrats and Republicans) seems to be collectively in favor of Title II authorities 
because of the benefits to security operations. Ideologically, the ACLU (made up of both 
Democrats and Republicans) seems to be collectively opposed to Title II authorizations 
due to civil liberty concerns. By focusing on the more contentious sections of Title II, it 
was possible to use predictive analysis to deduce how these 2 organizations would 
respond to the various Title II authorities. This allowed for a predictive coding scheme in 
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which the ACLU would always publically oppose Title II and the DOJ would always 
publically support the title. Any significant deviation would have illustrated areas of 
potential compromise, but none were found with this data. 
The sections selected for the predictive codes were developed by reviewing Title 
II of the USA PATRIOT Act to deduce which areas of debate would likely illustrate the 
ideological division between the ACLU and DOJ. Ideological polarization is a 
contributing factor to the PET described, bounded rationality that has prevented 
meaningful incremental policy change with Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. One of 
the most easily identifiable points of contention between the DOJ and ACLU is how the 
title has affected FISA. It was expected that the data would show that the ACLU 
generally objects to how Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affects FISA, while the DOJ 
supports the changes. The FISA codes were expected to be infiltrate all the Title II 
debates, regardless of which specific provision was being argued.   
As expected FISA was mentioned extensively throughout various debates about 
Title II, but the codes about specific Title II sections were equally as important. These 
codes not only show elements of bounded rationality, but also explain the specific 
benefits and contentions of the title, answering Research Subquestions 3 through 5. 
Although several sections of Title II have been controversial at times, Sections 203, 206, 
215, and 218 have consistently been debated by the DOJ and ACLU. By selecting these 
codes it was possible to chronicle the arguments in the course of nearly 15 years. The 
other sections of the title simply do not have enough associated data to adequately 
identify the elements of bounded rationality preventing effective incremental change. 
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Following the typical tract of the PET of public policy change, it was expected that the 
DOJ and ACLU would be completely locked in opposition.  
The exception to this is the last set of codes (USA PATRIOT ACT enacted due to 
9/11) which assumed both organizations would agree that the USA PATRIOT Act could 
not have been implemented if it were not in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks. For this particular code it was expected that the DOJ would state that the USA 
PATRIOT Act was designed to correct security deficiencies that contributed to the 
attacks. It was also expected that the ACLU would state that Americans would not have 
tolerated the passage of the act except for during the distress of the attacks. This code was 
designed to further anchor the logic model technique to the PET of public policy change. 
The foundation of PET is that rapid and dramatic change occurs due to a shocking event 
that spurs action. This dissertation asserts that the 2001 terrorist attack was that outside 
event that generated the USA PATRIOT Act’s momentum and put the law on the PET 
pathway. 
During the coding process I paid particular attention to any instance in which the 
ACLU supported Title II authorities or the DOJ opposed the authorities. There was very 
little substantial Title II support by the ACLU or DOJ opposition to the authorities. In an 
April 2004, hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, Dani 
Eyer, representing the ACLU, expressed limited support of Section 203 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act. Ms. Eyer explained that she understood why the wall between criminal 
and national security investigations should a “little less substantial” (Preventing and 
responding to acts of terrorism: A review of current law, 2004). While this was not a 
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definitive showing of support, it was the only example found of the ACLU supporting 
Section 203. 
In the same hearing Ms. Eyer also stated the ACLU was not in favor of “doing 
away with” the roving wiretap provision. This was the only example found of the ACLU 
lending any support to Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Clearly this, like the 
Section 203 support, was a somewhat trivial expression. I believe Ms. Eyer’s support was 
to show that she was open to pragmatic national security solutions as long as they did not 
interfere with civil liberties. I also believe that these 2 instances in which the ACLU 
seemed to sway from what was expected by the PET of public policy change were not 
indicative of any significant potential for compromise between the DOJ and ACLU. 
Neither of these notions of support were very substantive and given they were the only 
illustrations of ACLU support of these provisions, it is unlikely this represents an area of 
compromise for the organization. 
There were also 5 instances in 2 separate congressional hearing in which the DOJ 
expressed some opposition to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This is not to say 
there is any sign of compromise in the 5 instances. Four of the accounts expressed 
concern that Section 215 was too time consuming or difficult to use. These seemingly 
opposing viewpoints were really a way of defending against the ACLU’s presumption 
that the FBI used Section 215 to avoid the rigors of a warrant or subpoena. The final 
instance of opposition to Section 215 was the DOJ stating they were not opposed to the 
language of Section 215 being clarified in an amendment if it helped with the renewal 
process. This brief line in the testimony could be seen as admission that the section’s 
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authorities are not clearly defined, but I believe it is more a testament to the DOJ 
understanding that they do not write law, but rather work within the confines of the 
written law.  
Throughout this study I did not find any other instance in which either the DOJ or 
the ACLU expressed views that were inconsistent with what was expected. This lends 
credibility to study as it demonstrates that the logic model based on the PET of public 
policy change is sound. The few discrepant cases had little effect on the study due to their 
lack of consistency and intensity. If any of the discrepancies had been routinely repeated 
or if any of them had been a strong showing of support or opposition it would have 
represented an area of possible compromise between the organizations. The ACLU and 
DOJ have both repeatedly and consistently expressed their official viewpoints and as 
predicted using the PET of public policy change these viewpoints are locked in 
opposition with little chance for change unless acted upon by an outside force. 
Code: ACLU Opposition to FISA (FAA) 
The code “ACLU Opposition to FISA (FAA)” refers to the ACLU’s general 
opposition to the changes to FISA brought about by Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001 and the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008. The ACLU’s opposition to current 
FISA and FISC operations was one of the most prevalently discussed issues found in this 
case study. This particular code was found 323 times in 20 different sources. Most of the 
sources were from congressional hearings after 2008 related to the USA PATRIOT Act 
and FAA or from the recent court cases between the ACLU and DOJ. 
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The main theme discovered in this code stemmed from the USA PATRIOT Act 
Section 215’s bulk collection programs. The ACLU often argued against the legality of 
the FISC authorizations of bulk collections. Approximately 249 (77%) of the 323 coded 
references related in some way to FISC’s role with bulk collection authorizations. Section 
215 was specifically mentioned 13 times. Bulk collections were specifically mentioned 
another 8 times and dragnet surveillance was mentioned 14 times. The ACLU also 
contended that the FISC bulk collection permissions violated the U.S. Constitution with 
explicitly expressed concerns of Fourth Amendment infringements 11 times and First 
Amendment violations 12 times. General constitutionality concerns related to large scale 
surveillance were raised 36 times. Similar ACLU themes were discovered repeatedly 
throughout the study. 
Code: DOJ Support of FISA (FAA) 
The code “DOJ Support of FISA (FAA)” refers to the DOJ’s general approval of 
FISA and FISC changes brought about by Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
FISA Amendments Act of 2008. This code was important to the study because it 
chronicled the DOJ’s rebuttal to the ACLU’s claims about the post - USA PATRIOT Act 
FISA system and explained some of the benefits of FISA to the DOJ. This particular code 
was found 191 times in 25 different sources. All but one of these sources came after the 
FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Much like the code “ACLU Opposition to FISA 
(FAA)”, sources for “DOJ Support of FISA (FAA)” primarily stem from recent court 
cases, but a few of the sources are congressional testimony. 
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Again like the code “ACLU Opposition to FISA (FAA)”, the main theme 
discovered in this code stemmed from the USA PATRIOT Act Section 215’s bulk 
collection programs. The DOJ repeatedly touted the legality of the FISC authorizations of 
bulk collections and the oversite the FISC brought to the metadata program. This code 
mentioned Section 215 a total of 67 times. It referred to the general constitutionality of 
the bulk collection program 12 times. It specifically referred to the Fourth Amendment 13 
times, often using the phrase “consistent with the Fourth Amendment”. In addition, there 
was one example of the DOJ citing Judge Batchelder’s explanation of subjective chill 
from a First Amendment violation and applying that to the ACLU’s argument against 
mass collection to suggest the ACLU had not suffered under the program (West, Bharara, 
Letter, & Lenerz, 2010). Many of the DOJ related themes discovered in this study were 
refutation of ACLU claims. 
Code: ACLU Opposition to Section 203 
Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act is an effort to mitigate barriers to 
information sharing between criminal investigations and national security investigations 
(H.R. Res. 3162, 2001). The so called “wall” between criminal and national security 
investigations was a contributing factor to terrorists being able to carry out the September 
11, 2001 attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004). The literature review identified the potential 
for Section 203 to circumvent the Fourth Amendment by funneling information into 
criminal proceedings without warrant or even probable cause (Martin, 2005; Husain 
2014). Due to this identified theme in the literature review, it was expected that there 
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would be substantial evidence of the ACLU opposing the section, but this was not the 
case.  
This code was not found as much as expected prior to the data collection. The 
“ACLU Opposition to Section 203” code was only found 8 times in 5 different sources. 
Five of the referenced excerpts explained the potential for abuse of information sharing if 
Fourth Amendment protections were circumvented. The remaining 3 references (all from 
the same source) were related to how information from a FISC authorized investigation 
of Brandon Mayfield under Section 218 authorities was ultimately shared under Section 
203 leading to Mayfield’s detention (USA PATRIOT Act: Hearings before the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005). Generally the evidence of 
ACLU opposition to Section 203 was inconsequential in both frequency and intensity.  
Code: DOJ Support of Section 203 
The DOJ’s support of Section 203 was much more robust than the ACLU’s 
opposition of the provision. This code was referenced 78 times from 7 sources. The 
references in this code were somewhat generalized and there was not a dominate theme in 
this code. Fifteen of the references were generally related to the value of information 
sharing. Ten references explained the use of Section 203 leading to the prosecution of 
various crimes related to terrorism. The 9/11 Commission’s results and the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks were represented in 9 references in this code. Five of the references 
explained how the combination of Section 218 and Section 203 were beneficial to 
national security. Despite not having a definitive theme with this code the number 
references and sources combined with the ACLU’s lack of opposition demonstrates that 
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Section 203 might be somewhat less controversial than what the much of the literature 
about the section seemed to suggest. 
Code: ACLU Opposition to Section 206 
Section 206 authorizes roving wiretaps in national security investigations (H.R. 
Res. 3162, 2001). The ACLU has expressed opposition to this provision. In 5 separate 
sources the ACLU’s opposition to Section 206 was coded 24 times. The dominate theme 
expressed in this code is the ACLU contends the national security roving wiretap 
procedures should mimic the criminal investigation roving wiretap procedures. Nearly all 
the references alluded to differences between the criminal and national security roving 
wiretap procedures. The primary difference according to the ACLU is Section 206 allows 
the roving wiretap to not target a specific person. In other words, the roving wiretap 
theoretically is not tied to a person or a communication device allowing for vague wiretap 
authorizations. It is also worth noting in a few sources Section 206 was referred to as a 
“general warrant” similar to the general warrants that prompted the Founding Fathers to 
draft the Fourth Amendment. These particular claims were not made by the ACLU and 
were not coded, because of this.  
The 24 instances that were coded in this code illustrates the ACLU’s opposition to 
Section 206. In 5 of the coded references, the ACLU specifically calls for Section 206 to 
be more in line with criminal roving wiretap codes. In 3 of the code’s references, Section 
206 is said to authorize “John Doe” wiretaps. Two of the codes express concern about 
innocent conversations being intercepted. In addition, there are 2 examples of the ACLU 
claiming Section 206 violates the Fourth Amendment and one claim that the provision 
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violates the First Amendment. The ACLU’s opposition to Section 206 is clearly defined 
in the data gathered in this study. 
Code: DOJ Support of Section 206 
The DOJ’s defense of Section 206 is slightly more vigorous than the ACLU’s 
opposition, but this is expected as the DOJ had to defend against several entities not just 
the ACLU. This code gathered 50 references from 4 sources. The basic theme that 
emerged from this coded data is that the Section 206 roving wiretap is essentially the 
same as a criminal wiretap that has been used since 1986. This code contains 7 detailed 
mentions of Section 206 wiretaps being similar in scope and practice to criminal 
investigation roving wiretaps. There are 14 mentions disputing the claims that roving 
wiretaps are not tied to a specific person. The DOJ explains that the FISC requires the 
target to be “is in fact a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power (USA PATRIOT 
Act: Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 
2005). In a letter to Senator Feinstein the DOJ also explained “the "roving" authority is 
only available when the Government is able to provide specific information that the 
target may engage in counter-surveillance activity” (Weich, 2009). This counter-
surveillance requirement was mentioned in at least one other reference in this code. These 
references seem to effectively counter most of the opposing ACLU claims. 
In addition, there are 2 citations that explain the origins of the criminal 
investigation wiretaps. These citations illustrate that in 1986 the roving wiretap 
procedures were established as part of the War on Drugs campaign because drug dealers 
were changing phones to defeat wiretaps and that terrorists and spies use the same 
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tradecraft. The general theme revealed here is that if a tool can be used to thwart common 
criminals it should also be legal in terrorist and spy investigations. There were 18 
mentions of Section 206 roving wiretaps being used to defeat terror plots, which lend 
some credibility to the aforementioned theme. Furthermore Section 206 was not 
mentioned in any sources dated after 2011, possibly indicating that the controversies 
around the provision have faded. To truly determine if it has faded would require an 
exhaustive search of data that extended beyond the ACLU and DOJ. 
Code: ACLU Opposition to Section 215 
Section 215 amended the FISA to grant the FBI access to “any tangible things” 
relevant to an international terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation (H.R. Res. 
3162, 2001). This has been the most controversial aspect of the USA PATRIOT Act 
beginning with the concerns that all U.S. library records would be seized and continuing 
into late 2015 with Section 215 being the legal authority to the NSA’s bulk metadata 
program. This was the most cited ACLU code in this study. It was also the most recent 
and relevant ACLU code, because the ACLU is actively engaged in 3 high profile legal 
battles with the DOJ over Section 215. This code was referenced 424 times throughout 22 
sources. Five of the sources were within 6 months of the data collection.  
The dominate theme found with this code is the ACLU’s contention that the 
NSA’s bulk metadata collection violates First and Fourth Amendment protections and 
creates an unreasonable communication chill. The ACLU referred to the NSA program as 
bulk, blanket, mass, or dragnet surveillance 79 times throughout this code. Eighty-five 
citations described the program as unconstitutional or in violation of First and Fourth 
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Amendments. Seven other references asserted the program is an invasion or “gross 
invasion” of privacy. Another 16 coded mentions claimed the program is unreasonable. 
Twelve coded sections stated the program chilled free speech. Thirteen citations 
explained that the collection of metadata should constitute a search and thus deserves 
Fourth Amendment protections. The ACLU described the program as warrantless twelve 
times throughout this code.  
The ACLU made other effective arguments such as when the ACLU stated “the 
record is clear that the government need not collect Plaintiffs’ call records in order to 
obtain the call records of suspected terrorists and their contacts” (Dunn et al., 2015, p. 
15). This simple statement is a cornerstone of any argument against Section 215 
collections. The reason for the outrage with the metadata collection is it captured millions 
of records that had nothing to do with terror investigations. This argument from the 
ACLU was echoed by politicians from both parties and much of the public. On 
November 29, 2015 the NSA bulk collection program was altered to require 
communication carriers to retain the metadata and now the NSA only acquires records 
specific to national security investigations (Duncan, 2015). This compromise would 
seemingly negate the argument against the metadata collection as it is no longer mass 
collection. 
Throughout this code the ACLU referred to the NSA program as exceeding the 
legal authorities of Section 215. In this code the U.S. Congress was mentioned 56 times 
with 24 of those times explaining that the bulk metadata program is beyond Section 215’s 
original intent. The most powerful representation of this claim came from 2 citations in 
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which the ACLU quoted Section 215’s author, Senator Jim Sensenbrenner, as stating the 
program was an abuse of that law (Jaffer et al., 2013). The collective data composed in 
the 424 coded references illustrated the ACLU’s comprehensive and consistent argument 
against Section 215. This prompted the DOJ to generate an equally strong and reliable 
rebuttal. 
Code: DOJ Support of Section 215 
The DOJ’s support of Section 215 is as solid as the ACLU’s opposition. This was 
the most used code in this study. This code was discovered 617 times in 19 sources. 
Seven of the 19 sources were within 6 months of the onset of the data collection. This 
demonstrates how relevant and current this topic remains. Twenty-eight of the references 
were derived from a 2005 document, which illustrates the longevity of the contentions. 
Due to the nature of the congressional hearings and lawsuits in which the DOJ has had to 
defend Section 215 authorities since shortly after the provision’s conception. 
The theme expressed with this code is the polar opposite to the ACLU opposition 
to Section 215 code. The theme is a 2 prong confutation of the ACLU’s claims with the 
first prong addressing the legality of Section 215 and the second discrediting ACLU 
claims as speculative. First 132 of the coded references refuted the claims that Section 
215 or the NSA’s metadata program under that section violated the U.S. Constitution or 
any of its amendments. Approximately 80 of the codes were repudiating the claim that 
Section 215 violated the Fourth Amendment. The code contained 27 explanations of why 
the collection of records under Section 215 is not a search under Fourth Amendment 
standards. Seven additional references explained that even if the Section 215 collections 
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were a search, they would be permitted due to the government’s “special needs”. 
Approximately 40 other citations suggested the collection of metadata or other records 
under Section 215 was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. This study also 
found 7 instances in which the DOJ argued the legality of Section 215 collections by 
touting that 14 separate federal judges had authorized the collections on 34 separate 
occasions. This code also contains 125 DOJ mentions of congress’ authorization, 
knowledge, or oversite of Section 215 collections. The DOJ took great care to repeatedly 
address the legality of Section 215. 
The important point the DOJ’s 2 prong defense was that the ACLU’s claims were 
mostly speculative, because there was no evidence that any of their communications had 
been queried even if their metadata had been collected. The DOJ used the word 
speculative 19 times in this code when describing ACLU claims. On 3 separate entries 
the DOJ stated there was “no evidence” of a chilling effect. In legal documents 
containing this code, the DOJ questioned the ACLU’s standing 32 times. This dismissive 
legal approach has had mixed results in the courts, as each of the legal scuffles between 
the ACLU and DOJ have had victories and defeats by both organizations with the 3 
current cases seemingly locked in perpetual appeal. 
Code: ACLU Opposition to Section 218 
Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended sections 104 and 303 of the 
FISA by striking ‘‘the purpose’’ and inserting ‘‘a significant purpose’’ (H.R. Res. 3162, 
2001). This syntactic variation created a potential for FISA authorizations to be used for 
non-foreign intelligence related cases, perhaps even including common law enforcement 
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investigations (Francel, 2014; Sales, 2010). The theme that emerged from this code is 
best described by the coded reference that states “The danger of section 218’s lower 
standard is that the government will cut corners in criminal cases” (USA PATRIOT Act: 
Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005). 
This concept appears in virtually all the coded references of this code. In addition, there 
are 3 mentions of potential Fourth Amendment violations and 11 assertions that Section 
218 led to civil liberties violations in the Mayfield case. This code has a limited number 
of references due in part because Section 218 has not recently been indicted in public 
controversies like Section 215 has, but the consistency of the argument adequately 
explains the ACLU’s stance on Section 218. 
Code: DOJ Support of Section 218 
The code “DOJ Support of Section 218” chronicled the DOJ’s effort to have the 
provision extended beyond its original sunset by disputing the critics of the section and 
touting its successes. Throughout this code are examples of the DOJ crediting the 
cumulative effects of Sections 218 and 203. The basic theme is that the combination of 
the 2 sections helped mitigate the organizational cultures that led to a hypothetical wall 
that prevented criminal and national security investigations from cooperating. This code 
referred to the “wall” 8 times and Section 203 9 times. There were also 4 mentions of the 
9/11 Commission’s recommendation that a lack of information sharing led to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. There were 7 coded references to Section 218’s 
information sharing properties. This code also revealed the DOJ’s assertion that the 
section was fundamental to the disruption of the Portland Seven and the Virginia Jihad 
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terrorist plots. Much like the previous code this code reveals a reliable, well-articulated 
organizational viewpoint about Section 218. 
Code: ACLU - USA PATRIOT ACT enacted due to 9/11  
The code “ACLU – USA PATRIOT Act enacted due to 9/11” was developed as 
part of the predictive logic model to illustrate the validity of the PET of public policy 
change. The purpose of this code was to demonstrate that the ACLU would contend that 
the USA PATRIOT Act would not have been enacted if not due to the terrorist attack of 
September 11, 2001. Precisely as predicted the ACLU repeatedly mentioned the events of 
9/11 as the catalyst for the USA PATRIOT Act. This code contains 13 examples from 5 
sources that attest to this notion. Many of the examples clearly state the act was in 
response to the attacks, while others allude to it. All 13 coded references clearly articulate 
that the USA PATRIOT Act was a reaction to the terrorist attack. 
Code: DOJ - USA PATRIOT ACT enacted due to 9/11  
Like the code “ACLU – USA PATRIOT Act enacted due to 9/11”, the code “DOJ 
– USA PATRIOT Act enacted due to 9/11” was developed as part of the predictive logic 
model to illustrate the validity of PET to this study. Also like the previous code, this code 
gave credibility to the notion that the DOJ would consider the USA PATRIOT Act to be 
a response to the 9/11 attacks. This code was used 18 times in 5 sources. The DOJ was 
not as specific as the ACLU in this context, but it did allude to the USA PATRIOT Act as 
correcting pre-9/11 deficiencies. Both of these codes will be further discussed in the 
results section of this chapter when discussing the research questions. See Table 1 for a 
summary of code occurrence.  
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Table 1 
Summary of Code Occurrence 
Code Number of occurrences Number of sources 
ACLU Opposition to FISA 323 20 
DOJ Support of FISA 191 25 
ACLU Opposition to Section 203 8 5 
DOJ Support of Section 203 78 7 
ACLU Opposition to Section 206 206 24 
DOJ Support of Section 206 50 4 
ACLU Opposition to Section 215 424 22 
DOJ Support of Section 215 617 19 
ACLU Opposition to Section 218 27 5 
DOJ Support of Section 218 42 2 
ACLU Act enacted due to 9/11  13 5 
DOJ Act enacted due to 9/11 18 5 
 
Evidence of Trustworthiness  
Credibility (Internal Validity) 
The credibility strategy described in Chapter 3 focused on 3 main aspects, the 
theoretical framework, literature review, and researcher biases. In qualitative studies 
credibility is highly influenced by the results of previous studies (Rudestam & Newton, 
2007). To capitalize on this aspect of qualitative research the literature review and the 
theoretical framework were examined to a point of saturation. To add to the credibility of 
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this study I read and analyzed hundreds of articles and books related to U.S. national 
security policies and the PET of public policy change. The continuous search for new 
material related to national security and PET not only kept the study relevant and 
credible, but was absolutely necessary in keeping up with the ever changing legal actions 
between the ACLU and DOJ. Fortunately the recent developments with Title II of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, like the historic policies before it, followed the PET cycle. 
The theoretical framework provided by the PET of public policy change is a key 
component to the internal validity of this study. It was essential to validate this theory to 
the study. The PET of public policy change has been a widely accepted theory for several 
years (Givel, 2010; Prindle, 2012; Sabatier, 2007). Ripberger (2011) and Romano (2011) 
explained that there is a natural ebb and flow to national security policies with spikes in 
contentious policies following major events. This supports PET. The literature review in 
this study examined national security policies and programs from the founding of the 
United States through modern times. This examination revealed national security policy 
throughout American history has consistently followed a basic PET cycle of stagnation, 
incremental change, and rapid change following significant events.  
This study is fundamentally dependent on the PET (PET) of public policy change 
applying to Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. Both the literature review and the data 
analysis suggest that the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted as a direct response to the 
terrorist attacks of 2001. For several years following its enactment Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act remained largely stagnant. In 2015 Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act was 
repeatedly on the verge of incremental change. While most of these changes failed to 
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fully manifest, there were some significant changes to certain Title II authorities. The 
evidence provided by the lifecycle of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act indicates that 
thus far the law has followed a PET pattern. 
Reviewing U.S. national security policies throughout American history was 
essential not just to understanding and validating PET, it was also necessary to develop 
perspective about the USA PATRIOT Act. To fully appreciate the nuances of a law it is 
important to comprehend the historic policies relevant to the USA PATRIOT Act 
(O’Brien, 2011). The literature review chronicled major national security policies, legal 
decisions, and even security related scandals leading up to and including the USA 
PATRIOT Act. This revealed a consistent trend of security policies and even abuses 
following PET, but it also explained legal precedence, traditional policy standards, 
historic abuses of authority, and the original intent of various laws. All of these concepts 
were critical to developing a credible understanding of the USA PATRIOT Act and its 
related controversies. The literature review provided a sound foundation for the study and 
is nearly as important to the credibility of this work as the theoretical framework. 
The next most important aspect related to the credibility of this study was 
mitigating my biases about the USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act is a very 
polarizing subject, but by consistently evaluating my personal beliefs and actively trying 
to understand both sides of the debate I found myself maintaining a neutral opinion about 
the law. By having an open mind I was able to see that the USA PATRIOT Act is an 
imperfect but useful law. I never developed strong opinions for or against the law. Even 
after the data analysis, I contend that both sides of the debate have valid arguments. In 
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addition, as stated in Chapter 3, the USA PATRIOT Act does not have any direct effect 
on my life. I am neither a member of the ACLU or the DOJ. This has allowed me to 
mitigate biases throughout the case study. 
Transferability (External Validity) 
Transferability is the capacity of study’s structure to be applied to a similar 
subject matter (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). Yin (2014) suggested that the 
theoretical basis is essential to external validity. Much like the study’s internal validity, 
the external validity of this case study is enhanced by the integration of the theoretical 
framework throughout the study. As repeatedly observed and mentioned throughout each 
chapter of the dissertation, the PET of public policy has been extraordinarily consistent 
throughout American national security policy history including the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Using PET as the theoretical framework this study could easily be transferred to a study 
of a different title of the USA PATRIOT Act or even a different law altogether. In 
addition, the case study could also be transferred to other groups that oppose and support 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. For example, this study format could be applied to 
Electronic Frontier Foundation rather than the ACLU and the Office of Director of 
National Intelligence rather than the DOJ. 
The general application of the PET framework developed in this case study would 
likely yield similar results in any controversial national security policy throughout U.S. 
history. The most basic element of the policy lifecycles have shown that even the most 
controversial of security policies have similar origins and conclusions. Major changes to 
security policies tend to stem from a significant event that jolts the public and by 
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extension the lawmakers into action. The bounded rationality of the situations have 
historically generated imperfect laws, policies, or procedures. However, in the past once 
these imperfect conditions were established there was a period of stagnation in which the 
opposing and supporting forces were engaged in a gridlock induced stagnation. With the 
historic examples, as pressure has mounted, the entrenched legislators have accomplished 
limited incremental change until the law is either no longer controversial or another 
outside source prompted dramatic change. This consistency has added credibility and 
transferability to the case study. 
Dependability 
Dependability is the reduction in errors and biases in a study (Miles, Huberman, 
& Saldaña, 2014, Yin 2014). This case study utilized a logic model technique of 
deductive analysis which predicted results based upon historic evidence and the use of 
theory. As discussed in the credibility and transferability sections of this chapter, both the 
history of national security policies and the PET have been constant. This consistency 
made it possible to accurately predict the views of both the DOJ and ACLU in regards to 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act.  
While there were a few instances, mentioned previously in this chapter, when 
statements of certain members of either the ACLU or DOJ differed slightly from the 
predicted results, the overwhelming majority of the data collected and analyzed was 
exactly as predicted. The DOJ generally supported Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
while the ACLU generally opposed the authorities. This is consistent with PET and the 
historic references discussed earlier. There was a direct and consistent effort to look for 
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any instance in which the DOJ opposed Title II or the ACLU supported Title II. Even the 
examples of unexpected results laid forth in the data analysis section of the chapter were 
not compelling, scarce, and genuinely unimportant. They were included in the study 
primarily to demonstrate the effort to find data that fell outside expected results. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability is the degree of which a study is free from the burden of researcher 
biases or how differently the results would be if the research was conducted by a different 
researcher (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). The theoretical framework and logic 
model technique used in this study mitigated the potential for researcher biases to 
significantly affect the results of the study. The codes were all predetermined based upon 
assumptions made from an understanding of PET. There was never a need to alter or add 
codes to meet unanticipated trends or inconsistent information in the data collection or 
analysis. This study could as previously mentioned be readily transferred to a related 
topic and it could also be confirmed by a different researcher due to the reliability of the 
theory and the simplicity of the study’s structure. 
A central objective of the study was to develop a thick description of both sides of 
the debate about Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. If another researcher were to analyze 
the same documents using the same predetermined codes the results would necessarily be 
similar. This is not due to anything other than the consistency of the period of stagnation 
described in the PET theory. During this period the political or ideological polarization 
unifies arguments in both directions. A different researcher would have similar results, 
because the DOJ and ACLU arguments were consistent throughout thousands of pages of 
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court proceedings and congressional hearings. With greater than a decade of debate about 
Title II neither organization strayed from their original viewpoints. 
Research Results 
Central Research Question 
How does the bounded rationality of the PET of public policy change prevent 
incremental change from achieving the security objectives of Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 while addressing concerns of potential circumventions of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? 
The bounded rationality aspect of PET suggests the incremental Title II changes 
have been insufficient to achieve the surveillance and information sharing goals while 
mitigating Fourth Amendment concerns because ideological polarization prevents 
effective political action. The results of this study illustrated that in the politically and 
ideologically polarizing debate about Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act there is little 
room for compromise between the opposing viewpoints with each side posing convincing 
arguments, but neither side willing to accept the other’s opinion. In addition, the 
opposing viewpoints are correspondingly well thought out and persuasive. The natural 
divide between 2 equally compelling arguments is akin to having twins on opposing sides 
of a tug of war competition. As the data analysis and literature review have illustrated the 
argument between the 2 groups has remained constant but after years of debate there has 
not been a definitive court decision, policy change, legislative amendment, or procedural 
adjustment. 
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To explain the results of the Central Research Question it is useful to break the 
question into its key elements. To begin with it is essential to determine if there is 
evidence that Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is an imperfect policy developed under 
the stress of bounded rationality. For this research question the bounded rationality 
effects both the enactment of the law and the extended period of policy change stagnation 
the USA PATRIOT Act has had. During the period of dynamic change, lawmakers were 
forced to make choices rapidly without extensive debate due to the public fear of a follow 
on terrorist attacks. This resulted in the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. This 
assertion will be more thoroughly explained later in this section of Chapter 4. During the 
incremental period of change, the legislators were locked in a political and ideological 
stalemate as neither those opposed to the law or those supporting the law were able to 
conjure enough influence to elicit change.  
To meet the criteria of bounded rationality the law would need to have been 
hastily enacted resulting in a useful yet problematic policy. The primary evidence that the 
law was enacted in haste comes from the timing of the enactment. The law was drafted, 
debated, and enacted within 45 days of the September 11th attacks (Bellia, 2011). This is 
a rapid enactment for even a minor bill and is astonishingly swift for a bill as far reaching 
as the USA PATRIOT Act. As previously mentioned, the data analyzed in this case study 
suggests that both the ACLU and DOJ contribute the quick passage of the law to the 
September 11th attacks. In addition, the law itself mentions the attacks 25 times in its text. 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that the law was in response to the terrorist attacks.  
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The next step is to determine if the law was affected by bounded rationality 
during its creation. The data analysis suggests that the law was negatively affected by the 
forces of bounded rationality. First while the act garnered very limited debate between 
September 11, 2001 and its passage that October, almost immediately after its passage 
the debate grew in frequency and intensity. This case study focused on congressional 
hearings and court cases from 2004 through 2015. The number of high level debates 
suggest the law is imperfect. When the suggested imperfection is combined with the rapid 
enactment it seems that the law was impaired by bounded rationality during its creation. 
The fact that the argument has lasted more than a decade suggests that bounded 
rationality has restrained legislators from achieving adequate incremental change that 
satisfies both sides of the debate. 
It was important to address the bounded rationality of Title II of the USA 
PATRIOT Act as it is paramount to designing a logic model technique based upon the 
PET of public policy change. For the strategy to be an effective analysis tool the title 
needed to display evidence of bounded rationality in its genesis and its period of 
stagnation. The data indicates this is the case. The bounded rationality and PET created 
the foundation of the Central Research Question, but confirming the presence of bounded 
rationality was a small part of the data analysis regarding the question. The main 
objective of the question is to evaluate both sides of the controversies surrounding Title II 
and to look for any possibility of overcoming the bounded rationality caused stagnation. 
The focal point of the controversies has stemmed from changes to surveillance 
and information sharing. The contentious changes came in many forms with the ways in 
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which Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act modified the FISA at the forefront of several of 
the controversies. As described in the literature review, FISA was designed to 
dramatically reform national security policies and procedures following the numerous 
unsettling discoveries of the Church Committee. Originally FISA was meant to create 
oversite of national security investigations and prevent the broadened authorities of the 
intelligence agencies from being applied to U.S. citizens. The events of September 11, 
2001 changed FISA’s role. 
The 9/11 Commission (2004) asserted that the failure to prevent the 2001 attacks 
was due in part to the “wall” between criminal and national security investigations. The 
data analysis in this case study suggested that the DOJ firmly supports the 9/11 
Commission’s observation. During an FBI oversight hearing Director Mueller stated “If 
we learned one thing on September 11th and one thing only, it was the need to share 
intelligence and gather intelligence to identify persons who would kill American citizens, 
whether it be here domestically or overseas” (Oversight of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2012). In a 2004 congressional hearing James B. Comey, Jr., Deputy 
Attorney General, explained “The PATRIOT Act also did something radical, something 
earth shattering, something breathtaking that nobody talks about. The PATRIOT Act 
broke down the wall that separated intelligence investigators tracking terrorists from 
criminal investigators tracking terrorists” (Preventing and responding to acts of 
terrorism: A review of current law, 2004). The Deputy Attorney General went on to 
explain that prior to the USA PATRIOT Act criminal and national security investigations 
working out of the same building and focused on the same suspects could not collaborate 
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in any meaningful way. In the data collected in this case study, the DOJ generally 
expressed disapproval of the pre-9/11 barriers to information sharing and approval of the 
ways in which the USA PATRIOT Act mitigated these obstacles. 
 This was a common theme throughout the data analysis as members of the DOJ 
mentioned the wall or information sharing approximately 50 times. This number of 
mentions would have been higher, but the DOJ often submitted identical letters and 
testimony to multiple entities. When duplicate documents were found addressed to 
different members of congress or hearing the duplicates were not added to the data 
collection. Typically when the DOJ mentioned the wall it was to state that the wall made 
America less safe. Typically when the DOJ addressed information sharing it was to 
explain how it was making the nation safer. When the DOJ cited the wall, information 
sharing, or FISA the focus was nearly always about terrorism or terrorists. 
By contrast the ACLU responses in this study tended to warn about the dangers of 
broadened authorities. The ACLU was particularly concerned with the potential for 
Fourth Amendment violations if national security investigations shared FISA authorized 
evidence with criminal prosecutors. In a letter submitted as testimony in a 2011 
congressional hearing the ACLU remarked “The Patriot Act vastly – and 
unconstitutionally – expanded the government’s authority to pry into people’s private 
lives with little or no evidence of wrongdoing. This overbroad authority unnecessarily 
and improperly infringes on Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search 
and seizures” (Permanent provisions of the PATRIOT Act, 2011). In previous 
congressional testimony the ACLU claimed “now the government can—for what are 
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primarily criminal searches—evade the Fourth Amendment’s constraints of probable 
cause of crime and notice to the person whose property is being searched” (USA 
PATRIOT Act: Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States 
Senate, 2005).  
The ACLU’s concern about the Fourth Amendment was the dominate theme for 
the organization noted in this study. There were 72 ACLU mentions of potential Fourth 
Amendment violations. The majority of the Fourth Amendment references came after the 
Snowden leaks. Approximately 69% of the ACLU’s discussion about the Fourth 
Amendment were directly related to Section 215 bulk collections. Prior to the Snowden 
revelations the ACLU’s Fourth Amendment claims either referred to the Mayfield case or 
were theoretical in nature. In addition, with the Mayfield references the Fourth 
Amendment concerns always accompanied a First Amendment claim as well. After the 
exposure of the bulk metadata collection program, the claims nearly always asserted that 
the program was an example of Fourth Amendment violations.  
This study found that the DOJ consistently defended constitutionality of Title II of 
the USA PATRIOT Act. This study found that the DOJ mentions of the Fourth 
Amendment were rebuttals to claims against the constitutionality of USA PATRIOT Act 
programs rather than spontaneous proclamations. For this reason the DOJ references to 
the Fourth Amendment spiked after the admission of the bulk collection programs. This 
study found 86 DOJ mentions of the Fourth Amendment following the 2013 leaks. 
Nearly all of the coded references involving the DOJ and the Fourth Amendment are 
examples of the DOJ dismissing the claims of the ACLU or another organization. 
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A leading DOJ rebuttal centered on the Third Party Doctrine. As mentioned in the 
literature review, the Third Party Doctrine, established through the court cases of United 
States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland, states that the assumption of privacy is lost 
anytime documents are held by third party organization (United States President’s 
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 2013). The DOJ 
asserted “the Smith Court reaffirmed the established principle that ‘a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties’” (Delery et al., 2014, p. 43). The Smith v. Maryland case was crucial to the 
DOJ’s defense of bulk collections authorized by Section 215. The DOJ mentioned the 
case 49 times. This particular reference was related to bulk metadata collections, as most 
of the references were, but the argument applies to any record held by any public 
company. 
In regard to the central research question, this back and forth of debate between 
the ACLU and DOJ illustrates that the 2 organizations are locked in a rigid ideological 
dispute. Neither side is likely to be satisfied with the outcome of any compromise. This 
notion is evident in the numerous appeals to any legal decision in the previous and 
current court cases surrounding the Title II surveillance and information sharing. The 
data analysis did not show any sign that either side wanted any compromise. The DOJ 
generally argued Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act should remain as is, while the ACLU 
suggested Sections 203, 206, 215, and 218 should at a minimum be amended. As 
previously mentioned both sides claimed to have constitutional back and both made 
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logical, articulate arguments for their opinion. Neither side seemed willing to concede to 
the other’s points. 
Another prime example of sides being locked in ideological polarization came 
from a significant event related to Title II USA PATRIOT Act that occurred during the 
course of this case study. In the summer of 2015, Section 215 was allowed expire, just to 
be renewed the next day with the USA FREEDOM Act (Kelly, 2015; Whitaker, 2015). 
The USA FREEDOM Act could have been seen somewhat as a compromise in that it 
ended the most controversial aspect of Section 215 to date, the bulk metadata collection 
by the NSA. The ACLU assessed the change as only a symbolic victory since Section 
215 remained intact (Duncan, 2015). At first glance it seems that the ACLU should 
consider the changes to be a significant victory. They argued against the federal 
government collected the bulk metadata of innocent Americans and the bulk metadata 
collection was stopped. Technically that should be considered a victory, but ACLU point 
about it being a “symbolic victory” also seems valid because the legal mechanism for 
bulk collection is still in place.  
In addition, Section 215 isn’t necessarily limited metadata records and could in 
theory be used to gather medical records, emails, financial statements, etc. The ACLU 
has consistently argued against Section 215 authorities. The ACLU assertions of Section 
215 improprieties began long before the bulk metadata program was revealed. In a 2004 
congressional hearing the ACLU stated that the inefficiency of Section 215 programs 
plus its potential for abuse “should prompt further review of Section 215 to find the 
balance between its efficacy and the problems of perception that it creates, which could at 
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least be mitigated by a restriction of its use to those for whom there is individualized 
suspicion” (Preventing and responding to acts of terrorism: A review of current law, 
2004). This explains why the ACLU would consider the USA FREEDOM Act’s changes 
to the metadata program to be symbolic. The organization wants to ensure all Section 215 
authorities, many of which might be unknown to the public, are legally bound to 
individual suspicion not broad surveillance. 
By using the PET of public policy change to predict the life cycle of Title II of the 
USA PATRIOT Act the results of this study suggested Title II authorizations will likely 
remain relatively unchanged until an external development shocks the equilibrium of the 
debate. This study illustrated that throughout the politically and ideologically polarizing 
dispute regarding Title II, the USA PATRIOT Act has been locked in stagnation with 
only limited incremental change. The bounded rationality of PET explained that the 
incremental changes were insufficient to achieve the surveillance and information sharing 
goals of Title II while mitigating Fourth Amendment. In addition, the changes that have 
occurred have not affected the controversies surrounding Title II of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. The evidence analyzed in this case study suggested that it is unlikely either side of 
the debate is currently willing to accept any compromise. The conclusion that developed 
from the data analysis is that Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is expected to remain in 
perpetual stasis with periods of limited incremental change unless an outside event 
generates significant public enthusiasm for one side of the debate or the other. 
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Subquestion 1  
How is political and ideological polarization prolonging the stagnation period of 
the PET of public policy change with the USA PATRIOT Act? 
As explained above, the debate about Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act has 
developed 2 uncompromising points of view with relatively equally persuasive 
arguments. This study focused upon the views of the ACLU and DOJ, but these 
viewpoints are representative of the American populace and the U.S. political leaders. 
Examining the strife between the DOJ and ACLU provides insight into the political and 
ideological divide about the USA PATRIOT Act that exists throughout U.S. politics. By 
realizing lawmakers are somewhat evenly split amongst those that generally side with the 
ACLU’s opinion and those that typically side with the DOJ’s assertions it is apparent 
why the law has remained relatively stagnant since 2001. The 2 views effectively cancel 
each other out. 
Throughout more than a decade of debate about Title II of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, the ACLU has remained steadfast that there are “provisions of the PATRIOT Act 
that violate the Constitution and civil liberties” (Permanent provisions of the PATRIOT 
Act, 2011). Many of the ACLU’s concerns have focused on how the USA PATRIOT Act 
changed the FISA system. The ACLU claimed the broadened use of FISA authorities due 
to the USA PATRIOT Act “exacerbated other constitutional problems with the statute 
under both the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment” (USA PATRIOT Act: 
Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005). 
The ACLU claimed the FISA authorizations do not meet the same rigorous standards as 
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criminal investigation authorizations. The ACLU claimed that the FISC, due to the USA 
PATRIOT Act and FAA, no longer protects the Fourth Amendment and “is simply to 
issue advisory opinions blessing in advance the vaguest of parameters, under which the 
government is then free to conduct surveillance for up to one year” (Jaffer et al., 2012, p. 
8). This study found very limited instances of the ACLU ever altering their message 
about Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
 The DOJ has been equally unwavering in its defense of Title II authorities. At no 
point in this study was any information uncovered that suggested that the DOJ even 
slightly questioned the constitutionality of any Title II authority. In fact in with each 
mention of the U.S. Constitution by the DOJ was to explain how a particular program or 
authority was constitutional. The DOJ also aggressively defended how the USA 
PATRIOT Act affected FISA and FISA authorizations. The DOJ stated “the FISA Court 
are far from a rubber stamp; instead, they review all of our pleadings thoroughly, they 
question us, and they do not approve an order until they are satisfied that we have met all 
statutory and constitutional requirements” (Strengthening privacy rights and national 
security: Oversight of FISA surveillance programs, 2013). The DOJ repeated similar 
statements throughout this study’s data. 
 The DOJ’s argument and the ACLU’s argument genuinely negate each other. 
Applying the debate findings between the ACLU and DOJ to the broader stage of 
American legal and political interactions it is clear that ideological polarization has 
prolonged the stagnation period for the USA PATRIOT Act. As mentioned with the 
central research question, the results of this study suggest that Title II of the act will 
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remain basically unchanged unless a significant event sways public opinion about the 
law. This outcome is not surprising. A review of PET illustrates that this is often the case 
with national security policies.  
Subquestion 2 
How does the PET of public policy change explain the enactment and extensions 
of the USA PATRIOT Act? 
The PET of public policy change asserts that dramatic policies changes often stem 
from a significant event and these changes are negatively affected by bounded rationality. 
As previously mentioned, the USA PATRIOT Act was a direct response to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Both the ACLU and DOJ repeatedly alluded to this fact. The 
DOJ suggested the law was necessary to combat terrorism in the modern age. The DOJ 
supported this affirmation with the findings from the 9/11 Commission. The ACLU also 
accredited the passage of the law to the terrorist attack, but implied the law was imperfect 
because it was rushed. “The Act was the product of an extraordinary time just after 
September 11 in which Congress and the administration were working quickly, under 
pressure, to give law enforcement and intelligence agencies new surveillance powers” 
(Preventing and responding to acts of terrorism: A review of current law, 2004). This 
ACLU comment illustrates bounded rationality in action, as does the fact that the sunset 
provisions of the law have been repeatedly reaffirmed. While this study did to find any 
direct statement mentioning the reenactments of the provisions being due to bounded 
rationality, it does fit with the presumption that the law is stuck in a period of stagnation. 
Even the sections that recently expired in 2015, were immediately reinstated the next day. 
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Letting provisions actually expire would be a significant change and significant change 
does not occur in stagnant periods in PET. 
Subquestion 3 
How does Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act affect U.S. law? 
The significant portions of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act for this study affect 
U.S. law in the following ways: 
• Section 203 promotes information sharing amongst criminal and national 
security investigations. 
• Section 206 allows for roving wiretaps in national security investigations. 
• Section 215 grants access to any type of record deemed necessary to a 
national security investigation. 
• Section 218 broadens the authority of the FISC by allowing FISA 
authorizations to be used in any investigation when the significant purpose 
of the investigation is security related. 
Subquestion 4  
What are the benefits of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act? 
The results of this study illustrated that the DOJ considered many of the Title II 
provisions to be beneficial. In regard to the information sharing changes brought about by 
Section 203 the DOJ stated “I think beginning with the PATRIOT Act, removing the 
wall, we have made great steps to make sure that that information is shared” (Oversight 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012). In reference to the roving wiretaps of 
Section 206 the DOJ stated “Section 206 now gives us the authority in terrorism 
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investigations to use the tools we had used in a wide range of criminal cases, including 
drug and racketeering cases, since 1986” (Preventing and responding to acts of 
terrorism: A review of current law, 2004). The DOJ also adamantly defended Section 215 
of the act with “the government has provided examples in which the Section 215 program 
provided timely and valuable assistance to ongoing counter-terrorism investigations” 
(Branda, Olson, Letter, Byron III, & Whitaker, 2014, p. 67). Finally with Section 218 the 
DOJ touted “the successful use of section 218, including investigation of the Portland 
Seven and the Virginia Jihad” (USA PATRIOT Act: Hearings before the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005). The data analysis identified 
hundreds of examples of the DOJ praising a benefit of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Subquestion 5 
How is Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act controversial? 
The data analysis also identified hundreds of examples of the ACLU expressing 
concern about a provision of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. In regard to Section 203 
the ACLU was most concerned with how and what information is shared. The ACLU 
warned “little is known about the breadth of use or the distribution of our personal 
information” (Reauthorization of the Patriot Act, 2011). Concerning Section 206 the 
ACLU argued “that roving wiretaps should have the same Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirements as Title III criminal wiretaps” (Permanent provisions of the PATRIOT Act, 
2011). The data analysis identified Fourth Amendment concerns as a primary ACLU 
theme that transcended each coding category. Since its enactment Section 215 has been 
one of the most controversial aspects of the USA PATRIOT Act. The ACLU alleged it 
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“has uncovered serious and unconstitutional chilling effects of section 215 on the 
exercise of basic freedoms” (USA PATRIOT Act: Hearings before the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 2005). Finally with Section 218 the ACLU 
explained “This seemingly minor change allows the government to use FISA to 
circumvent the basic protections of the Fourth Amendment, even where criminal 
prosecution is the government’s primary purpose for conducting the search or 
surveillance” (Reauthorization of the Patriot Act, 2011). These ACLU quotes provide an 
insight into the controversies of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Summary 
The data analysis answered the research questions to a point of saturation 
acceptable for this case study. The logic model technique based, upon the reliable 
findings of the PET, yielded the results expected in the predictive pattern. The PET 
bounded rationality suggested that incremental changes to Title II would be insufficient 
to achieve the surveillance and information sharing goals while mitigating Fourth 
Amendment concerns due to ideological polarization preventing effective political action. 
The data analysis provided evidence that this prediction was accurate. The incremental 
Title II changes have been insufficient to achieve the surveillance and information 
sharing goals while mitigating Fourth Amendment concerns because ideological 
polarization prevents effective political action, as the logic model suggested. 
The DOJ and ACLU viewpoints were representative of the leading voices for and 
against Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act. Throughout the data collection and analysis 
neither party ever significantly changed their opinions. Ultimately this amounted to more 
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than  10 years of consistent debate. Even when important developments occurred, such as 
the Snowden releases, both organizations remained steadfast on their arguments. The data 
lends evidence to the probability that Title II will remain controversial until a significant 
outside event spurs political motivation either for or against the act. This probability is 
expected under the PET of public policy change.  
The study does not conclude with mere mention of the consistency of the ACLU 
and DOJ arguments. Nor does it end with the effectiveness of PET in the logic model. It 
is still necessary to report the interpretations of the findings and limitations of the study. 
This case study also has recommendations and implications based upon insight acquired 
through the course of the study. These items will all be addressed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
This chapter is designed to further explain the findings of the study, limitations of 
the study, recommendations for further studies, and potential implications of this study. 
The primary finding of the study was that provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are in a 
prolonged state of imperfection brought about by consistent ideological polarization as 
demonstrated by the leading voices of support and opposition to the law. This study 
substantiated the consistency of the PET of public policy change with national security 
policies, but its transferability is limited to national security policy. A key 
recommendation for further study is to examine USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 under a 
similar PET of public policy change theoretical framework. This could shed additional 
light on ideological polarization and add validation to the framework. Because the data 
and analysis presented in these 5 chapters is part of a dissertation, the potential 
implication of the study is somewhat limited, but it does contribute to the base of 
academic knowledge. Everything mentioned in this paragraph is further explained in the 
chapter. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this case study was to examine the advantages and contentions of 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act to better understand how PET described bounded 
rationality prevented incremental policy change from achieving the objectives of the 
provisions while mitigating the potential for or perception of the circumvention of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
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Key Findings 
The key findings from this case study are as follows: 
• Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act has been and continues to be in the 
PET’s stage of imperfect stagnation prolonged by ideological polarization 
contributing to bounded rationality.  
• There was no credible evidence of potential incremental changes that 
could satisfy the surveillance and information sharing goals of Title II 
while mitigating Fourth Amendment concerns. 
• The ACLU and DOJ viewpoints are unwaveringly polar opposites. This 
study did not find any indication of the organizations being willing to 
compromise on Title II provisions. 
• The primary ACLU concern found in this study was a concern that Title II 
authorizations might have the potential for circumventing the Fourth 
Amendment. 
• The DOJ aggressively disputed the ACLU constitutionality claims, relying 
heavily upon the Third Party Doctrine and legal precedence. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The literature review illustrated that most major U.S. national security policies 
followed a life cycle that fit the PET of public policy change. This case study 
demonstrated that Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is currently in the stagnant stage of 
punctuated equilibrium. During this stage, incremental change has only a limited effect 
on the policy. The findings showed years of ideologically polarized debate with no 
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acceptance of opposing views by either side of the argument. Polarizing disagreement is a 
key component to the sluggish period of change described in PET and has been a factor 
in preventing substantial incremental change. During the course of the data collection and 
analysis there was almost a significant incremental change with Section 215 being 
allowed to expire, but within 24 hours the provision was reinstated. The voices for and 
against Title II provisions effectively cancel each other out. The arguments on both sides 
are convincing enough to have created a political and ideological rift that prevents 
legislators from having the political capital or motivation to allow effective change.  
During the literature review it became apparent that the DOJ and ACLU are the 
most vocal supporting and opposing voices respectfully. Specifically the literature review 
revealed that much of the controversy surrounding Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act 
centered on Fourth Amendment concerns. Using PET as the theoretical framework for a 
logic model data analysis technique, the primary prediction that developed was that the 
ACLU and DOJ would consistently differ on Fourth Amendment concerns. The data 
analysis discovered that this prediction held true throughout thousands of pages of debate 
in the span of more than 1 decade. The DOJ solidly defended the constitutionality of Title 
II. The ACLU repeatedly questioned the constitutionality of Title II. As explained in 
Chapter 4, there is little evidence of either organization recognizing the legitimacy of the 
other’s arguments.  
Limitations of the Study 
The transferability of this case study was restricted by the case boundaries. This 
study verified the consistency of the PET of public policy change with national security 
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policies only. Applying the findings to other facets of public policy would require 
additional scrutiny of the theory as it is feasible that the theoretical framework would not 
be as reliable with other public policies. The validity of the theory would need to be 
tested against specific types of public policy. For example a study of national healthcare 
policies could use this case study as a general testament to the consistency of PET, but 
could not be used in place of assessing the theory against national healthcare policy life 
cycles. 
 Similarly the data collection and data analysis were strictly limited to Title II of 
the USA PATRIOT Act. This particular logic model based upon PET was adequate and 
accurate for this case study, but it’s unproven outside Title II. It is possible if the logic 
model technique was applied to a similar law or even other titles of the USA PATRIOT 
Act it might not yield the same results. Thus the results must be limited to Title II of the 
USA PATRIOT Act. A study of a similar law could help confirm the transferability of 
this case study. 
Recommendations 
A potential follow on study that could help validate both the theoretical 
framework and the logic model technique could be a study of the USA FREEDOM Act 
of 2015. The USA FREEDOM Act is similar to the USA PATRIOT Act in function. In 
addition, the law is starting to develop some controversy as it reinstated Section 215 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act. Presumably the DOJ would support the law and the ACLU 
would generally oppose provisions of the act. If this outcome held true with a study of the 
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USA FREEDOM Act it would help validate the logic model technique and theoretical 
framework set forth in this study. 
Implications 
The social change implication this case study hoped to achieve was to identify 
areas of potential compromise in the current, often contentious, debate regarding the 
balance between national security surveillance and civil liberties. This study did not 
identify any indication of potential compromise. The debate is simply too polarizing. As 
repeatedly expressed neither side of the argument ever made any significant willingness 
to negotiation. This dissertation will not affect the ongoing legal, political, and 
ideological clashes between the ACLU and the DOJ, but it does add to the base of 
knowledge about the processes that are keeping the organizations locked in debate about 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act.  
Scholars and legislators alike, could benefit from understanding the processes 
explained in the PET of public policy change, as they relate to Title II controversies. The 
implication that this dissertation achieved was to identify that both the ACLU and DOJ 
made valid points and that it is essential to consider opposing views in legislation. In 
issues of public policy and administration it is imperative to make decisions based upon 
facts not ideology. Administrations are inhibited by the policy life cycle illustrated in 
PET. As a result, national security policies often undergo a period of controversial 
stagnation and understanding the reasons why could reduce tensions with imperfect 
policies. 
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Throughout American history bitter political, legal, and ideological stalemates 
have prevented meaningful security policy changes. This is primarily is due to the 
polarizing nature of national security arguments and the both the incremental changes and 
the punctuated modifications are constrained by bounded rationality. The policies are 
seldom if ever going to be acceptable to both sides of the debate until incremental policy 
alterations eventually quell the contentions. The implication is that both sides should 
attempt to work past their ideological and political differences and instead focus on the 
valid aspects of their opponent’s argument. It is unlikely that any controversial provision 
that remains in contempt is without fault or benefit, for it were it would be amended, 
reaffirmed, or canceled without issue. 
The prime example of this is with Section 215. Security agencies need to be able 
to access records related to international terrorists, but equally as important is innocent 
U.S. citizens should not have to have their records seized. Both sides made a valid 
argument in their respective regards. Eventually the Section 215 metadata program made 
it through its stagnation period and was transformed into an acceptable option under the 
USA FREEDOM Act. While this act did not mitigate the broader concerns about Section 
215 it did meet the metadata collection and the civil liberty goals of both the DOJ and 
ACLU. The take away from this event for policy makers should be that examining both 
sides of an issue can lead to an acceptable arrangement without compromising principles.  
Conclusion 
Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act is in a state of imperfect and often contentious 
stagnation. The title has both clearly identifiable national security benefits and civil 
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liberty problems. The PET of public policy change can be used to explain that the law is 
currently held in this state due to bounded rationality. The bounded rationality has been 
created by polarizing opinions about the title making it difficult for either side of the 
debate being able to garner enough political capital to overcome the resistance being 
generated by the other side. Currently there are no meaningful indications that Title II 
will be amended to reduce contentions in the near future unless in response to an outside 
force.  
This case study came to this conclusion by examining more than a decade’s worth 
of public debate between the leading voice of support for the law and its leading voice of 
opposition. The DOJ has been the leading voice of support for the USA PATRIOT Act 
and the ACLU has been the leading voice of opposition to the law. Both organizations 
have presented effective well-articulated arguments expressing their concerns and praises 
of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act in the halls of congress, all levels of the courts, and 
equally as important in the halls of public opinion. This dissertation contended that both 
organizations have valid points, but data collection and analysis revealed that neither side 
is likely to accept the other’s views as such. In conclusion ideological polarization will 
keep Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act in imperfect stagnation due to the bounded 
rationality explained in conjunction with the PET of public policy change.  
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Appendix A: IRB Ethics Planning Worksheet 
The following is the IRB Ethics Planning Worksheet. The results of this 
worksheet suggest this case study will have a low level of ethical risk. Originally this 
case study had considered using interviews with members of the ACLU and DOJ. I 
received IRB approval to do so, but there was resistance from the organizations to 
contribute to this study. Instead all data were collected from publically available sources, 
which greatly reduced any ethical considerations with the study.  
The first 13 questions apply to all studies (even when the researcher is not 
interacting with participants to collect new data).  
 Answer each 
question 
below with 
yes, no, or 
N/A. 
1. Has each data collection step been articulated in the method 
section of the proposal? 
yes 
 
2. Will the research procedures ensure privacy during data collection? yes 
3. Will data be stored securely? yes 
4. Will the data be stored for at least 5 years? yes 
5. If participants’ names or contact info will be recorded in the 
research records, are they absolutely necessary?  
yes 
6. Do the research procedures and analysis/write up plans include all 
possible measures to ensure that participant identities are not directly 
or indirectly disclosed?  
yes 
7. Have confidentiality agreements been signed by anyone who may 
view data that that contains identifiers? (e.g., transcriber, translator) 
yes 
8. Has the researcher articulated a specific plan for sharing results 
with the participants and community stakeholders?  
yes 
9. Have all potential psychological, relationship, legal, 
economic/professional, physical, and other risks been fully 
acknowledged and described? (If IRB staff judges the magnitude or 
probability of risks to be greater than minimal, then the researcher 
will be asked to submit the long form ethics application in addition to 
this self-check.) 
yes 
10. Have the above risks been minimized as much as possible? Are yes 
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measures in place to provide participants with reasonable protection 
from loss of privacy, distress, psychological harm, economic loss, 
damage to professional reputation, and physical harm? 
11. Has the researcher proactively managed any potential conflicts of 
interest? 
yes 
12. Are the research risks and burdens reasonable, in consideration of 
the new knowledge that this research design can offer? yes 
13. Is the research site willing to provide a Letter of Cooperation 
granting permission for all relevant data access, access to 
participants, facility use, and/or use of personnel time for research 
purposes? (Note that some research sites will only release data if a 
more formal Data Use Agreement is in place, often in addition to a 
Letter of Cooperation.) 
yes 
The remaining questions only apply to studies that involve recruiting 
participants to collect new data.  
14. Is participant recruitment coordinated in a manner that is non-
coercive? Coercive elements include: recruiting in a group setting, 
extravagant compensation, recruiting individuals in a context of their 
treatment or evaluation, etc. A researcher must disclose here 
whether/how the researcher may already be known to the participants 
and explain how perceptions of coerced research participation will be 
minimized. 
yes 
15. If vulnerable individuals will be specifically sought out as 
participants, is such targeted recruitment justified by a research 
design that will specifically benefit that vulnerable group at large? To 
specifically recruit vulnerable individuals as participants, the 
researcher will need to submit a long form ethics application in 
addition to this self-check. 
N/A 
16. If vulnerable adults might happen to be included (without the 
researcher’s knowledge), would their inclusion be justified? 
N/A 
17. If anyone would be excluded from participating, is their exclusion 
justified? Is their exclusion handled respectfully and without stigma? 
yes 
18. If the research procedures might reveal criminal activity or 
child/elder abuse that necessitates reporting, are there suitable 
procedures in place for managing this?  
N/A 
19. If the research procedures might reveal or create an acute 
psychological state that necessitates referral, are there suitable 
procedures in place to manage this?  
N/A 
20. Does the research design ensure that all participants can 
potentially benefit equally from the research? 
N/A 
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21. Applicable for student researchers: Will this researcher be 
appropriately qualified and supervised in all data collection 
procedures? 
yes 
22. If an existing survey or other data collection tool will be used, has 
the researcher appropriately complied with the requirements for legal 
usage?  
N/A 
Questions 23-40 pertain to the process of ensuring that potential participants 
make an informed decision about the study, in accordance with the ethical 
principle of “respect for persons.” 
23. Do the informed consent procedures provide adequate time to 
review the study information and ask questions before giving 
consent? 
yes 
24. Will informed consent be appropriately documented?  yes 
25. Is the consent form written using language that will be 
understandable to the potential participants?  yes 
26. Does the consent form explain the sample’s inclusion criteria in 
such a way that the participants can understand how/why THEY are 
being asked to participate?  
yes 
27. Does the consent form include an understandable explanation of 
the research purpose? 
yes 
28. Does the consent form include an understandable description of 
the data collection procedures? 
yes 
29. Does the consent form include an estimate of the time 
commitment for participation? 
yes 
30. Does the consent form clearly state that participation is 
voluntary?  
yes 
31. Does the consent form convey that the participant has the right to 
decline or discontinue participation at any time? When the researcher 
is already known to the participant, the consent form must include 
written assurance that declining or discontinuing will not negatively 
impact the participant’s relationship with the researcher or (if 
applicable) the participant’s access to services. 
yes 
32. Does the consent form include a description of reasonably 
foreseeable risks or discomforts? 
yes 
33. Does the consent form include a description of anticipated 
benefits to participants and/or others? 
yes 
34. Does the consent form describe any thank you gift(s), 
compensation, or reimbursement (for travel costs, etc.) or lack 
thereof?  
yes 
35. Does the consent form describe how privacy will be maintained?  yes 
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36. Does the consent form disclose all potential conflicts of interest? 
yes 
37. Does the consent document preserve the participant’s legal 
rights?  
yes 
38. Does the consent form explain how the participant can contact the 
researcher and the university’s Research Participant Advocate? (USA 
number 001-612-312-1210 or email address irb@waldenu.edu). 
yes 
39. Does the consent form include a statement that the participant 
should keep/print a copy of the consent form? 
yes 
40. If any aspect of the study is experimental (unproven), is that 
stated in the consent form? 
N/A 
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